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PART I
CHAPTER 1
For nearly all people the most important, interesting,
and consequential beings in the universe are people. But for
philosophers other realms of Being often take precedence, at
least in what they write. Regrettably, it seems to me, since
whatever is claimed to be the ultimate ontological entity or
epistemological principle, there must be room for people, for
what is qualitatively and quantitatively predicable of persons.
Part I of this thesis is concerned with arguing for the
necessity of some conditions of the self. Part II presents
certain philosophers* theories of the self and appraises them
in terms of the conditions claimed to be necessary in Part I.
This thesis is not directed to solipsists. It will not
try to show that there is more than one person, oneself, in
the world. Rather it takes as fact - more certain than which
there is not - the "going concern* of persons. What it attempts
to do is rationalize (in the sense of making consistent the con¬
cepts used) what we believe to be true of persons or selves.
(I shall use "self" and "person" interchangeably, and "selves",
"persons", and "people" interchangeably. Neither "person" nor
"self" is to be taken as equivalent to "soul".)
I take then as given certain facts about persons and try
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to see what are some of the necessary conditions of being a
person. To help in the analysis of what persons must mini¬
mally be I shall sometimes refer to laws or legal writings.
I shall also make use of a few works of fiction. These works
may be either folk stories or works composed by a well-known
author. The fact that I will be citing in these cases is
that such-and-such a story is widely understood, and there¬
fore though what is presented to us in the story is not fact,
still it must be consistent with and perhaps reveal what is
believed to be necessary to persons because it is widely un¬
derstood.
Before turning to the analysis I should like to do some
groundwork, making clear my position regarding certain points
where fundamental objections might be brought.
First. It would be well to make it clear that what is
asserted as necessary to persons in this thesis is based on
people as we now have them. There is in this context no point
to the question: are persons as we know them really persons?
Persons as we know them are paradigms of persons although
there may very well be a point in asking whether a particular
individual is a person. To ask whether persons as we know
them are really persons implies that we might have a defini¬
tion or criterion of personness from some other source be¬
sides our actual experience of persons. Persons different in
certain respects from the people we know are conceivable,
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and considering such possibilities may illuminate what we
think being a person involves but imagined persons will not
be more real or more authentic than ones we know, and our
knowledge of what is involved in being a person will be under¬
stood to be based on our common experiences of persons. So
if the facts about persons were to change in some radical way,
then the characteristics of persons I shall assert to be ne¬
cessary now might not then be necessary. New facts could re¬
quire other conditions for selfhood. But so long as the facts
cited are the facts, the conditions of the self which I shall
present are, I assert, necessary.
Second. Perhaps it might be argued that facts concern¬
ing people have been different in former times so that theo¬
ries of the self written to make those facts intelligible can¬
not fairly be expected to likewise satisfactorily rationalize
present-day facts. I would reply: if the facts were different,
then either the differences can be specified or they cannot.
I am not aware of any reports which describe how in significant
ways persons were different then from now, or there from here.
But if such specified differences were presented, we could al¬
ways adjust the analysis and the criticism of the philosophi¬
cal theories to accomodate the now-known-to-be-different facts.
If on the other hand, the ways in which persons were different
were not specified because supposedly the differences could not
be exactly known, then whatever those people left us must be
unintelligible to us, because anything could have some other
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meaning from what it has for us. Concerning persons in the
past then, we may say either that they were enough like us
(admittedly different in ways negligible for our purposes)
that philosophical theories of the self would apply to them
as to us, or that the differences between them and us can be
specified in which case the analysis designed to cover those
facts can be adjusted, or that there are fundamental but un-
specifiable differences so that nothing valid can be said
about them as people. The first alternative is the one under
which I shall proceed (leaving open the possibility of the
second) so that the statement of my position on this point is:
so long as tjjat facts cited are the facts, and are believed to
have been the facts, the conditions to be given for being a
person are necessary. In other words, the conditions hold
wherever and whenever the facts are as cited.
A further objection may be brought. A critic could say:
theories of the self are a new vogue in philosophy so you
have no right to criticize older philosophies for not doing
what they were never intended to do. My reply would take the
following form. It was always a person among persons writing
philosophy and therefore there were the facts about persons
to be made intelligible. So even if a philosophical theory
was not called a theory of the self, it was doing the same
job, i.e., rationalizing the phenomena of selves (perhaps
among other phenomena), and could have been called a theory
of the self.
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Now to proceed to the analysis.
Perhaps it will be thought that there is a carelessness
or philosophical naivete in my writing of characteristics as
necessary to persons instead of saying that so long as the
facts are what they are, we must think about persons as having
these characteristics. The distinction being drawn is between
what we think a thing is and what that thing is in itself,
briefly, between phenomenalism and epistemological realism.
In the case of persons there is no difference between what is
known or knowable and what really is, or more cautiously, the
argument for there being a difference between what an object
is and what we know about it does not apply in the case of
persons. As I understand the phenomenalist position it is
based on two premisses pertinent to the matter at hand:
1) that the objects we know have or may have existed before
being known by people, i.e., that we have not created the ob¬
jects, and 2) that what we know about these objects is limited
by our faculties. If the objects have existed before being
known, then they have had characteristics before we have known
any of these characteristics. This would apply also to arti¬
cles manufactured by and for us, for even though these objects
have not had such a sophisticated form in theirnatural state,
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still they have had some form, and even the manufactured items
depend upon their material. The object in its natural state
is an object with some characteristics. A manufactured object
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with different characteristics does not become more than an
object. And, going to the second point, how this object is
known depends on our faculties for sensing it, which faculties
may or may not - we cannot know - be suited to sensing what is
most characteristic in the object. Our knowledge of these ob¬
jects and therefore what these objects are for us would be
different if we had e.g. no vision or x-ray vision. The pur¬
pose of my outlining the phenomenalist's position is not to
make us doubt whether what we know about an object is contri¬
buted by us, but rather to emphasize that it is conceivable
and intelligible to us that objects in themselves are really
something more and/or different from what we know about them.
The case is otherwise with persons. For the two above-
stated points which give us some reason to believe that ob¬
jects may be different from what we know about them do not
apply to persons. First, persons do not exist prior to being
known by persons. Certain animals, members of the species
Homo sapiens, (as it happens) become persons only in relation
to persons. Without socialization infants would not become
persons. This is an assertion of what might be called ne¬
cessary fact, not an assertion of logical necessity, though
it is problematical whether we can understand the statement
that a person could occur spontaneously, like Athena full¬
blown from the head of Zeus (which becomes unintelligible
when we try to understand how she could understand other per-
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sons), or through some means other than development by another
person or persons. My evidence for this factual but not mere¬
ly contingent statement is of two kinds: the ordinary experi¬
ence of people who have never (I warrant) known or even met a
person who has not been reared and associated with persons,
and the statements of social scientists who inquire more sys¬
tematically into social phenomena.
... it has become increasingly clear that social inter¬
action is absolutely essential to the development of
personality. We are not at the outset isolated indivi¬
duals with drives, habits, attitudes, and ideas, who are
later socialized. Rather, from birth on, the individual
operates within a social matrix. (Kimball Young.
Handbook of Social Psychology. London, Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1946.)
The ... thesis is that apart from his group a man is a
mere potentiality. He is developed in a milieu that
fosters, modifies his capacities. (A. Myerson. Social
Psychology, 1934.)
The body is not a self, as such; it becomes a self only
when it has developed a mind within the context of
social experience. (George H. Mead. Mind, Self, &
Society from the Standpoint of a. Social Behaviorist.
Chicago, 111. The University of Chicago Press, 1934,
p. 50.)
The social scientists hold as incontrovertible the proposi¬
tion that animals (of the appropriate species) become persons
only in relation to persons. This point is of such central
and radical importance that I hope that I may be excused for
insisting perhaps beyond necessity concerning what is self-
evident or at least unarguable for some.
Statements like those of the social scientists' above
could be multiplied; the increase in the number of such con-
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sidered opinions of competent people might still not persuade
some. To him who believes that a person is not actualized
only in relation to other persons the following challenge is
directed: if you doubt that infants become persons only in
relation to other persons, let your child be raised in isola¬
tion, without contact with people, cared for by mechanical
means.
It takes little imagination to picture what the re¬
sponse would be.
If animals of the appropriate species become persons only
in relation to persons, then what they become is adapted to
the persons for whom they become persons. One obvious example:
children come to speak the language of those around them. So
that, and this is the second way in which persons differ from
objects which may be something more or different from what our
faculties can sense, selfhood is acquired in relation to other
selves and what is learned is suited to the faculties of per¬
sons so there is not the lag between the being and the known-
ness of a person as there can be in the case of an object.
The first very general assertion concerning persons then
which I wish to make relates to their ontogeny: they come to
be in relation to and for other persons, so whatever they are,
they are products of persons and knowable - in their real na¬
ture - by people. People are made, not born.
The suppressed major premiss of this argument: that
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whatever is made by us can be understood in its essential na¬
ture by us, might be questioned. Counter instances might be
brought forth: man has made the atomic bomb, but he doesn't
understand it. Now I believe that this proposition is slight¬
ly but significantly incorrect, Man has made the atomic bomb,
but he doesn't understand (fully) the nature of the atom.
Granted that he doesn't understand the atom, but clearly this
is no counter instance to the above principle because he has
not made the atom. We understand the bomb in a way better than
we understand its constituent atoms. To whatever extent we do
not understand the raw materials, objects, from which manu¬
factured objects are made, to this same extent we shall not
understand the finished object. (What we add, we understand.)
For it is still an object. We have not changed its fundamental
category.
An examination of differences ordinarily believed to hold
between the widest classes of things may clarify what has just
been written and may advance the matter at hand.
In our normal practice we distinguish between four classes
of particulars: 1) objects, 2) plants, 3) animals, and 4) per¬
sons. One question this thesis may be understood as trying to
answer is how we distinguish between persons and other kinds of
particulars, ie., if anything is to be labelled or treated as a
person, what must it minimally be?
Objects are those things which are locatable in space,
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extended, perceptible. Plants are locatable in space, ex¬
tended, perceptible, and alive. Zoologists distinguish live
from non-live things by the characteristics of irritability
(responsiveness to environment) and growth by metabolic change.
(This kind of growth is distinguished from growth by accretion,
the way in which e.g. crystals grow.) On the level of one-
celled organisms it is a less than obvious matter distinguish¬
ing between plants and animals. But most of us deal with or¬
ganisms rather larger than unicellular organisms and have no
difficulty separating the plants from the animals. For in
addition to being locatable in space, extended, perceptible,
alive, animals are (mostly) animated, that is, able to move
themselves in space.
These three classes are comparatively easy to demarcate
and recognize. There is between the classes an observable dif¬
ference, between objects and plants - liveness - evidenced by
irritability and growth by metabolic change, between plants
and animals - self-locomotion. With each step up in the
hierarchy there is something added: a plant is an object plus
life; an animal is a plant plus self-movement.
The plus which is thought to be added to animal to give
person is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a ne¬
cessary condition of being a person, and the necessity here
is logical necessity. What "self-consciousness" means, and
which facts require our attributing it only to persons will
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be treated below.
There have been many philosophers who claimed that man is
only spirit, non-body, that he would be his real, essential
self even if he were disembodied. I can conceive more easily
of a person's being disembodied than his being a person with¬
out benefit of association with others. Why a person cannot
be bodiless will be considered in order to pay due heed to
those who have claimed that a person can be bodiless. Here
as elsewhere my method of displaying the unacceptability of a
position will be to show what actual facts the position being
considered, in this case the inessentialness of animal body
to a person, would make impossible.
Actually there are two different, interesting claims
that could be made: 1) that persons need not be animals, mem¬
bers of the species Homo sapiens, 2) that persons need not be
extended in space, including being sensuously perceptible.
(That which is perceptible is either extended in space or de¬
pendent on what is extended in space. Visual and tactile ob¬
jects are clearly extended. What is tasted must have volume.
Smells and sounds are both, we believe, necessarily connected
with, because produced by, an extended object.)
The first assertion is true, I think; the second, false,
or so indeterminable as to be vacuous.
Showing why membership in the species Homo Sapiens is not
a necessary characteristic will give me an opportunity to dis¬
tinguish between a characteristic always obtaining in fact and
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a necessary characteristic. It might have been thought that
a characteristic present in all the persons that we have any
actual dealings with as persons is a universal characteristic
in fact, and therefore just what I intended by 'necessary
characteristic'. But it is something different from 'factu¬
ally always obtaining' which I mean by 'necessary' condition.
What I want to emphasize in this necessity is the requirement
of intelligibility. To say that a characteristic is a neces¬
sary condition of the self is to say that we cannot think of
a person doing what persons do without his having this charac¬
teristic, that it makes no sense to talk of a certain thing as
a person unless it has this characteristic, that we cannot
think of treating an x without this characteristic as a person.
A little reflection on the problem will reveal that mem¬
bership in the species Homo sapiens is patently not such a ne¬
cessary condition of the self because we can understand talk
about things - in all significant respects treated as persons -
that are not members of this species. Fairy tales abound in
which there are individuals who carry on as persons though
they are not members of the species Homo sapiens. Examples
are: "Little Red Riding Hood", "The Three Little Pigs", "Puss
in Boots", "The Three Bears", "The Little Gingerbread Boy".
These are fairy tales in which non-homonoid animals and even
objects act like persons, though so far as we are given infor¬
mation in the stories, the animals of these stories never had
human bodies. There are also fairy tales and myths in which
persons are turned into animals, flowers, stars, trees.
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We have no trouble understanding stories in which things
which we should not in real life treat as persons play the
roles of persons. That we can understand these admittedly
fanciful stories in which non-homonoid things are treated as
persons indicates that the content of our concept 'person'
does not require that a person be a member of the species Homo
sapiens. Even children understand these stories of non-homo-
noid things which behave like persons. It may be easier for
a child to understand that things (objects, plants, animals)
are persons than that some things are not persons. Animism
may be a more "natural" attitude than objectivism (if one may
use that word to mean non-animism). If certain facts are true
about the child to himself, why shouldn't he think that these
facts are true of what he sees around him? If he feels stub¬
born and unco-operative when his mother wants him to wash his
hands, why shouldn't he think that his shoes feel stubborn and
unco-operative when he wants to take them off? Perhaps the
child is aware that he can and does make an object of himself -
his mother is always reminding him to be careful, to pay atten¬
tion to what he is doing - that it would not be strange to him
as a child if an object could likewise "see" what it is doing
and mean to do what it does.
Stories of persons in non-human forms are not limited to
fairy tales and myths which may be thought to be unsophisti¬
cated literary forms. A story intended for adults, I feel
sure, of a person no longer in human form which is interesting
18
for our purposes if it is agreed that fiction can give us in¬
sight into our concepts is Franz Kafka's "Metamorphosis". The
story begins:
As Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from uneasy dreams
he found himself transformed in his bed into a gigantic
insect. He was lying on his hard, as it were armour-
plated, back and when he lifted his head a little he
could see his dome-like brown belly divided into stiff
arched segments on top of which the bed-quilt could
hardly keep in position and was about to slide off com¬
pletely. His numerous legs, which were pitifully thin
compared to the rest of his bulk, waved helpldssly be¬
fore his eyes.
What has happened to me? he thought. It was no
dream. (Franz Kafka. Metamorphosis and other
stories. Translated by Willa and Edwin Muir. Penguin
Books. P. 9.)
It may be just the matter-of-factness of the style which
allows us to go along with the story. It is an unusual happen¬
ing, to say the least, but the reader does not balk at what
Kafka tells about Gregor.
His family and immediate superior at work (who has come
to find out why Gregor is late to work) are wanting an expla¬
nation of why he is not out of his room. He speaks.
Gregor has a shock as he heard his own voice answering
hers, unmistakeably his own voice, it was true, but with
a persistent horrible twittering squeak behind it like
an undertone, that left the words in their clear shape
only for the first moment and then rose up reverberating
round them to destroy their sense, so that one could not
be sure one had heard them rightly. (Ibid. P. 11.)
They cannot understand what he says, and the chief clerk ob¬
serves , "That was no human voice". When Gregor appears, they
are all horrified. The clerk backs away "as if driven by some
invisible steady pressure", and will not wait to hear Gregor's
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explanations. Nor does anyone understand Gregor's good in¬
tentions ; his father only tries to drive Gregor into his room
instead of helping to mollify the chief clerk.
No entreaty of Gregor's availed, indeed no entreaty was
even understood, however humbly he bent his head his
father only stamped on the floor the more loudly.
(Ibid. P. 21.)
His parents and sister cannot understand his speech or
his gestures. They know about him only what one can know about
an animal, e.g., what food it prefers by observing what it eats
and what it leaves. Such knowledge depends upon behavior only
and not upon the use of intentional symbols - gestures, either
vocal or non-vocal. In the case of Gregor there is no express¬
ing his thought because they cannot understand his speech or
bodily gestures. They see him as being only the present animal
there before (hem, as being only in the present, not as remember¬
ing his past nor as having attitudes toward the future. They
cannot know that he remembers his former condition, fed.s "great
pride in the fact that he had been able to provide such a life
for his parents and sister in such a fine flat," and goes on to
think, "But what if all the quiet, the comfort, the contentment
were to end in horror?" This thought is not to be endured.
"To keep himself from being lost in such thoughts Gregor took
refuge in movement and crawled up and down the room." (Ibid.
P. 27.)
After a time he is no longer a member of the family but
"a creature". The family consults concerning what is to be
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done.
'If he could understand us,' said the father, half
questioningly; Grete, still sobbing, vehemently waved a
hand to show how unthinkable that was.
'If he could understand us,* repeated the old man,
shutting his eyes to consider his daughter's conviction
that understanding was impossible, ' then perhaps we might
come to some agreement with him. But as it is -'
'He must go,' cried Gregor's sister, 'that's the only
solution, Father. You must just try to get rid of the
idea that this is Gregor. The fact that we've believed it
for so long is the root of all our trouble. But how can
it be Gregor? If this were Gregor, he would have realized
long ago that human beings can't live with such a creature,
and he'd have gone away of his own accord. Then we
wouldn't have any brother, but we'd be able to go on living
and keep his memory in honour. As it is, this creature
persecutes us, drives away our lodgers, obviously wants the
whole apartment to himself, and would have us all sleep in
the gutter.' (Ibid. P. 56-7.)
This is far from Gregor's intention but what can he do?
Shortly the problem is resolved. Gregor, who has been much
weakened by an inability to eat,
thought of his family with tenderness and love. The de¬
cision that he must disappear was one that he held to
even more strongly that his sister - if that were possi¬
ble. In this state of vacant and peaceful meditation he
remained until the tower clock struck three in the morn¬
ing. The first broadening of light in the world outside
the window entered his consciousness once more. Then his
head sank to the floor of its own accord and from his
nostrils came the last faint flicker of breath. (Ibid.
P. 58.)
To himself Gregor remained a person who remembered his
former experiences and compared them to his present state.
But for his family he lost personality, not because he has been
transformed into an insect since for the reader too his physi¬
cal form is that of an insect but still a person because we
know what he is thinking. If for the reader he were not a
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person, there would be no pathos; who finds a mere insect pa¬
thetic? Gregor lost personality for his family because com¬
munication stopped. They did not know that he thought, felt,
remembered his past and realized what the present situation
meant to them. They did not try to communicate with him be¬
lieving that he could no longer understand them. The reader
knows Gregor's states of consciousness because we have access
to them through the omniscient author. Having lost the ability
to communicate he is for them only a creature, but for himself
as for us he is still a person because his past and present
experience belong to the same subject who is self-conscious.
Gregor's having self-consciousness and therefore being a person
to himself and being unable to communicate and therefore lack¬
ing personality for those around him point up relationships
between self-consciousness, communication, and selfhood. To
be a person(for oneself) one must be self-conscious; to be a
person for others one must communicate. Our understanding
Gregor's being a person for himself and our viewing him as a
person though he is no longer a member of the species Homo
sapiens makes it quite clear that membership in the species
Homo sapiens is not a necessary condition of the self in the
sense given above. (P. 16)
The first of the two possible claims given above (p. 15)
has been settled, it seems to me. The "Metamorphosis" shows
that a person need not be a member of the species Homo sapiens
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because we find intelligible a story in which a person is not
homonoid.
Next we shall consider the second possibility: whether a
person must have a body of some sort or other.
Suppose we imagine a bodiless, unextended person, i.e.,
an intangible, invisible, inaudible self-consciousness. Two
problems occur to me. First, how did this person become a
person? The people we know were born, in extended form, and
through these extended forms their consciousnesses were 'gotten
at', and developed until the person was self-conscious. But
how is the unextended person to be 'gotten at' or 'gotten to'?
How does one get across to a disembodied person? It is logical¬
ly possible that a spirit would come into being and from the
time of its incursion into spirit society would develop, inclu¬
ding self-consciousness. The newly-arrived spirit might have
only a flow of experience without being able to categorize or
reflect upon that experience, which abilities are learned. But
what this uncategorized experience would consist of I cannot
even conjecture; the possibilities which have occurred to me,
e.g., sensory experience or pure formulas such as '2+2=4',
seem unlikely unpon reflection. Sensory experience hardly
seems possible if one has no senses, and a bodiless spirit
would certainly have no sense organs as we know them. Formu¬
las are hardly possible without categories, and cannot be mere
unknowing recitation, of the sort which is not uncommon to
children who repeat television advertisements, say, like par-
23
rots without knowing what they are saying. Parrots and chil¬
dren can hear. How is a spirit to hear? That which seems
logically possible at first glance: that a pure spirit could
arrive on the scene and develop into a self-conscious spirit
does not with thought turn out to be logically impossible.
There is rather simply a blank when one tries to conceive of
the details. What could we imagine the content of this young
consciousness to be? And how is one to communicate to a pure
spirit?
The second question immediately suggests itself: how does one
get any communications from a pure spirit? Let us allow that
somehow a spirit might have experiences and ideas. The ques¬
tion then is: how do we learn what these experiences and ideas
are? If we cannot learn about them, then they are for us as
good as non-existent.
There is one means of bilateral communication possible to
spirits, that is, telepathy. Telepathy is communication i-s
communication between one mind and another mind otherwise than
through the known channels of the senses. There are problems
with telepathy as a kind of communication, not the least of
which is how one knows from whom the communication comes. Sup¬
pose one spirit, Angelica, gets an idea (in her mind). How is
she (does gender apply to spirits?) to know that this idea is
from another spirit, Damon. She experiences it. Is her ex¬
perience of it different from her experiences of her own ideas?
Does it come to her with "Damon's" stamped on it? Would all
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ideas for spirits be monogrammed? With ordinary embodied
people when telepathy is claimed to have taken place, one can
check by asking aloud (or writing): "I thought you were think¬
ing such and such. Were you really?" And confirmation or dis-
confirmation is directly available. But what can a pure spirit
do? There is no further distinct way of corroborating the im¬
pression that the idea is another spirit's, such as, asking
aloud. There are only more of one's own impressions.
This may be why people do not rely on telepathy: because
in itself it isn't self-guaranteeing. Were telepathy, guaran¬
teed or even testable, really possible, bodiless persons might
be possible. But I find the actual possibility remote.
I conclude regarding the two questions relating to animal
species and extendedness that a person need not be a member of
the species Homo sapiens (which will allow us to greet Martians
civilly) but that persons must be extended and sensuously per¬
ceptible if we are to communicate with them until such time as
some other means of communication is actually possible, e.g.,
telepathy.
Now what is meant by self-consciousness will be made more
explicit.
'Self-consciousness' in the philosophical sense differs
from 'self-consciousness' in the ordinary sense. When people
ordinarily speak of self-consciousness, they are thinking of
an embarrassed awareness of oneself. A self-conscious person -
in this ordinary sense - is someone painfully aware of what
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(s)he is doing, saying, and/or how (s)he looks. The philoso¬
phical meaning of self-consciousness includes the awareness of
oneself, but not, necessarily, the embarrassment.
One difference then is the subtraction of embarrassment
from ordinary self-consciousness to leave philosophical self-
consciousness. One kind of object is however to be explicitly
included in philosophical self-consciousness; this object is
one's own thoughts (in the broad, Cartesian sense of 'experi¬
ences '). Although one would or could be attentive to more
than just private experiences when self-conscious in the philo¬
sophical sense (which is henceforth the sense I shall intend by
"self-conscious" unless otherwise noted), the addition of pri¬
vate experiences as object is philosophically crucial.
By self-consciousness in a philosophical sense I mean
then one's looking at that of oneself which others look at and
one's looking at that of oneself which others do not and - we
mostly believe - cannot look at. In other words, self-conscious-
ness takes as object behavioral, extended aspects and private,
experiential aspects of the self. To say that what is experi¬
enced is private in its occurrence is not to say that what is
privately experienced cannot be shared. Whether an experience
can be lived through without being made an object of conscious¬
ness , and whether an experience can be made an object of con¬
sciousness without being put into public terms are two further
questions which would have to be examined before the question:
to what extent is the private, experiential aspect of the self
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shareable could be answered. Why what is privately experienced
can be shared at all is intelligible in terms of how an indivi¬
dual becomes a person: if the categories by means of which self-
consciousness comes to be and the means of expressing the con¬
tent of self-consciousness are gotten from the communication
with persons, that these expressions of self-consciousness are
understood by others is not surprising since these categories
and expressions are from the very beginning interpersonal and
not unique to individuals though the consciousness is experi¬
enced privately. If one denies that persons are actualized by
persons, the fact that a person could communicate private expe¬
riences to others who would be able to understand becomes a
mystery.)
What evidence can be offered for the assertion that self-
consciousness is necessary to differentiate persons from other
particulars? What phenomena can be understood better on the
presupposition that persons have this characteristic of self-
consciousness which no other objects have?
1. Though it is true that animals other than people learn
to do things, it is also true that animals other than man can¬
not correct themselves but must wait upon correction from the
environment. Sheep dogs learn to herd sheep by running with
an already-trained dog. Cats - big and domestic - can be
taught to do tricks. But when an animal makes a mistake,
punishment must be forthcoming from the environment to make
him cognizant of the error; the animal does not spontaneously,
of himself, "back up", and do it over in order to do it right.
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The child likely has to be taught to play the piano. For quite
some time he must be told that he has made a mistake. But the
day comes when he hears his own mistakes, and corrects them,
repeating the phrase to set it right. This shows that persons
are not only corrigible, as are other animals, but they are
able to correct themselves. This is explicable only if one
assumes that they are able to listen to themselves, to hear
what they have produced in comparison with what it should sound
like, i.e., to take themselves as objects.
2. The trained dog and cat make mistakes. If they are
regularly punished for making mistakes, they may show fear when
they are made aware of having made a mistake. A child is like¬
ly not punished corporally when he plays the wrong note, though
he may be reprimanded. Later when he hears himself make a mis¬
take, he does not cower, but evidences embarrassment. Embar¬
rassment is the sign of one's being aware that in some way one's
performance falls short of what it should be. Only people are
embarrassed because only people can be aware of their own inad¬
equacies and be ashamed of them.
3. A dog being trained to herd sheep may learn to herd,
but he cannot improve his performance by practicing on his own.
The actual situation must present itself for a dog to perform...
A pianist who wants to give a performance does not wait for the
actual audience to begin playing; the pianist rehearses in ad¬
vance, listening to himself as if he were the audience. Only
persons can practice doing a task in advance of its actually
being needed by circumstances, providing himself as object and
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critic. (One related fact is that for animals there is no
future. The means of acquiring awareness of a future is si¬
multaneously the means of being self-conscious.)
4. People learn from each other to an extent beyond which
any other animals learn from one another. (Songbirds may learn
songs and cats in psychologists' traps may learn how to release
the exit spring from one another but this is insignificant com¬
pared with the quantity of skills and abilities which persons
learn from one another.) Young children not yet self-conscious
imitate like songbirds do and this is the means by which they
learn their first words and gestures through which they develop
self-consciousness. Once self-consciousness is actualized the
learning methods are proliferated: one learns how to do some¬
thing not only by copying a procedure but also from a verbal
description of that act. This is possible because the teacher
can watch himself perform, and tell another what is done. The
learner understands the description to mean the aspects of the
act, and on the basis of the description knows what to do.
Both what the teacher does and what the learner does require
self-consciousness.
5. Wittgenstein asks in the Philosophical Investigations
why dogs don't lie. The answer is that they do not mean any¬
thing by their movements; there is no intention, no intended
message. To lie one must be self-conscious; one must know what
one's gestures mean to the one with whom one is communicating.
This is possible because one 'looks at' one's expressions, has
a more or less correct idea of what these expressions mean to
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the other. The lie consists in one's intending the other to
learn from one's expressions what one does not believe to be
the case. (One may unintentionally mislead another if the re-
j
ceived meaning is not equivalent to the intended meaning,
though the intended meaning is believed by the intender to be
true.) Lies are common enough; one cannot deny their actuali¬
ty. They are possible because persons are self-conscious and
can intend to deceive their interlocutors.
These five phenomena peculiar to persons: self-correction,
embarrassment, practicing, learning from one another, and lying,
are all evidence that persons are self-conscious, since only on
the assumption that persons are self-conscious are these pheno¬
mena intelligible.
There are some concluding remarks I must make before sum¬
marizing.
Being a person for oneself is not the same as being a
person for others. Once the person has acquired through inter¬
action with other persons an actualized self-consciousness, he
is no longer dependent on them in the same way. By himself he
may carry on quite well, acting, correcting himself, practicing,
describing his behavior for his own benefit, thinking on what
he is doing and experiencing. He might be a kind of Robinson
Crusoe. (We shall not consider the empirical question whether
a person isolated in this way for so long a period as twenty
years would go mad.) The self-consciousness is a logically
necessary condition for being a person. But if a person is to
be a person for others, he must, as argued above, communicate
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the fact that he is a self-conscious person to others. That
is, communicating is a logically necessary condition of being
a person for others. And in order to communicate with others
he must have some controllable form which occupies space. Some
kind of controllable, space-occupying form is necessary because
telepathy, though conceivable in the sense of not being self-
contradictory, is not actual and not even imaginable in detail,
it being impossible to conceive of criteria of accuracy. This
kind of necessity, really depending on what we can conceive, we
could call conceptual necessity.
Because of our situation - sine telepathy cum bodies - we
reflect our decision concerning whether x is a person not merely
by the label we attach but also by the treatment we accord x.
One may call a child or a lunatic or an idiot or a prisoner a
person, but the treatment of a child (or lunatic or idiot or
prisoner) is markedly different from treatment of an adult per¬
son who is considered a full-fledged person.
There seem to be degrees of being a person. Nice dis¬
tinctions are made, less in the explicit labels assigned them
than in the treatment accorded them. Most disputants are quick
to resent the labelling of a child as a 'non-person', but they
do not hesitate to tell the child what to eat, when to go to
bed, whether he may speak in adult company or not, with whom
he may associate, etc. non?:of which they would dream of telling
an adult person. Probably there are more shades and subtleties
of behavior recognizing or denying degrees of selfhood than
there are labels.
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If someone wants to apply the label 'person' to all members
of the species Homo sapiens, I shall not quibble. I only insist
that he observe that there are differences in the way we treat
different component classes of this species, allowing that in
practice (if not in name) there are degrees of selfhood and that
if non-homonoid things could behave like persons in all essential
ways, we would treat them as persons.
Summary of Chapter 1.
1. Persons are real, no less real than anything else.
2. On the basis of our universal practice of socializing
children and the social psychologists' claim that socialization
is necessary, I have asserted that infants become persons only in
relation to other persons, so that it is necessarily true that
all persons developed what it takes to be persons in relation to
and because of other persons.
3. The claims I make concerning what is necessary in persons
are based primarily on the actual ordinary practice of persons.
4. Persons must be self-conscious. This is a logically
necessary condition.
5. If a self-conscious person is to be a person for other
people, he must communicate his self-consciousness. That is,
communicating is a logically necessary condition of being a
person for others.
6. A controllable body extended in space is a conceptually
necessary condition of communicating as things stand now.
CHAPTER 2
Thus far we have dealt with three necessary conditions of
the self; they are: self-consciousness, some kind of body, and
the becoming of persons in relation to other persons. /%s may
be seen, no one condition nor combination of given conditions
is claimed to be sufficient.
This chapter will have five sections. There will be one
section primarily but not exclusively devoted to each of the
following logically necessary conditions: identity, change,
self-knowledge, knowledge of others, and responsibility.
Another logically necessary condition, content, will be dis¬
cussed in several of these sections.
Identity, change, self-knowledge, knowledge of ethers, and
responsibility have more logical affinity with each other than
they - disjunctively or conjunctively - have to consciousness,
content, and body. These latter three have more affinity with
each other.
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A. Identity
The first of these conditions which will be considered
is identity.
There is an ambiguity in 'identity1 as applied to persons.
It is commonly used in a non-philosophical way to mean "who one
is", e.g., in mystery story cases of 'mistaken identity*. Here
part of the meaning is reflected in the cognate "identifiability".
'Identity' as used about persons includes the distinctive nature
of each person which allows him to be distinguished from all
other persons. "Individuality" expresses the same notion.
The more common philosophical problem discussed under the
heading of 'personal identity' is the problem of personal
enduringness. The cognate of "identity" expressing this no¬
tion is "identicalness". Philosophers from Plato on have con¬
cerned themselves with the question: how is the endurance
through time of a person to be explained?
Why both of these notions of identifiability and identi¬
calness are included in the concept of identity is easily seen
is one considers the philosophical requirements of identifying.
A thing must be what it is and not another thing for a duration
in order to be known as the thing. To have an identity a per¬
son must endure for some time. And on the other hand, in or¬
der for a person to be the same person for some time, he must
have a certain identifiable character.
A note as to my usage. 'Identity' will include both
'enduringness' and 'individuality* or 'unique character'. To
draw attention to one aspect over the other, I shall say that
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a self-identical person endures, or that a person has a unique
identity. The meaning will, I think, be clear in the context.
Certain facts of ordinary life which I propose to use as
raw material for analysis and as evidence for assertions will
be presented first.
1. A person can remember (some of) his own (long or not-
so-long) past experiences but not another person's experiences
unless he has been told about them.
2. A person is thought to be the same person from birth
to death, though not the same (without alteration) since his
mannerisms, attitudes, tastes, interests, beliefs, etc. may
change and the stored experiences will change. His physical
appearance will almost certainly change.
3. A person is recognized after a short lapse of time.
4. A person is recognized after a lapse of years.
We may begin our analysis of identity with the uncontro-
versial observation that in non-problematical instances we rely
on a person's body to identify him. The people that we see
every day or frequently have each a certain 'look' which we can
recognize though we could not necessarily describe it. We know
what their physical features are (though we cannot describe)
and can identify them even in death. But we do not consider
corpses persons.
I mention that we can recognize people even in death be¬
cause then some of the personal traits that we clearly use to
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identify people no longer obtain, e.g., the ways of moving
and speaking. We can recognize a person by his walk at a dis¬
tance too great to make out his features. We recognize some¬
one's voice over the telephone. We mistake one person for
another in only a tiny percentage of the cases of identification
and these mistakes are usually quickly corrected.
These non-problematical cases of identification are likely
in the majority. But there are other kinds of identification
in ordinary life not far-fetched which bring out additional
factors contained in our concept of personal identity.
A friend whom we have not seen for years telephones to
invite us t.o dinner. We do not immediately recognize the voice
but when the voice identifies itself, we say, "Oh, yes." At
the appointed, time the friend appears, older, fatter, balding,
dressed as he never would have formerly, so that except for
the expectation that he will appear then, we would not at first
glance know him. His gestures are slowed. The face is so dif¬
ferent. But then gradually the vestiges of the old friend emerge,
the habit of chewing his lower lip, the rhythm and inflection of
his speech, the angle at which he holds his head while he re¬
flects. As the conversation progresses, even more of the old
friend reappears: the attitudes, interests, beliefs, preferences,
tastes, etc. are there, in short, what - close to ordinary usage -
I shall call the personality.
If there were any lingering doubts about whether this is
our old friend, they would be entirely laid to rest when the
reminiscing begins. The recalling of shared experiences, some
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of which only he besides oneself knows about, is sufficient
to convince us that this person is the one we knew long ago.
The long-unseen friend is identified (though his body has
changed markedly) by means of patterns of moving and speaking,
personality traits, and the (recalled) past experiences; I
shall lump these three together under the single term "content".
Though the case for my general assertions will be more
firmly and perspicuously established with the presentation of
less common phenomena, I think that already I may reasonably
make several claims subject to elaboration and refinement.
1. A person has an identity - a peculiar and recognizable
nature - which allows him to be distinguished from all other
persons.
2. This identity endures not merely from one day to the
next but for a period of years.
3. That which is most obviously and probably most commonly
used to identify a person is his body.
4. The disposition of a person's body is idiosyncratic in
some respects. These mannerisms are also used to identify a
person.
5. The habitual interests, attitudes, beliefs, prefer¬
ences, tastes, etc. expressed in what a person says and does
constitute a person's personality, thought to be peculiar to
him.
6. Stored experiences which a person recalls serve to
37
establish the rememberer as identical with the experiencer,
that is, he who remembers is identical with him who had the
experience.
Now to go on to a less common phenomenon but one yet
found in ordinary life - identical twins.
Identical twins are so startling because they look alike.
The biological account of their alikeness is that they were at
first one - a single fertilized ovum - which in the early sta¬
ges of cell division divided completely and became two complete
organisms having the same gene pattern. It is then no wonder
that these two look like repeats of one form, one individual
seen twice. They are said to be mirror images of one another,
in that what (e.g. , a mole) occurs on the left-hand side of
one would occur on the right-hand side of the other. And in¬
deed each twin looks like a reflection of the other.
At first glance such twins cannot be told apart; one knows
there are two but there are no differences to be seen. One
feels uneasy and immediately sets about looking for differences,
and finds them. The twins who had - at first stare - appeared
to be replicas of one another come to look different from one
another; one twin has curlier hair or a thinner face than the
other. But we find fewer and less obvious differences between
identical twins than between two stages of one individual's
appearance.
There are between these two twins few differences we
should remark were they dead. Motionless and mute they would
38
be nearly indistinguishable. But animated, they are distinguish¬
able, for the ways of speaking (including voice quality), smiling,
gesturing, sitting, moving, etc. are different and it is mostly
these mannerisms of body action that we employ to identify them.
And these mannerisms indicate and constitue personality differ-
/"
ences, differences in attitudes, interests, beliefs, preferences,
tastes, etc. Presented with two bodies and two personalities,
we do not doubt that there are two persons.
Suppose now that there were two identical twins. Finding
two bodies we expected differences, however slight, of body
but found none, no physical trait in one not matched perfectly
in the other. And even more, no difference in habitual dispo¬
sition of these bodies. Whether talking, smiling, frowning,
inquiring, laughing, each comported himself exactly like the
other. Further, the personalities (attitudes, interests, pre¬
ferences, beliefs) and memories of each (as determined by what
they said and did) were in every case indistinguishable from
the other*s. Would we allow that the personalities were the
same? I think that we would.
For most of us the idea that two people might have the
same interests, attitudes, habits, beliefs, and memories does
not seem impossible, unlikely perhaps, but not impossible.
We can suppose that these two imaginary twins are indis¬
tinguishable in body, personality, and memories. Could we then
go on to suppose that the two are one person?
It is certainly true that we expect each personality to be
unique, that is, to have an unduplicated collection of beliefs,
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habits, interests, preferences, and almost as certainly true
that we have never in real life found any two (or more) peo¬
ple who were indistinguishable. In Brave New World Aldous
Huxley gives us a fictional picture of "Bokanovsky twins" - as
many as 96 - produced from a single fertilized ovum and identi¬
cally conditioned to result in uniform individuals; these Bo¬
kanovsky twins are so revolting to the outsider, Mr. Savage,
because they seem to have no unique personalities. We can
probably go along with Huxley's device which is like our ima¬
ginary indiscernibles above. To give up the expectation that
two distinct bodies present distinct personalities would cost
us less of a wrench than to give up the belief that two dis¬
tinct bodies will result in two separate persons.
What is it that requires the two bodies: two persons
principle?
Consider again the indiscernibles. So long as we were
questioning even separately our indiscernibles about something
which both of them had witnessed or talked about, they could
conceivably (within our ordinary way of thinking about people)
give the same answers, even if they were questioned apart.
But now suppose that we tell only one twin something, the other
will not know it, until he also is told. This fact we explain
by saing that they do not have a single shared faculty of ex-
f-
periencing between them; there are two consciousnesses so it
is always possible, not merely logically but in actuality also,
for one to have an experience that the other does not have.
The reason why we would not allow that there might be two
40
or more bodies constituting a person is that we believe that
each body has its own consciousness (whether the belief is so¬
phisticated enough to associate consciousness with a nervous
system or not does not matter) so that (and as evidence for
which) the experienced content can always be made dissimilar
by presenting the two bodies-cum-consciousnesses with dissi¬
milar events.
However some groups give an impression of such unity and
togetherness-feeling, the question may well arise whether a
group like this could not be viewed as one person. One might
take as examples Plato's guardians, a monastic order, a team,
or a choir, i.e., some group made up of individuals who have
no private interests and no individuality apart from the group
while they are members of the group. But even if such a group
could give for shorter or longer periods of time the appearance
of co-operative effort, we would not want to stress this uni¬
fied action to the extent of making this a sufficient condition
for being a (single) person, or we might have to call a motor
with well-regulated parts or a hive of bees a person. The
separate experiencing of each member is necessary to our con¬
cept of person. And this separateness is part of our under¬
standing of 'consciousness'. (Cf. discussion of Descartes'
cogito, Chapter 5.)
I know of no actual cases where a single consciousness
was shared by two or more bodies, so in this sense the members
of even a tightly organized, cohesive group are always separa¬
ble, like our indiscernibles. By presenting one with an event
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which will make his series of experiences different from the
series of any other member of the group shows that each member
does have a separate consciousness. In some circumstances this
fact might be thought unimportant; the importance would attach
to actions and responses, all of which would be on the part of
the group and directed toward the group, not by or toward mem¬
bers of the group. One member might be considered no more
separate not acting separately than one now considers his left
hand separate because it cannot act separately. All the same,
it would remain true that each member could be separate (so
long as a single consciousness is not shared by two or more
bodies) in a way one's hand could not be separate.
An experience, we believe, is universally and necessarily
limited to one experiencer, so that two persons cannot have
exactly the same experience. Even if we were to expose both
of the indiscernibles to the same events, we would not and
could not believe that their experience was the same one. Ex¬
perience is necessarily private, for although the objects of
experience can be public, the consciousness which has and con¬
nects experiences is necessarily private.
Consciousness is a sine qua non of experience, that in
virtue of which an event becomes an experience. Experiences
had by a consciousness are recallable by that same conscious¬
ness as memories; an experience is immediately accessible as
experience only to the same consciousness, though we can of
course be told about the present and past experiences of
another. A memory or experience recalled is recognized by the
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consciousness; that is, the recalling consciousness knows it
has lived through the recalled experience (at least) once be¬
fore, that the way in which it (the consciousness) is now
aware of the memory (of the past experience) is the same way
in which it was originally aware of the experience. A recalled
experience feels "warm", as William James describes it.
Without such a consciousness of its own, we would not say
that an extended body (of appropriate sort) was a person. If
we encounter a body of appropriate form, in order for us to
consider it a person, it must have at least one consciousness.
I say "at least one" because there seems to be evidence for
multiple consciousnesses in one body; cf. Morton Prince's The
Dissociation of a. Personality and Thigpen and Cleckley's The
Three Faces of Eve. The same kind of evidence which would con¬
vince us that there were two consciousnesses in the case of our
indiscernibles would require us to conclude that there were two
or more consciousnesses in the case of Miss Beauchamp and two
consciousnesses in the case of Eve, the kind of evidence's being
that what is experienced by one consciousness may not be ac¬
cessible to nor reportable by another consciousness (in the
same body in the case of what is called "multiple personalities").
If it is consciousness which separates and makes distinct
persons including those who might in other ways be indistinguish¬
able, is it then consciousness which we identify?
Consciousness is characterized, as asserted above, by being
the necessarily private aspect of experience. What is necessari¬
ly private cannot be known by another, so consciousness, being in
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no way publicisable, is useless for identifying others since
we have no access to their consciousnesses. What we identify
is the body, personality, and recalled experiences of a person.
These experiences must be connected; the connecting and recall¬
ing are done by consciousness. We have to learn by means of a
person's body what the connected experiences are and that they
are recalled, but it is not a body itself which connects a
series of experiences since two such series have occurred within
a single body, and the body may change, even radically as in the
case of Gregor, while the series of experiences remains intact.
The next question I should like to consider is: is it con¬
sciousness which makes a person the same person from birth to
death?
Regarding consciousness it has already been said that it
is consciousness which connects the experiences of one person
and necessarily separates him from other^ persons so that the
experiences of one person who has lived fifty years do not get
connected to the series of experiences belonging to a person
who has lived twenty years.
This consciousness is numerically identical from the birth
to the death of a person, connecting all experiences so that
earlier experiences recur as memories. But for the experiences
to be connected is not enough. They must be known to be con¬
nected by him whose experiences they are before the cons.cious-
ness and the experiences connected by it and the communicating
body are thought to be a person. More succinctly, it is .self-
consciousness which makes a person the same person from birth
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to death. What is meant in this context by "self-consciousness"
can perhaps be made clearer with an example. Suppose a human
body which is familiar to us comes and begins to relate experi¬
ences which we know to be its own without indicating that it
knows them to be its own. The consciousness is connecting the
experiences; the experiences are communicated. But we would
not look 011 this as a person; it would be something else, a
zombie or "parrot". If one knew of the experiences which were
one's own without knowing that they were one's own, an essential
requirement for being a person would be lacking. If this were a
human body, we would probably view it as a possible person (e.g.,
a child), or a deprived person (e.g., a congenital idiot), or a
damaged person (e.g., a person who was complete but is now in¬
jured in a drastic way). That is, we would not treat a non-self-
conscious being as responsible (the relation between self-con¬
sciousness and responsibility will be discussed below) and there-
not as a full-fledged person. Consciousness suffices to make
its possessor an animal; self-consciousness is required to make
its possessor a person.
Summary of identity
1. A self-identical person endures.
2. That which is numerically identical and endures from
birth to death in a person is his consciousness; it separates
each person's experiences from every other's, being necessarily
private.
3. The consciousness connects the experiences of one person,
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and defines thereby what counts as one person, so that a group
of individuals having separate consciousnesses cannot count as
one person.
4. One person's consciousness is not in itself identifi¬
able by others.
5. That experiences are connected by a single conscious¬
ness is shown by earlier experiences being accessible as memo¬
ries later. The rememberer must know that he was the original
experiencer; this is part of what is meant by saying that a
person must be self-conscious.
6. A person has an identity which allows him to be dis¬
tinguished from all other persons. Each person is unique,
7. The content of a person (mannerisms, beliefs, interests,
attitudes, preferences, tastes, etc. making up the personality,
and the stored experiences) is another logically necessary con¬
dition of the self. The content of a person is expressed in
and through a body.
8. That which we identify is the body itself and the con¬
tent of the person expressed in and through the body. A. per¬
son must have such content and a body in and through which to
communicate it in order to be identifiable.
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B. Change
By 'change' I mean 'alteration within a person either by
replacement, addition, or subtraction'. Clearly not included
in change is one person's becoming a numerically different
person. Logically change goes hand in hand with identity; un¬
less something self-identical endures, one cannot say it has
changed. It is therefore in relation to the condition of iden¬
tity that we discuss the condition of change.
The facts of ordinary life given as material for analysis
and evidence for assertions are:
1. People come to exhibit abilities, skills, and knowledge
of facts and theories they earlier did not have.
2. Because of various sanctions- people desist from morally
disapproved of actions which they formerly were guilty of.
3. People communicate with one another, making appropriate
responses, giving and receiving information, and affecting one
another's actions.
4. People at least while awake are always experiencing,
that is, there is always something in awareness, and the ma¬
terial of awareness is steadily changing.
5. Some people's personalities change markedly through
time.
These facts and others which could be added show that in
ordinary life people are taken to change.
It has been asserted above that persons are composed of
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consciousness, body, and content. Which of these cannot change?
Which do change? Which must change?
To answer the first question: the consciousness cannot
change but must remain numerically identical, or the person
cannot be the same person. If the person is not the same per¬
son, it cannot be he who changes. It is surely true in ordi¬
nary life that a given, self-identical person changes.
In reply to the second question we may ansi^er quickly that
the body and content of a person change. People get older,
fatter, thinner, balder, stiffer, etc. Their attitudes, skills,
tastes, preferences, stored experiences, behavior, etc. which
we have labeled 'content1 change.
Having denied that the consciousness may change and having
asserted that the body and content do change, we may discuss
the third question. The body and content of a person do change,
but must they change? That is, is change a necessary condition
of being a person?
To clarify the question of body change, we may distinguish
three kinds: 1) change in appearance, 2) metabolic changes
within the organism, and 3) changes of the body as expressive
vehicle of attitudes, habits, tastes, knowledge, etc. It is
not possible to consider this last kind of body change separate
from content change. Because it has already been said that
content is expressed in and through a body, the changes of body
which are constitutive of and expressive of content will be
subsumed under content changes and dealt with below.
The incidental changes of appearance - slimming, tanning,
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etc. - do not seem to be necessary. People might never gain
or lose weight and yet be full-fledged persons. Such changes
seem to be brought about, sometimes at least, by choice, and
VU
there is no serious penalty is one does not choose to make such
changes in one's appearance.
But the changes in one's appearance which are due to aging
are not similarly amenable to one's desires. People get more
wrinkled and stiffer, more bald if their genes are so inclined,
willy-nilly. Are these changes in appearance due to aging ne¬
cessary then, if everyone who lives long enough undergoes such
changes. I think not, for untold quantities of money and ef¬
fort are spent by people to retain their youthfulness, and re¬
wards rather than penalties are their lot if they succeed in
minimizing if not altogether arresting the changes (more com¬
monly called the ravages) due to growing old.
Statistics showing how much money is spent on cosmetics
and keeping one's figure would however be less interesting and
less convincing than citing the central theme of Oscar Wilde's
"The Picture of Dorian Gray". As a young man Dorian Gray has
his portrait painted and he wishes that the portrait might age
instead of him. And indeed this is what happens. The figure
in the painting shows the effects of age and immorality while
Dorian Gray himself is unaltered in appearance. Far from this
changelessness being a handicap it is a positive advantage. So
it would likely be for us if we could somehow arrest the changes
in the appearances of our bodies.
One may conclude from this evidence that although the ap-
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pearances of bodies do change, an individual might very well
continue to be treated as a person even if his physical ap¬
pearance did not change.
Concerning the second kind of body change: the metabolic
changes within the organism. If a person must have a body which
is animate (or at least movable), and if to be animate an or¬
ganism must have metabolic processes going on, then there must
be metabolic processes going on in the person. Metabolic pro¬
cesses entail changes. So persons, if they are to be animate
organisms, must have changes going on within them.
We may now move on to consider whether change of content
is necessary. Included under change of content are the changes
of body constitutive of and expressive of change of content.
There are four phenomena which entail change of content.
To deny that change of content is possible (or, as it would
more likely be done, to deny that change in a person is possi¬
ble) is to make impossible at least these four phenomena:
1) learning, 2) moral improvement, 3) communication, and
4) the continuous flux of experience.
Each one of these means that there is some change in the
content of the person involved. If these four phenomena are
necessarily parts of the going concern of persons, then change
of content is necessary to persons.
First, we shall consider learning. People come to know
what they did not know previously. This knowledge may be know¬
ledge of facts, theories, skills, or abilities (such as the
ability to 'manage1 a touchy friend). That one learns new things
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seems to me entirely uncontroversial; that learning entails
adding (one kind of change) to the content of a person seems
likewise uncontroversial.
Not so uncontroversial however is a species of learning I
should like to discuss here, namely, arriving at new solutions
to intellectual, practical, and artistic problems. This learn¬
ing of new solutions is being contrasted with the learning which
consists in acquiring knowledge which others have had and taught
to one, so that one's own getting of the knowledge cannot be
thought to be a mark of originality or inventiveness.
The position as I am asserting it is likely to be offen¬
sive even to those who grant that there is originality exhi¬
bited by some few great minds because I mean to say that there
is some originality displayed by every person, granted that in
some cases it may be markedly less than in others.
But none of us has everything in life taught to him. The
housewife combines foods which she has never been told to com¬
bine. The traveler learns tricks to get along in a strange
language and land. The pipe-smoking man devises a way to mend
his favorite pipe which has been broken. The woman wears color
and clothes ensembles which she has never seen before, not even
in magazines. The farmer works our a machine made of scrap
parts to mow a field.
I do not insist on a high degree of creativity in every
one, but some degree in all people, as well as an extraordinary
amount in some people. At the very least, we all use sentences
which we have never heard before. Even the making of a simple,
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before-unheard sentence requires some degree of originality.
On^jwho denies novelty altogether or that these low de¬
grees of novelty are novelty may say that the elements have
already been known, only the re-arrangement or whole has not
existed before. Even this degree of novelty is sufficient for
my purpose. All that I need and wish to say is that not all
that an individual produces or does has been taught to this in¬
dividual at some previous time.
What difference does such originality make in our discussion
of persons? It makes this difference. If changes of this sort
are necessary to persons, then whatever is to be a person must
evidence the ability not only to learn what others present to
it, but also to arrive at what another has not taught it. This
requirement is pertinent when one is trying to decide whether
a machine could be a person. If it is granted that such origi¬
nality is a necessary condition of being a person, then a machine
could be a person only if it could show such originality. Whe¬
ther a machine presently can or ever will be able to is a ques¬
tion for the machine experts - and time - to answer.
The second phenomenon requiring change of content is moral
change. Within a social system some acts are thought better
than others; the better acts are encouraged, the worse one§ dis¬
couraged. It is generally supposed that any normal person who
has been guilty of a disapproved of action may refrain from such
actions, because some persons do refrain. There are many methods
used to influence the wrongdoer, e.g., scolding, ridicule, teas¬
ing, shaming, ostracism, corporal punishment, incarceration. It
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need not be maintained that the only purpose of these sanctions
is correction (retribution, deterrence, protection of society
may also figure in) but it is clearly part of the intent in
some cases. Such sanctions presuppose that the person against
whomp they are directed is able to change. Why would we scold
or exhort if such efforts to alter the behavior of a person
were foredoomed to failure by his unchangeability?
The evidence that I shall offer to show that punishment is
intended to produce change (among other things) is the law.
In various states of the United States there are laws simi¬
lar to the Indiana law which states:
Every person who, after having been twice convicted,
sentenced and imprisoned in some penal institution for fe¬
lony, whether committed heretofore or hereafter, and whe¬
ther committed in this state or elsewhere within the
limits of the United States of America, shall be convicted
in any circuit or criminal court in this state for a felo¬
ny hereafter committed, shall be deemed and taken to be an
habitual criminal, and he or she shall be sentenced to im¬
prisonment in the state prison for and during his or her
life.
To authorize a sentence of imprisonment for life un¬
der this act, the indictment or affidavit shall allege
that the defendant has been previously twice convicted,
sentenced and imprisoned in some penal institution, for
felonies, describing each separately. If the trial jury,
in their vjer diet , find these facts to be true, and con¬
vict such defendant of the third felony, the trial court,
after passing sentence of imprisonment for a specific
term, as prescribed by the statute, shall proceed to sen¬
tence the defendant to imprisonment for his or her life.
(Burns Indiana Statutes, 1956 Repl., paragraphs 9-2207
and 9-2208 quoted in Criminal Law by Richard C. Donnelly,
Joseph Goldstein, and Richard D. Schwartz, New York, The
Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., p. 483.)
What are we to understand the significance of this law as
being? It seems that the rationale of this law is that when a
person has been tv/ice previously convicted, sentenced, and im¬
prisoned, upon the third conviction he may be deemed to be an
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habitual criminal because he has shown no improvement as a re¬
sult of earlier sanctions which should have produced a change.
The first two imprisonments were supposed to change the person;
if he has not changed, the belief is that he will not change.
And if he will not, then he is punished for being incorrigibly
(i.e., unchangeably) bad. The penalty is for his unchangingness.
There is no more expectation of changing him so he is given no
further chances. Protection of society becomes the primary con¬
cern; he is removed from their midst.
If one is sufficiently bad (i.e., bad enough to run afoul
of the lav;), he is required by law to improve, to change his
evil ways. And many do. But not only criminals are less than
perfect. Everyone is liable to occasional correction, by spouse,
by friends, by offspring, by teachers, by superiors, by oneself.
No one is so good that there are never any sanctions - however
mild - imposed, at least not anyone involved, in the thick of
things.
If sanctions are employed only on the presupposition that
people can change their behavior, and if people actually do
change their behavior, then to deny that persons can change is
to run counter to the actual practices we have. Behavior is,
as said above, included under content, so that it is change of
content which is necessary.
The third kind of activity entailing change of content is
communication. When two or more people communicate, what one
person says is intended to affect the other, however trite or
simple the communication is. One intends when talking to another
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person to make a difference in that person even if what one
says is ceremonial, conventionally fixed. Acquaintances who
have seen each other for years may still greet each other with
"Good morning" intending to show the other his good humor,
good breeding, or conformity to custom.
In dialogues which are more than ceremonies, the intent to
alter the other is even clearer. One gives another a piece of
information, to add to that person's store of knowledge. Or
one gives a command and thereby intends to alter the actions of
another person or persons. One argues and means for the listen¬
er to come to the same conclusion.
Would communication be possible if change in persons were
impossible? No. Communication would be ruled out. There
could be nothing like the message, nor anything like the re¬
sponse. There would be no saying or writing (only two of the
possible kinds of communication) because these entail change.
There would be no learning what another says for learning, add¬
ing to one's store of knowledge, is obviously change. There
would be no replying, nor compliance to a command, if the obe¬
dience required that one do other than what one was doing.
It seems indubitable to me that communication would be
entirely impossible, were change impossible.
Fourth and last, it appears that what we know as experi¬
encing would itself be imposible if change were impossible.
The material of one's experience is steadily changing. ("Con¬
tent" would probably be the more natural word to use here in¬
stead of "material" but I hoped to avoid ambiguity by not using
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"content" here in the sense of 'what the experience is about'
as well as in the broader sense which "content" already has.)
If the material were static, there might be some object of
awareness, but experience as we know it, essentially changing,
with contrasts, variety, would be impossible. And the material
of one's experience would have to be static if it were denied
that people change.
Now that the questions of what does and must change have
been discussed, one might want to' ask whether a person in iso¬
lation (an adult hermit) must change even if he has no contact
whatsoever with people. It seems to me that he must, since his
body must be undergoing metabolic changes; he must arrive at
solutions to changing problems presented him by his ever-chang¬
ing environment; he may require moral improvement of himself;
and the material of his awareness must be changing. Learning
from others, the use of sanctions by others, and communication
(with others) are activities involving a community of persons
which require change.
So whether a person is alone or with others, he must change.
That a person must change is not likely to be denied (ex¬
cept by some philosophers - see Chapter 3 on Plato). Rather the
difficulty might arise on the other side. The question might be,
not, can an individual not change and still be a person? but
rather, how much can an individual change and still be a person?
Or in other words, are there any limits to the extent which a
person may change?
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Imagine an individual who is unquestionably the same per¬
son for the period of time under consideration. We know that he
is the same person because he looks the same and relates as his
own, upon demand and voluntarily, experiences which we know to
O
have been his which no one else could know about. But through¬
out the period of time under consideration the personality of
the person changes continuously. Yesterday he drank coffee;
V
today he will not drink it. Last week he was socidie; this week
A
he is a recluse. What irritated him previously leaves him pre¬
sently unruffled. Different and even contradictory predicates
correctly describe his behavior within a short period of time,
say, a week.
The question might very well arise: what about such a case?
Before I discuss the question, I would like to point out
again that my assertions about these concepts are principally
the bringing to light what I believe to be contained in ordinary
practice.
In the case given above, I think that we would hold that
the individual is the same person, since he fulfills our strin¬
gent requirement of being a self-identical person, namely ,
that he can relate earlier experiences of his which could only
have happened to that consciousness. But our responses to a
person are not only to his consciousness but also to his content,
including his modes of behavior, so that if his modes of behavior
are different, we treat him differently even though we believe
the consciousness to be the same.
Just the distinction between consciousness 'which remains
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self-identical but inaccessible and personality which is ac¬
cessible to others but varying seems to fit what takes place
in ordinary life when we believe a person to be the same person
but believe him to be markedly different in personality, i.e.,
to be a different kind of person.
That we view persons as constituted of both consciousness
and content which allows a person to be self-identical while
changing radically in personality is evident in our attitudes
and treatment of non-hypothetical old people who are greatly
though perhaps not suddenly altered by time. There are many
old people who become infirm though they were previously active
and lively, who are foolish and senile though they were acute
and of sound judgment before, who were even-tempered and cheer¬
ful and are now irascible and complaining. Did these present,
unprecedented characteristics not belong to the same person who
was formerly so different, there would be no pathos in the
phenomena of aging. The old altered person is thought to be
numerically the same; his consciousness connects the series of
experiences and predicates belonging to him, but he is qualita¬
tively much different from what he was. The same may be said
about individuals who become insane. Though they are who they
were, they no longer are what they were; their content is too
much changed.
What we do about ±he self-identical person who is now a
different kind of person depends upon the degree and signifi¬
cance of his change. There are some areas in which persons
change to which we attach little wMght, e.g. , which foods one
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prefers; a person may eat chocolate ice cream today, strawberry
tomorrow, tutti-frutti the day after; it does not matter. The
realms in which one must be consistent (or have a reason for in¬
consistency) are those to which we attach importance, usually
moral. Clearly, if one has committed oneself to some mode of
behavior by a promise or contract, one cannot simply change one's
mind with impunity. Not all of the kinds of behavior or persona¬
lity traits which are thought important can be designated here be¬
cause groups differ in their assigning import. Here one may say
briefly that a person may change to any extent provided that these
changes do not result in his be'ng labeled insane or incorrigibly
immoral or irresponsible. If he comes to be thought of as immoral
(and unalterably so), insane, or irresponsible, our treatment of
and attitudes toward him will be based on and express our thinking
that although he Is the same person (in having the same conscious¬
ness which connects all his experiences), his content including
his modes of behavior are so much changed that we treat him dif¬
ferently, i.e., as a different kind of person. We will not be¬
cause we cannot treat insane persons as if they were not insane,
irresponsible individuals as if they were responsible, incorrigi¬
bly immoral individuals as if they were moral. But our feelings
are different toward these different groups though they all fail
to be normal persons. If the now irresponsible person is aged and
senile, our feelings are those of sadness and compassion; toward
the incorrigibly immoral person we are likely to feel indignant.
Summary of change
1. Change cannot occur except in relation to what is un-
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changing or self-identical. It is self-consciousness which
provides self-identity for persons, therefore if change occurs
with a person, self-consciousness must endure. If self-con-
sciousness becomes numerically different, then we have a dif¬
ferent person and the problem is changed.
2. The appearance of a person's body need not change.
3. If a person is alive, his body must be undergoing me¬
tabolic changes.
4. Growth, moral improvement, communication, and experi¬
encing different things are the ordinary life phenomena re¬
quiring that persons change. What must change if these pheno¬
mena are to be possible is the content of a person.
5. No limits are put on the extent to which an individual's
personality or modes of behavior may change unless because of
such changes an individual must be viewed as insane, immoral,
or irresponsible.
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C. Self-knowledge
It is clearly the case that the ordinary belief is that
we have knowledge of persons, and what is more, that knowledge
of persons is necessary to what we know as persons. It would
be far less troublesome if I could say that all of our know¬
ledge of persons is getten in the same way, that the knoitfledge
we have of ourselves is gotten in exactly the same ivay as know¬
ledge of other persons is gotten. But - the worse for ease of
analysis - I do not think that this singleness of method really
obtains.
Rather than a single way of getting knowledge of persons,
there are three methods: experiencing, (which obtains only in
one's own case), symbolic expression, and behavior. The extent
that each means of knowledge contributes to a kind of knowledge
determines where on a private-public scale the kind of knowledge
under discussion should go.
At the private end of the scale is the kind of knowledge
each person can have only in his own case which depends wholly
upon his experience. This knowledge cannot be exhaustively
communicated in a way which will distinguish it . Because this
kind of knowledge must be limited to each person's having it
only of himself, I call it logically private.
At the other extreme - the public end - we have knowledge
depending upon behavior. With these kinds of knowledge what is
experienced by the person to whom the knowledge pertains is be¬
side the point. This kind of knowledge can be had only if others
besides the person to whom it pertains have it (too). I call
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this kind logically public knowledge.
In between these two limits there are kinds of knowledge
which have some experiential part and are communicable but dif¬
fer in the extent to which behavioral enactment is possible or
necessary. The less behavioral enactment necessary: the more
private the knowledge, so that toward the private end we have
kinds of knowledge which have no behavioral component and toward
the public end kinds of knowledge which almost must and usually
do have behavioral components. I call these intermediate kinds
of knowledge contingently public kinds of knowledge.
In this section we shall discuss the logically private
kind of knowledge and the contingently public kinds of know¬
ledge as well as the reasons for asserting that some knowledge
of persons does not have to be public.
These facts constitute the material for analysis and the
evidence for assertions.
1. One knows some things about persons as well as anything
at all which is known.
2. One recognizes oneself without having to look at one¬
self or observe one's behavior or remember any specific facts
or events.
3. Some things that one knows one may or may not tell
other persons; that is, not all that one knows (about oneself)
is known by another to be known (by oneself), but another could
be told and then he would know too.
4. In reporting or expressing in behavior what one knows,
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one may lie and be believed.
5. Some people sometimes dream, know that they dreamed
and what they dreamed, before they tell others and even if they
do not tell others.
6. People remember past experiences; many of these memo¬
ries are not reported to others at the time that they are re¬
membered.
7. A person knows when he has a pain, or an itch, or a
tickle. Another person besides the person having the pain
(itch, tickle) may not know. Malingering is a not-uncommon
occurrence.
8. Some emotions are feelings of the person concerning
which he is the final authority.
9. One knows one's own sensations of sight, hearing, touch,
smell, and taste, though one may label them mistakenly.
10. One knows at least sometimes what one means by one's
words and also what one intends to do. What one means or in¬
tends can be misunderstood by another person. Such misunder¬
standings are not rare.
11. People's choices indicate what gives them pleasure.
The consistent or habitual choices we call tastes or preferen¬
ces. People may also report their preferences to us.
What counts as knowledge will not be discussed here. It
is assumed that persons have knowledge. Granted even this much,
one may go on to make the Cartesian point that the knowing of
anything whatsoever gives the knower knowledge about at least
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one person, himself. This knowledge would consist in knowing
that one is the kind of thing that can have that kind of infor¬
mation and that one does in fact have it.
Secondly, everyone has the conceptual knowledge that each
person is separate from all other persons. According to our
present ways of thinking if two things had shared experiences,
they could not count as two separate full-fledged persons.
At once an objection may be made to saying that everyone
knows that each person is separate from all other persons. A
critic may say that by far the majority of persons do not think
about the concept 'person1 and therefore they do not know that
'person' entails 'the separateness of each series of experiences'.
Indeed, I would allow that most people do not know this entail¬
ment explicitly. But this connection underlies what they say
and do regarding persons. Some of our knowledge is implicit,
"goes without saying". It is one task of philosophy to say
explicitly what for most people goes without saying.
There is one kind of knowledge which all people have, but
which I should think very few people consider explicitly, that
is the knowledge of who they are. In the section on identity
we said that in order to identify others, we make use of their
physical characteristics, mannerisms, personality, recalled
experiences. These are used in the case of others but none of
these are necessary for identifying ourselves. And as regards
each person for himself, probably even the word "identify" is
inappropriate, for there is not period of doubt before knowing
who the person (in this case oneself) is as seems to be implied
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in the word "identify". In one's own case one simply knows
who one is. If one were to say, "I identified myself," he
would probably be understood to mean that he identified himself
to some other person by giving his name, occupation, place and
date of birth, education, associations, or perhaps some anecdo¬
tal material about his past. But none of this is needed for
oneself.
When I wake up in the morning, I 'come to myself', for I
suppose that it is more or less accurate to say that while one
is asleep, he is 'away from himself', so that if there were go¬
ing to be any time at which I should not know who I am, it ought
to be upon awakening. But when I awaken, I do not need to look
at myself, or remember my name, or recall particular events or
facts which pertain to me; I just carry on as myself without
doubt that I am myself.
And if there were any doubt or hesitation, I cannot see
thatlooking at myself, or remembering my name, or recalling any
specific events in my life would make or even help me recognise
myself. When people has-e lost their minds and do not know who
they are, letting them see themselves, telling them their names
or giving them facts about themselves does nothing to improve
their condition.
In what does this knowing oneself consist?
It consists in part of knowing that one is unique, a logi¬
cal particular, separate from every other thing and just oneself.
This knowing that one is unique makes intelligible one's not
needing to look at one's body, or observe one's behavior, or
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remember any personal facts, experiences or traits belonging
to oneself. For it could not be one's body which is logically
unique; another person's body might be a perfect duplicate of
it. Nor could it be any fact, experience or trait that was
unique because any fact could logically be true of another per¬
son, and any experience or trait could logically also be had by
another person. Nor could it be the series of experiences or
set of traits as a whole which was unique, because it is logi¬
cally possible that a set descriptively identical could belong
to another person.
Only that which experiences in the person, that is, the
consciousness, could be that person's alone, and nobody else's.
From the uniqueness of consciousness follows the fact that it
cannot be described. For descriptions are necessarily in terms
of universals which apply actually or possibly to more than one
thing. A universal stands for a quality or class of objects.
Each particular to which the universal applies exhibits the
quality, or the qualities defining the class. Each instance of
the quality is identical or similar to every other instance of
the quality and could be (logically though perhaps not actually)
substituted for any other instance. Demonstratives can refer
uniquely but all of the demonstratives are based on "I", and
this is just what needs to be given meaning. Now what each per¬
son knows is that he - his consciousness - could not even logi¬
cally be substituted for any other instance of consciousness
(though he believes that there are other consciousnesses) and
be the same, that is, his. This is what I mean by saying that
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each consciousness is a logical particular. "I" refers to
my consciousness, a logical particular.
It might be well to forestall a likely criticism at this
point. "I" has more meaning thah the bare consciousness. It
would be absurd to say "My consciousness went to the party".
But it would be sensible, meaningful, and for some of us some¬
times true to say, "I went because they asked me, but I wasn't
really there." A philosopher who says "I" cannot refer to con¬
sciousness because "I" sometimes does not refer to only conscious¬
ness dogmatizes in the face of contrary facts.
"I" cannot be only a linguistic device nor can "I" refer
to a merely logical device or intentional entity. For if there
were not some real thing to which the "I" of "I think" refers,
the "I think" when used by anyone would hover, possibly attach¬
ing to any one of the billions of persons who can say or think
it. I am certain that the "I" when I use "I think" does not so
hover, because I know that it refers to something both real and
unique: my consciousness. One either allows consciousness as
the ground for uniqueness or denies that a person is unique
since there is no other candidate for grounding uniqueness.
Because each personb consciousness is unique and therefore
indescribable, it is incommunicable (in this sense). There is
no telling another person what this experience of one's own
consciousness is like; it must be like nothing else. We have
no possibility at all of making it public because 1) there is
no describing it, 2) there is no behavioral way of expressing
the quality of consciousness, 3) there is no public means of
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producing the experience as in the case of pain to be discussed
below, and 4) there is no public object of the experience as in
the case of sense experience (also to be discussed below). The
experience of one's own consciousness is logically private.
(See Chapter 5, the discussion of the Cartesian cogito and the
Kantian *1 think'.)
Moving now to contingently public knowledge.
Asserting that all experiences occur privately but that
almost all are communicable, that is that there is knowledge we
have of persons (other than ourselves) which is contingently
public, leaves me open to attack from two sides. There are
those who want to say that there is no private arena of the
self which only the person himself has access to. And on the
other hand, there are those who say that each self is entirely
restricted to his own sphere without even being able to send a
surreptitious signal through an open window to another self
because there are no windows.
The contention that some of what people know about people
(themselves in this case) is private knowledge (which can but
/
does not have to be shared) will be supported by two facts of
everyday life: 1) that other people do not always know what one
knows for oneself (in Chapter 1 this point was made using Kafka's
Metamorphosis), and 2) that one may lie, that is, purposely pass
off for true what one does not himself believe to be true, and
be believed. If persons had complete knowledge of one another,
every attempt to lie would be abortive. Successful lying de¬
pends on ignorance on the part of the deceived. (how it is
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possible that what occurs privately can be made public will be
discussed in the section on knowledge of others, following this
section.)
The reason why others can sometimes be ignorant of what
one has knowledge of, namely, one's own experiences, is that
some experiences have no behavioral equivalents, no necessary
behavioral expressions, nor any related behavior sometimes,
besides intentional gestures (symbols). As behavioral expres¬
sion becomes possible, and even obligatox-y, we are less depen¬
dent on intentional gestures for knoxtfledge of another, and
consequently less subject to being deceived by him. If one
were to deny as the extreme behaviorists do that there are
these three sources of knowledge about persons (experience -
in one's own case, reporting, and behavior), he will have to
either deny such ignorance and the lying that depends on it
or give some ether account of it. In this section one of the
primary aims is to argue for and draw attention to kinds of
private experience.
Some uses of intentional gestures (for short we may say
talking and writing though there are more kinds) are plainly
to be included in behavior so that not all kinds of talking
and writing count as reporting of private experience. When
the use of intentional symbols constitutes part or all of what
is attributed to the person (on the basis of what is said or
written), I shall call this use verbal behavior. E.g. , when a
child recites the alphabet correctly (consistently), nothing
further is needed for us to say that he knows the alphabet
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since part of what we mean by saying that someone knows the
alphabet is that he can recite it. When a person gives fine
lectures, nothing more is vvanted for us to say that he is a
fine lecturer, by which we mean that he gives fine lectures.
These uses of intentional gestures count as behavior or verbal
acts. Contrasted with verbal acts or behavior is reporting as
when a man reports that he has a slight head-ache, which we may
believe but may doubt, since the reporting is not-the same nor
even a part of what is attributed on the basis of the report,
vis., having a head-ache.
One example of experiences lacking a behavioral equiva¬
lent is dreams which constitute the first kind of contingently
public knowledge to be considered. Concerning the discussion
which follows: I do not claim that the list of kinds of know¬
ledge ranging from the more private to the more public is com¬
plete, nor that the discussion of each kind mentioned is ex¬
haustive. I only intend to point out some salient character¬
istics of the kinds of experiences I do mention, relating ig¬
norance, lying, behavioral expression, and privateness or pub-
licness of object or content.
Dreams are peculiar experiences. They duplicate experi¬
ences of real things, most often producing! complete conviction
in the dreamer. Young children have to learn that dream objects
are not real, that no one else could have seen the bear that the
child has dreamed of. A child of my acquaintance began discuss¬
ing with her father her dreamed wolf, assuming that he knew
about it too. But after a few more months, when she was three
70
years old, she realized that dreams occurred privately, and
that the content was private, so that if she wanted her father
to know about her dreams, she had to tell him what she had
dreamed*
Dreams are peculiar in a number of ways. One of these
peculiarities is that dreams (excluding daydreams) occur while
we are sleeping unlike our other experiences which occur while
we are awake. Our being asleep may account for dreams' being
so disorganised, inconsecutive, shifting, fuzzy5 perhaps this
is the way the sleeping mind works. But at any rate when we
dream, we know at the time what we are dreaming even though we
probably do not know that we are dreaming. The dream may be
muddled but vivid. Remembering later what we have dreamed may
be difficult or impossible, even though we may be certain that
we dreamed.
And if we can remember the dream, telling someone else
about it is another difficulty because dreams may be about such
weird things, and our dream feelings and thoughts so jumbled
and irregular. There may be no real object or event one can
point to and say, "My dream was like that". And further he who
had the dream cannot invite or compel anyone else to have the
same dream, because there is no known way of producing dream
content to order.
So one's knowledge of the dream may dissipate with the
dawn, and even if one remembers the dream, the labels may not
fit exactly. But knowing what one dreamed does not depend on
telling what one dreamed. If anyone else is to know what is
71
dreamed, it has to be by means of lab-els for there are no be¬
havioral expressions of dream content.
Humans, like dogs or cats, may twitch or jerk while they
are asleep and we assume in these cases that dreaming is going
on. But in the case of dogs or cats we never know for sure,
and in the case of humans, we know only post facto, and only
sometimes. What the person is dreaming3 we do not know from
watching him, nor from an electroencephalogram which will tell
us, at best and in an a. posteriori manner (from correlating re¬
ports from awake subjects and the pattern of brain activity while
they were previously asleep) that the person had a. dream. If we
want to know what a person dreamed, he must tell us. Our under¬
standing of what he dreamed will be no bwtter than his memory
and his ability to describe what he dreamed.
Concerning the limits of successful lying about dreams.
There seem to be no limits, so long as the person does not both
assert and deny that he had a particular dream. So long as he
consistently asserts the same content to his dream, he may say
whatever he likes, and we have no grounds for doubting him, for
in a dream anything goes. The regular laws of the universe are
suspended, so we cannot use these to check his story.
There is nothing at all public about a dream in its occur¬
ring; it becomes public in a limited way if and only if it is
described afterward. We who did not have the dream cannot know
about it unless we are told. But the dreamer's having the dream
does not depend on his telling the dream. There are no behavi¬
oral expressions of the dream content. There are no limits to
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what a person may say he dreamed. Little if anything hinges on
whether a person is telling the truth about his dream, but even
if we cared, there seems to be no way of catching someone who
has lied about what he dreamed. If it is denied that a person
has a private experiential knowledge of his dreams, wither a
person does not know at all what he has dreamed or he learns
what he dreamed from what he tells others. Both of these as¬
sertions seem contrary to the facts. We do know what we have
dreamed and know even if we spare our families and friends the
recital thereof.
The next kind of experiences we shall consider is memories.
They are like dreams in that what a person says he remembers, we
must believe he remembers. But vie may doubt - if his memory is
of a public fact or event which we have independent knowledge of
and not of a private experience - the correctness of his memory.
Even if he agrees to our correction of the fact or event which
he is remembering, we have not established thereby that his me¬
mory was not in the first instance what he claimed it was. If
he refuses to accept our version of the past event, and vehe¬
mently maintains that his own version is the right one, we may
come to doubt oux own memory, or we may think that he is being
stubborn, though cognisant of his error, he simply persists in
asserting it. But we can never be sure because we - as out¬
siders - have no access to his memory, the object of his present
experience.
Here as in the case of dreams, there is no necessary be¬
havioral correlate. One cannot tell by merely looking at a
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person what he is remembering0
There is however one difference between dreams and memories
already mentioned above. A dream as an occurrence is private,
and if we are to know about it at all, the person who had the
dream must tell us about it. He is our only source of informa¬
tion about the dream. But memories are often, or claim to be,
of past events or public facts which others do, or could logi¬
cally, have knowledge of too, so that not all of our knowledge
of the event depends upon the one rememberer's memory. And,
another check, if the event remembered was supposed to have
taken place in the real world (as contrasted with a dream world),
it must conform to the regular laws of the universe, so these
laws may be used to criticize his story.
Memories then are still private in that they have no ne¬
cessary behavioral correlates so that if an outsider is to know
what is remembered, when what is remembered is a fact or event
or scene, he must be informed by him who remembers. What a
person says is the content of his memory, we must believe to be
the content of his memory. But, and here one moves toward pub-
licness, what one claims the memory to be of may be a public
fact or event in which case our knowledge does not logically
depend on the one reporter. I suppose that the extreme beha-
viorist would deny that there is any idle reminiscence, any
recalling to mind of past scenes and situations not told to
anyone.
The third kind of knowledge we can have is knowledge of a
person's emotions. The word "emotion" covers a great many
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things, not all of which in the degree of privacy-publicness
belong here. So I should like to restrict "emotion" to episo¬
dic emotions, i.e., emotions which occur and are felt at certain
distinct though not necessarily datable times. Included are
feelings which can be linked with some kind of occurrence word,
e.g., pangs of conscience, thrills of delight, tremors of fear,
shivers of horror, swells of pride, fits of annoyance, surges
of anger, resentment, passion.
Excluded from "emotion" in this sense are character traits,
motives, moods, e.g., vanity, good-naturedness, greed, joviality,
irascibility. The person described as 'vain' has no feeling
arising in him which he could label 'vanity'; if any feeling is
felt by him that relates to his being labeled vain, it is pro¬
bably something like self-satisfaction. It would seem that in
ordinary English "vanity" is not an emotion word at all, but
rather a word describing a person's character. My use of
"emotion" to means something felt by the person is probably
not unfaithful to ordinary language.
These kinds of private experiences are often named or de¬
scribed by analogies with the physical feelings one has. A
stab of emotional pain is like a stab of physical pain and vice
versa, nicely illustrated by the observation of a four-year old
acquaintance, who upon taking a good-sized gulp of whisky (by
mistake), said, "That hurt my feelings."
Felt emotions of the episodic sort may spread out into
mood emotions, so the distinction is not sharp. But here the
claims are only to be applied to feelings which are felt as
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occurring.
Episodic emotions can and often do give rise to behavior,
but do not have to. That is, we would not normally refuse to
allow that a person might be feeling angry, annoyed, resentful,
slighted, hurt, though he gives no behavioral sign of it.
These kinds of emotions are the sorts concerning which the
person whose feelings they are is the final authority. There
are situations which customarily produce certain feelings, e.g.,
embarrassment, but there is no necessity that these emotions
actually be felt by a particular person. The person may conse¬
quently cover up or lie with complete success, in some cases at
least.
In the case of the fourth kind of contingently public ex¬
periences , we have no access to what one claims to be presently
aware of (which is also true of memories and emotions) but we
have some public control, and in this sense, knowledge, of ex¬
periences of this sort in that we have the means of producing
them. Included in this group are pains, itches, tickles, and
other like experiences. If a child pinches another child, we
may pinch the first child to show him what the effect of his
pinch is. We believe, deeply, implicitly, without question,
that we are sufficiently alike so that what, e.g., a pinch, pro¬
duces pain for one person also produces pain for another person.
The means of producing pains or tickles are agreed upon, known,
by the community, to apply generally to members of the community.
So that a person having a pain does not always have to describe
it to give another person knowledge of it, he can - if he is
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thoroughgoing in his intent - sometimes produce it in another.
Clearly, pains, tickles, etc. differ in this way from dreams
and memories which cannot be produced at will in another.
In addition - another push toward publicness - are the
generally accepted behavioral expressions of these experiences.
A person in pain groans, writhes, has a pained expression on
his face, and/or gives some other evidence of his discomfort
usually. A person with an itch scratches. A person tickled
with a feather rubs, tickled in the ribs, laughs and/or
squirms. So we sometimes have behavioral indications when a
person is having a pain or an itch or a tickle and then a re¬
port of what he is experiencing can be dispensed with.
But such behavioral expressions are neither necessary
nor sufficient conditions for the person's having experiences
of this group. People have a mild to moderate pain and give
no behavioral sign of it. One does not feel well but has a
meeting he must go to; he covers up his discomfort: no groans
allowed, a cheerful face put on. On the other hand, one may
act as if one were sick though one feels quite well. And as¬
suredly not scratching does not mean no itch; it may be that
one politely restrains himself. Or a person may scratch not
because of an itch, but from habit or nervousness.
So self-control may repress the expressions of genuine
pains and itches, and posing - and false reports - may con¬
vince an onlooker of non-existent pains. There is no knowing
for sure whether a person is lying when he tells us he has or
hasn't a pain, and if he has good self-control, we may be alto-
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gether in the dark about a pain or itch he is experiencing, if
our knowing depends upon what he can control. If, as the sup¬
porters of the "expression theory" say, there were no reports
of pain but only expressions of pain, how could one ever lie
about it (either malingering or covering up)? In those cases
where lying is possible, doubt is possible.
The possibility of doubt does not exist in cases of suffi¬
cient bodily disorder or damage. In cases of obvious somatic
damage, e.g., a bad cut, broken bones, symptoms of body disorder,
our conviction that the person is suffering (or about to suffer
as soon as the shock or anaesthetic wears off) is complete. But
the conviction does not rest on his report or controllable be¬
havior but on the evidence that he is hurt, and the knowledge
that a higher animal damaged in that way necessarily suffers.
That higher animals damaged to such an extent hurt is not
a contingent fact, at least not contingent in the sense that
one must find out each time whether a damaged organism is hurt¬
ing. It is a universal truth of higher animals, a necessary
truth based on what is needed for the organism to survive. Or¬
ganisms which could undergo any amount of damage without pain
would be destroyed, not having a spur to move them away from
further damage.
A person badly hurt does not need to persuade us that he
is hurting. We are convinced. Perhaps in the cases of anaes¬
thetic persons who feel no pain we help and sympathize because
their organisms are out-of-order and must be repaired if they
are to carry on.
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The fact remains that there are cases where we have per-
fact assurance that someone is hurting® But where our convicbion
lacks no degree of perfection it will not be based solely on
what the person says or does which he can control, but upon the
condition of the organism and the circumstances.
Sense experiences constitute the fifth kind of experiences
which can be communicated. Experiences coming through our five
senses make up this group, and these experiences are character¬
ized by being of or having as object a public entity. If I say
that I see a red ball, another person (of normal vision) should
be able to look and see the red ball also. For what I mean by
saying "I see a red ball", is that there is a red ball 'out
there', not only in my experience. Since when I make a claim
about an object which I have sensed, I claim that others should
be able to sense it too, most emphatically others should not be
ignorant of the object of my experience.
If one made a claim about an object one was sensing, and
no other persons around could sense that object, one might mo¬
dify the claim from being an assertion about public objects to
being a description only about one's own sense experience.
E.g., if one says he hears a high-pitched noise and others say
they do not hear it, one may say, "My ears must be ringing."
One thereby allows that in this case one's senses are not giving
information about the public world as they normally do.
Sense experiences or sense data, in themselves, are hardly
ever mentioned except by philosophers. Ordinary people do not
say, "I am having an experience of round redness"; they would
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say that they were seeing a red ball. But there is an ordinary
language locution which stresses the private side of the claim.
Suppose someone says, "I see a red ball." The emphasis is then
on the public object. But other persons around him may insist
that the ball is not red at all. He may then say, "Well, it
looks red to me." This expression is then intended to stress
the private experiential quality present to him.
The sense experience however is normally important prima¬
rily as it gives information about the world. When one sense
is failing to give accurate information about the world, then
attention is drawn to the failing organ, and the inaccurate ex¬
perience is used to give information about the wayward body.
Because of the possibility of a sense organ's failing to
give a correct picture of the world, when a person gives a re¬
port of a sense experience which is incorrect as compared to
the world, we do not necessarily believe right away that the
person is lying. His sense equipment may be 'off', or he may
be attaching labels differently from us. We might check for
the latter possibility and if we agreed on labels, but still
disagreed on the appropriate labels in this instance, go on to
test the possibility that someone's sense equipment was faulty.
But we could never come to the conclusion that the other per¬
son was definitely lying in reporting his experience as he did
so long as he maintained it consistently.
Because there are so many and diverse kinds of sense ex¬
periences , no one requirement for accepted behavioral expression
can be given for all of them. If one makes an affirmative as-
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sertion, that he sees or hears something, he should be able to
point to the seen object or the direction from which the sound
comes at least. Failure to be able to point to the object or
the direction from which the sound is supposedly coming, once
doubt of his veracity has arisen, would make us mistrust the
person's claim. We could not be sure that he was lying. But
if he couldn'k give us some behavioral evidence or a detailed
report, we might suspect that he was lying or simply ignore
his report.
Denying that he sensed something which we believed that he
should be able to sense might leave us uncertain. If he denied
seeing something, say, a chair, we might lead hi.in to it to see
whether he would avoid it. If he did, we would likely disbe¬
lieve his assertion that he did not see it.
But often our sense experiences are not expressed in beha¬
vior. One hears pigeons, sees flowers outside the window,
feels a breeze, tastes the toothpaste flavor left in one's
mouth, smells soap scent of one's hands, but no action follows
from these sense experiences. However when we do act, our be¬
havior is based on our sense experiences, and consequently all
behavior gives us some information about what the actor is sen¬
sing. I might add that I am not asserting that all one's sen¬
sations are explicitly known.
These casual remarks may serve to illustrate that the be¬
havioral requirements vary from one kind of sense experience
to another and. between affirmations and denials. But testing
a person who makes certain claims about sense experiences is
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is more feasible than in the case of the other kinds of expe¬
riences so far discussed because the sense experience almost
j
always claims to thave as its object a public entity so that
we can compare others* assertions with our own experiences.
We cannot however compare our experiences to others * ex¬
periences. The experiences are in their occurrence ineluctably
private. That sense experiences are private is further evidenced
by the not-nonsensical question: do you see red the way I see
red? and its indeterminableness, though we both stop at red
lights, i.e., behave similarly. For some kinds of situations,
the appropriate responding behavior is all that matters. But
even in these situations the behavior - however appropriate,
like stopping for a red light - is not what we mean by saying,
"I saw the red light."
Coming to the next kind of experiences, we find that be¬
havior is usually entailed. This fifth group includes inten¬
tions and meanings. Fulfilling or embodying behavior is re¬
quired in some cases. For example, if on a summer day in Texas
when the temperature stands at 107 degrees a person says, "It's
hot today", and then proceeds to put on an overcoat to go out¬
doors , we would want some justification or think that he did not
know the meaning of "It's hot".
As an example of an intention's requiring fulfilling beha¬
vior we might consider the following. A friend sayS, "I intend
to take a trip tomorrow", but has done nothing to prepare him¬
self (and it seems to us that the kind of trip he is intending
to take would require a great deal of preparation, planning an
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itinerary, looking at maps, getting clothes and supplies, buy¬
ing tickets, etc.). Would we think that he intended to go?
And when tomorrow comes and goes and he has not left on his
trip, would we then believe that he really had intended to go
at all? Or consider a farmer who says for three years that he
intends to fix a tractor standing immobile in the yard. Would
we think he really intends to?
My opinion is that we are all likely to take a person at
his word prima facie but to expect the appropriate fulfilling
behavior which is part of the meaning. And then if the occa¬
sion for the appropriate behavior comes and goes without the
action's coming to pass, we doubt that the person meant what he
said. Further evidence may be needed before we can decide whe¬
ther he was confused about the meaning of what he said, or whe¬
ther he is of infirm resolve, or 'whether he intentionally lied.
The behavioral component of meaning and intention - when
there is such a component - carries us further toward public-
ness, for we in these cases do not have to rely on a person's
report of his own understanding of what he intended or meant
(as we must wait in the case of dreams or memories). We can
observe and thereby infer his unr-eported intentions, and test
for confirmation his announced intentions. We listen to his
words and then watch for behavior to fulfill his meaning.
It would simplify our task appreciably if we could go so
far as to say that intentions and meanings must always be ex¬
pressed behaviorally, which would amount to making them logi¬
cally public. We could then say: no fulfilling behavior, no
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intention or meaning. But two facts keep us from this dictum.
First, in a conversation, a person may claim to be misun¬
derstood, to have been misinterpreted though he has not had an
opportunity to act on what he has said. Neither he nor his in¬
terlocutor ( s ) could have learned his meaning from his behavior.
So the most plausible way of accounting for such misunderstand¬
ing is to say that this person had a meaning in mind (or an en¬
tertained meaning), that from the verbal responses of his inter¬
locutor^) he could tell that the meaning grasped by them was
not the meaning entertained by him. If he says that what they
understood him to have meant was not what he meant, and if what
he first said might possibly be taken to mean that which he later
claims to have meant, his interlocutors cannot dispute his re¬
port (though they might think he had expressed himself badly).
The interlocutors would believe that he had a meaning, in mind,
non-behavioral. In the absence of confirming or disconfirming
behavior we do not in practice deny meaning to a person's signi¬
ficant gestures.
The second objection, this one to making intentions wholly
behavioral, is that there are intentions not only made or arrived
at privately, but also fulfilled privately. One may intend to
count sheep until one goes to sleep, and no one else, not even
one's bedpartner, will know. If one has lost something, he may
intend to review in his mind the places where he was, in an ef¬
fort to recall the place where he might have left it. One may
thus intend, and fulfill one's intention, privately, without
any one else having any knowledge of it at all, for there is
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nothing public to it, neither what is intended nor the means of
fulfilling the intention. The person with such a private in¬
tention may, of course, report it but whether he tells the truth
or not, we cannot know.
It is true that some intentions are never explicitly enter¬
tained; one may simply set about the (intended) task. That there
is no explicit intention does not mean that there is no end or
purpose. It only means that people sometimes act purposively
without explicitly symbolizing the end.
The conclusion concerning meanings and intentions is that
they are two-sided, with a private, entertained aspect and a
public, behavioral aspect. Sometimes one aspect may be lacking
or unimportant. But its occasional absence gives us no right to
deny it completely.
Like intendings and meanings in having two aspects - private
and behavioral - are tastes and preferences, our next kind of
private/public knowledge. We observe how a person dresses, to
which music he listend, what food he eats, whether he goes to
art galleries, which books he reads, what colors he uses in his
house and on his person, etc. to determine what his tastes are,
or, in other words, what gives him pleasure. His verbal reports
provide information, but probably if there is a discrepancy be¬
tween his behavior and his report, we put more stock in our
opinion based on his behavior than his report, which is likely
influenced by what he thinks he ought to prefer. (How much cre¬
dence is put in the report of a person claiming to greatly enjoy
serious music who never listens to it on the radio, does not
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have a record-player, never goes to concerts, not even free
ones?) We may ascertain a person's tastes, even our own, by
watching behavior. But we know that there are cases of and
reasons for pretence, for it is thought better to like some
things than to like other things, so we do not claim to have
certain knowledge even from observing behavior regarding some¬
body's tastes.
If it were not for the possibility of pretence, we could
say that tastes and preferences are expressed necessarily in
behavior. B\at part of the meaning of taste or preference is
the enjoyed pleasure from the thing preferred and there is no
inviolable connection between this enjoyed pleasure and ful¬
filling behavior. The connection is rather only a frequent
and customary one. So the behavior may be dissembled, the ap¬
propriate pleasure reported, and conviction in the onlooker
may be complete.
Summary of self-knowledge
1. Experiences in their occurrance are private.
2. Each person recognizes himself and knows himself to be
unique. It is his consciousness which he recognizes because
nothing else about him is logically unique. Because of its
uniqueness, each consciousness is indescribably, therefore in¬
communicable, and consequently the knowledge of it is logically
private.
3. Ignorance of other's experiences and successful lying
are evidence for the privacy of experience. Not all experi-
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ences require or even admit of behavioral expression.
4. We know about the content of another person's dream
only what he tells us. He may know about his dream though he
doesn't tell anyone.
5. What another person remembers we know only if he tells
us. But if the memory is of a public fact or event, there are
some checks on his story.
6. Emotions, e.g., fear, horror, annoyance, are felt as
episodes of experience. There are customary connections be¬
tween situations and feelings.
7. Behavioral expression as well as reports of pains,
itches, tickles are possible. But concerning these experiences
one may lie and feign the suitable actions to convince another
of what is not the case. Public means exist of producing these
experiences. Given sufficient evidence of somatic damage, no
doubt concerning pain is possible.
8. The objects of sense experiences are ordinarily public
entities. But disagreement over labels and the possibility of
a disordered sense organ would make us hesitate before we as¬
serted that a report differing from our own experience was a
lie. All behavior is based on sense experience, but not all
sense experiences are behaviorally expressed.
9. Meanings and intentions are two-aided, with a private,
entertained aspect and a public, behavioral aspect. If an in¬
tention (or meaning) admits of or requires behavioral fulfill¬
ing, we may demand such behavior before we are convinced.
10. Tastes and preferences are similarly two-sided. The
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enjoyed pleasure and fulfilling behavior behavior are not in¬
violably connected.
88
D. Knowledge of others
In the last section we discussed the kinds of knowledge
of persons in each of which what is privately experienced plays
some part. There were certain facts (lying, malingering, ig¬
norance) cited which seem to me to be sufficient evidence for
there being a private aspect to some kinds of things that we
know about persons.
In this section I should like to consider kinds of knowledge
in which what is known about a person is not what he privately
experiences. That is, what is experienced by the person is not
the basis for the knowledge that we have of that person. Beha¬
vior and verbal performances constitute the grounds of these
kinds of knowledge, so these kinds of knowledge are public.
Of these actions and the abilities attributed on the basis of
actions may be kept secret, i.e., never be done publicly, and
in this sense be contingently public. The other kinds of know¬
ledge treated in this section are logically public, meaning
that the person to whom this knowledge pertains cannot know it
unless at least on other person knows it too.
I
Then I shall consider how it is possible that we have
knowledge of other persons at all.
These are the facts to be used:
1. We have knowledge of people's actions.
2. We attribute skills, competences, abilities, knowledge
to people on the basis of what they do, though sometimes we
will allow prima facie that someone has an ability on the basis
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of what they report to us.
3. That people have certain roles is known by other persons
and is possible only in relation to other persons.
4. People have ranks or statuses within a group. These
ranks or statuses consist in the estimations of members of the
group.
5. Infants imitate sounds, gestures, and actions.
6. We understand what people mean when they tell us about
what has no behavioral expression, e.g., dreams, reminiscences,
intentions to be fulfilled at some future time or privately.
a
We also understand descriptive reports of pains and emtions
A
which can have some behavioral expression sometimes.
7. People believe themselves to be sometimes understood,
sometimes not understood.
8. Co-operative effort among two or more persons is an
everyday occurrence.
9. Human society in one form or another has endured for
thousands of years. Culture is cumulative,ie., it is not the
case that each person must himself discover all the knowledge
he will accumulate.
What we shall concern ourselves with first are the remain¬
ing kinds of things we know about persons which I want to dis¬
cuss. The first of these remaining kinds of knowledge is the
actions of persons. By "act" or "action" is meant "behavior
requiring some sort of bodily movement or position". "Position"
is included so that sitting, standing, lying down, etc. will
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count as acts. Verbal acts will count as behavior when the
use of symbols is part or the whole of what is attributed on
the basis of the language use. (Cf. above pp. 68-9)
Now the proposition that an act requires bodily movement
or position entails that an act cannot be logically private in
the way a thought can be since an act of a body is observable
if there are other persons present. Our bodies are perceptible
in the way any extended object is perceptible. A person's act,
necessarily requiring a body, is therefore perceptible in the
way that any object is perceptible.
Part of what we mean by saying an act is public is that
other people can get into a position to 'witness it. No matter
how close and how attentive another person may be, he can never
perceive or witness my dream. But if another person does not
(by chance) witness my action, he can if he chooses come within
range and observe me the next time. I cannot assert that he is
logically unable to perceive my act, as I plainly can in the
case of a dream.
It is of course possible that one might act without there
being any other persons present so that one might be the only
person who had knowledge of this act, and in this sense, the
knowledge of the act and the act could be private. Not all of
our acts are public, but they are then only contingently private,
because they are able to be public. Acts are contingently
private-public but in an even stronger sense than reportable
experiences are contingently private-public, since if the act
can be repeated, one can witnesses of its occurrence in a way
h
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one can never have witnesses of the occurrence of one's own
experiences.
Actions cannot then be kept completely secret or success¬
fully lied about in the way that experiences such as dreams or
memories can be.
Even though I think and assert that experiences occur pri¬
vately, I do not think that abilities are something which occur
privately, nor do we attribute knowledge to someone on the sole
basis of what he experiences. If we want to know what a person's
abilities are, we observe his actions. We may for convenience's
sake ask him for a verbal statement of what he can do, but this
is not a verbal report of what he privately experiences and alone
has access to. Instead, if he is not merely reporting what he
wishes he could do, he tells what he has on occasion done (be-
haviorally) which he likely can tell because he has heard others
give the appraisal he now gives.
There is more than a single meaning to "ability" which plu¬
rality of meanings perhaps has caused the confusion. We say a
person has an ability, e.g., the ability to swim, when he is
actually swimming. What a person is doing, we are willing to
say he knows how to do. So one meaning of "ability" is know¬
ledge or competence. Though we would allow that a person has
an ability (in this sense) if and only if he (when challenged)
gives actual behavioral evidence of this ability, we would not
want to say that he has the ability only when (for the period of
time that) he is actually giving us an example of this ability.
During the time between the behavioral instances of his ability
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he also has the ability, but the meaning is now what he could
do if circumstances arose appropriate to his actualizing this
dormant ability or disposition. What the ontological status of
a dormant ability or disposition is seems to be usually some
kind of logical or intentional status. Its status is not that
of a private experience, so behaviorists are quite right in in¬
sisting that an ability is not something privately experienced.
In the first sense of competence, an ability is something beha¬
vioral; in the second sense of disposition, an ability is not
something actually behavioral, but no more is it something ex¬
periential. One's ability to swim or knit between occasions of
actually swimming or knitting does not consist in one's enter¬
taining the awareness of how to swim or knit or in an awareness
of anything whatsoever.
The third meaning of "ability" is closer to the second
than the first. It can be understood best perhaps by means of
an example. A normal man who has never swum still has the abi¬
lity to swim, we say. Being a normal member of a class whose
members can swim, if they learn how, he would be able to swim
if he learned how. The ability to swim in a person who has
never swum is a latent ability, depending on his actual physical
characteristics which in the case of others are the means of their
swimming.
These last two meanings of "ability" include something not
at this moment or not yet actual. An ability in the first sense
is an actual competence (consisting in the behavioral performance).
An ability in the second and third senses is something potential,
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a potentiality, we could say, which may be actualized.
Having seen these three distinguishable meanings of "abi¬
lity", we can now see why a compound confusion about the status
of abi3ities may occur. One plausible account of how such con¬
fusion arises is this. The words "act" and "actual" look as if
they are logically related (they are etymologically related).
From saying "act" and "actual" are related it is only a (mis¬
taken) step to saying acts - and only acts - are actual. So
that what is not an act is not actual. In the sense that "act"
has been defined here as requiring bodily movement or position,
this is clearly not true. Experiences are actual too. Ignoring
or denying that they are is the first mistake. The next mistake
consists in saying that if dispositions and latent abilities are
not actual, then they must somehow be experiential, because ex¬
periences also are not actual. So abilities are experiential,
that is, something experienced by the person to whom the abili¬
ties are attributed.
These confusions can be eliminated by laying out the pairs
of terms we want to contrast and making clear which equivalences
are not asserted.
Terms are often contrasted in the following ways:
1. Mental - physical
2. Experiential - behavioral
3. Private - public
4. Potential - actual.
I think that 1. is the only confusing or positively erro¬
neous one. Though the contrasts in 2, 3, and 4 are all right,
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it would be a mistake to go on to assert the equivalences be¬
tween all the first column words and all the second column
words. What is experiential is private but not potential, ra¬
ther actual. What is behavioral _is public. Dispositions
though often part of a behavioristic analysis of persons are
not actual but potential.
But the behaviorists are right in saying that when it comes
to knowing the abilities - either mental or physical - that a
person has, what he does behaviorally is what decides the ques¬
tion.
The next kind of knowledge that we have of persons is of
the roles (or functions) they have. This word, "role", is used
in the sense social scientists not theatre people would give
it. Examples of roles are: parent, friend, teacher, president,
guest, hostess, spouse, correspondent, tourist. "Role" will be
defined as "the set of actions and duties that a person is ex¬
pected to perform with regard to other persons in a particular
kind of social situation".
Roles are even more public than actions, in that one cannot
have a role and know that one has that role without at least
one other person knowing about it too. One cannot be a spouse
without at least one's spouse knowing it. One cannot be a
teacher without one or more students knowing it.
In this sense roles are logically public, at the opposite
pole from what is logically private (which can be known only
by oneself). How one thinks about the role or, said differently,
one's feeling, affects how one plays the role but neither the
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feeling nor anything else experienced pfivately constitutes
the role.
It should not be thought that the roles we play are only
of interest to others, not to ourselves. For what we know
about ourselves depends largely on the roles we have, and what
we do and must do depend on the demands and possibilities of
our roles. A woman who has no husband cannot be a devoted
wife. A person cannot be a brilliant lecturer if he has no
audience.
The numerous roles we play describe us not only for others
but for ourselves. The roles we play inform us as well as others
of our place in the scheme of things, at least the social scheme
of things.
But we want to know not only what we are to do, which sets
of duties and problems are ours, but we also want to know how
this ranks us in respect to others, which brings us to the last
sort of knowledge had of persons to be considered, status.
"Status" is here defined as "standing or prestige of a person
within a group". Roles may be compared and rank-ordered, e.g.,
the role of doctor has more status than the role of garbage-
collector. A doctor can know he has more prestige qua doctor
than a garbage-collector has qua garbage-collector. Also there
is ranking within an occupation, i.e., among doctors as a class
and among garbage-collectors as a class. Doctors and garbage-
collectors can be better or worse at what they are supposed to
do and they can be esteemed by others to a greater or lesser
degree.
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About a person's status something rather surprising (at
first, at least) is true: that others very likely know more
about one's status (or statuses, if one prefers to say that one
has a status in each group of which he is a member) than one
knows oneself. Or more accurately, others probably know more
precisely how Everyman is rated than Everyman himself. Every¬
man's status is a fact about Everyman, yet others have better
knowledge of it than he.
Everyman's opinion of himself does not, of course, consti¬
tute his status, since status is something ascribed by others.
Status does something to and for persons which one's own opinion
cannot do. This is why status within a group is important to us,
and why knowing a person's status conveys solid and useful infor¬
mation to us.
We may certainly want to have a person's opinion of what
he thinks his status is. Eut if we want to know how good a
doctor a man is, we would place far less wMght on his self-
appraisal than on the evaluations of others. Some people under¬
rate thamselves and some people over-rate themselves and we can¬
not know which in a particular instance. So we rely more ofi the
opinions of others which are likely to be more just. Now it is
not Everyman telling about his experiences (of self-appraisal)
to others, but others relating Everyman's status to whomever it
may concern. Indeed there are other ways than a straight-forward
verbal statement to indicate how a person is ranked; there are
behavioral ways, subtle gestures of deference and disdain, which
we also understand.
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Knowledge of persons* roles and statuses is probably the
most informative kind of knowledge that we can have of persons
for roles are summaries of the relations into which one enters
and statuses are summaries of one's success in those relations.
To summarize. There are many kinds of things that we can
know about persons, ranging from each person's knowledge of his
own identity through dreams, memories, emotions, sense experi¬
ences , intentions, tastes, acts, abilities, roles, and statuses.
There is no way, no single way, of acquiring these differing
kinds of knowledge, but rather three, experiencing (in one's
own case), verbal reports, and observing of behavior.
Having disposed of the various kinds of knowledge, I shall
move on then to consider how it is possible that we have know¬
ledge of other persons.
One source of answers (at least answers that would be
thought consistent, complete, and exact) to a philosophical
question such as this can be ruled out, namely, what ordinary
people say in reply to such a question. To be sure of getting
adequate answers from ordinary people, one should have to teach
them how to make fine distinctions, how to put the label that
they really mean on an act, object, or quality, and how to fit
their replies together so that they do not contradict themselves.
They would then no longer be ordinary people.
Normally persons exhibit more varied, consistent, and ade¬
quate behavior than they have language for. The excess of beha¬
vioral subtlety and adequacy over verbal subtlety and adequacy
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is what influences me to rely less upon the language (some
would say metalanguage) that ordinary persons use than upon
the behavioral practices of ordinary persons to determine what
is and must be true of persons. The wife who circumvents a
long-standing point of disagreement with her husband, the mother
who distracts a child from naughtiness, the hostess who inter¬
rupts an increasingly-warming discussion between antagonistic
guests, the person who teases a reactionary friend out of his
prejudices, the psychiatrist who prods and puts through paces
Mongolian idiots during a demonstration for medical students -
to mention only an infinitesmal number of actions out of the
range of possible ones - might all be able to give some descrip¬
tion of what they were doing. But their descriptions would not
very likely match their performances in insight, subtlety, and
"on the mark-ness". That they could 'see' and state the signi¬
ficance or implications of their acts is extremely improbable.
If ordinary persons• language were consistently adequate to their
behavior, the honor given to and admiration felt for those who
make explicit in symbolized form what is going on would be super¬
erogatory.
But to say that persons' behavior is more adequate thai
their descriptions of their behavior is not to say that their
language is insignificant. It is not. For, as Descartes
pointed out, the language of a person differs from a parrot's
by its consistency, variety, flexibility, and appropriateness
to many different kinds of questions and situations, which a
parrot's is not.
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The first answer then to our question: how do we know that
(other) persons are persons? is by the consistency, variety,
flexibility, and appropriateness of their language.
To further answer the question we might again mention the
five phenomena discussed in Chapter 1 which we said there could
be best understood by attributing self-consciousness to the
beings displaying such behavior and traits. They are: 1) self-
correction, 2) embarrassment, 3) practicing, 4) learning many
and many different kinds of things from one another and from
verbal descriptions, and 5) lying. When we see beings display¬
ing such traits, we believe that such beings are self-conscious
persons.
Also we believe that persons respond not only according to
some totally predetermined impressed pattern but in some cases
spontaneously, not by rote. This has been discussed above under
Change. Probably if we felt that only a rote, unoriginal re¬
sponse could be gotten from an entity, this entity would be a
machine or a psychotic.
The requirement that a person's behavior be at least in
part non-rote might rule out machines. But I do not think that
another condition would be necessary and therefore result in
machines' being ruled out from being persons, namely, that a
person be born of persons. I think that this condition is not
necessary for we do not in fact know this about many of the
persons around us and asserting it as a necessary condition does
not lead us to anything illuminating about persons. With such
a necessary condition only persons present at an individual's
100
birth would be really entitled to treat that individual as a
person. We could always doubt the legitimacy to our own claim
not having witnessed our birth. There is nothing in the overt
behavior of a person which would prove that he was born of per¬
sons though there is a great deal in his behavior to show that
he was personified by persons. Whatever might be told me about
my own or some other person's origin, my conviction that we are
persons would remain unshakeable, so long as we can bhave and
speak with the requisite consistency, variety, appropriateness,
and originality.
There is a necessary condition, a corollary of what has
been said above, of interest for its implications for relations
with God. It is a necessary condition of being a person that
another person have or have had some knowledge of this kind of
entity but not complete knowledge. There must be some knowledge
because another person must have known Everyman in order for
Everyman to have become a person. The knowledge must be incom¬
plete because in order for knowledge of Everyman to be complete,
Everyman's awareness would have to be shared by this Compleat
Knower. And then there would not be two separate persons but
only one, the coalescence of the two.
And separate we must be. By group or community we do not
mean one large-size or super person but the collection (more
or less cohesive) of separate persons^.
But if we are separate, how is it that we can form commu¬
nities, i.e., communicate, with others separate from oneself?
The problem of connecting separate individuals with others
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is the same problem as connecting the three ways of knowing
persons, since the problem is that of connecting what is pri¬
vate with what is public. The problem is to link private ex¬
perience (which needs to be made accessible, knowable to others,
public) with behavior which is public, knowable to and by others
(which needs to be connected with what is not knowable simply
through behavior or which may be quite different from what is
indicated in behavior).
That which connects behavior with experience are words or
symbols. For convenience I shall consider mostly spoken words,
though what is said could and does apply to sign language, a
touch language such as Anne Sullivan used at first with Helen
Keller, and could apply (though I do not know that such a lan¬
guage has been actually used with children first learning a
language) to some kind of visual representation like hierogly¬
phics or sand painting.
What is needed and is present in the word or any similar
symbol is: first, a public, behaviorally producible and control¬
lable aspect. The word (as it occurs first to the child and for
a long period of history before there was a written language)
has a sound which strikes the ear like any noise does and which
can be produced by the organism employing diaphram, larnyx,
mouth, tongue, etc. Sign language entails an arrangement and
movement of hands, arms, face, etc. which are public objects
just like any other extended objects; hands, arms, face, etc.
can be controlled, moved at will. A pictorial representation
could be put onto any extended surface, one would see it in the
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way one sees any arrangement of colored areas or lines on an
extended surface, and one would produce these 'pictures' by
arranging with hands, feet, or mouth (as armless painters hold
a paintbrush)varieties of extended substances, twigs, sand, pens,
pencils, etc. It is logically possible that a language depend¬
ing on smell or taste (which includes smell) could be used. One
would have to learn ways of controlling particular odors or
tastes which would come to have definite, delimited, interrelated,
public (interpersonal) meanings. But I do not know that there
are any such languages. There might be certain practical prob¬
lems militating against their development and use.
A second characteristic of a word is its being able to
stand for or refer to something besides its own perceptible
properties. A spoken word must be not only a sound, but also
stand for, point to something beyond it. With practice our at¬
tention does not catch on the sound but moves to something fur¬
ther. This something further may be public or private; in tem¬
poral order the first referents intended by the child with his
early words are public.
The third characteristic of the symbol is its having an
entertained or experienced aspect. To use a word (as contrasted
with parroting it), one must know or be aware of, have a concept
of, what it refers to, or means. A parrot merely produces the
sounds without intending anything thereby. A person using words
intends to affect another person, to communicate to him what he
(the first) is thinking of.
The fourth characteristic of words that are the means of
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linking public and private is the connectedness amon^ words and
concepts. The concepts expressed by these words have conceptual
entailments. Words can be defined in terms of other words.
That these four aspects of words do in fact obtain would,
I think, be generally granted. That they must obtain in any
going concern of persons is my further assertion. For if any
one of them were absent, words would not be the means of com¬
municating, of establishing community among separate persons,
and could not be the means of socializing children. Words play
an indispensible function in personifying individuals.
Giving a description of how the child comes to use words,
how he comes to be a person, if successful, should be sufficient
to show how the ways of getting knowledge of persons are con¬
nected, how the private is connected with the public. This is
not merely a possibly interesting addition but of the very
essence since I have claimed that persons are made. To describe
their ontogeny is to describe their beings. However much of
them is produced by socialization is rendered intelligible, by
the description of the formation process.
Persons must have both private and public aspects con¬
nected by words. So persons must have some use of language
in order to be persons. The account of acquiring language fol¬
lows .
What appears first in the temporal order is an animal of
the species Homo sapiens. All the persons that we know are mem¬
bers of the same animal species which makes their personifica¬
tion much easier to understand, though I do not think that all
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persons must be members of Homo sapiens. It may be that they
must be socialized by members of their own species.
But let us consider our species of animals and concern
ourselves with accounting for the personification of other phy¬
sical types when persons of these types appear.
The animal arrives with body and consciousness, not self-
consciousness though. With few exceptions we believe that
higher animals feel pain, enjoy some foods and activities, have
sense experiences, dream, etc.
The infant like calves, lambs, kittens, baby birds, and
other young animals, makes noises; it cries, gurgles, coos, etc.
And like other animals, it imitates.
But infants can imitate far more varied acts and sounds
than other animals. (I was surprised to learn from Charles
Hartshorne, the expert on songbirds, that the mockingbird can
imitate as many as 75 different songs.) This instinct to imi¬
tate is clearly present in an examplary way in birds and por¬
poises as well as in homonoid animals. If this instinct to imi¬
tate were not granted, some other account of the acts which ap¬
pear to be imitations must be given. One alternative given is
that these behavior patterns are innate. I find it so implausi¬
ble that innumerable behavior patterns could be innate, lying in
wait, ready to be activated, that I reject this possibility. My
own experience with children would disconfirm the innateness
of behavior patterns which look like imitations (to me); the
acts which can be imitated are so disparate, so unnesded in the
young animal. Once moved by a lively and elegant Brandenberg
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Concerto of Bach's playing on the phonograph, I began to "con¬
duct" the music, waving my arms in imitation of the conductors
I had seen. A young child, seven months old, also enjoying the
music, waved his arms in a somewhat less faithful (I fancy)
imitation of me. To hypothesize an innate readiness to "con¬
duct" likely useless (to the organism) music seems to me to
violate egregiously Occam's Razor. Imitation is plainly a more
parsimonious explanation. The imitation instinct postulated is
a general one: to imitate as well as it can those beings around
it with which it identifies. The usefulness of such an instinct
is obvious.
In order to imitate, an animal must be conscious because it
must see or hear what it will imitate.
So far in this account we have then a conscious animal imi¬
tating an unlimited variety of acts and sounds of those around
him.
When even so much as the ability to imitate is allowed in
the infant, there is already something 'inner' granted. How is
that? a sceptical interlocutor might ask. My reply is as fol¬
lows. If one observes the act of imitation closely, one sees
that something is needed to translate the perception of the act
to be imitated into the performance of the imitating act. Con¬
sider an imitated word. It is heard as a sound. But to pro¬
duce it the proper innervation of diaphram, throat, and mouth
muscles is needed. There is a something interposing itself be¬
tween public sound produced by him who is imitated and public
sound produced by him who imitates. This (which is interposed)
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is not perceived by persons around and is in that sense 'in'
the imitator, but is not equivalent to what I have been calling
'private' since what I have been calling 'private' is known
consciously by him 'in' whom it is. The inner something which
connects a perception of the act to be imitated with the doing
of the imitating act is surely not known by the lower animal
which imitates and probably not even (in many cases) by the
adult person. But there is already something not public to the
animal.
Among the array of acts and sounds the child imitates are
words, which may be to the child at first like any sound that
he makes. But the sounds which constitute the public percepti¬
ble aspects of \7ords have effects in the environment tb£t some
other sounds do not have. "Mama" spoken has the effect of bring¬
ing mama, the purveyor of pleasure, which another sound produced
consciously by the child does not have. The power that pronoun¬
cing words gives a child must seem miraculous to him.
Referents of these first words are public: persons, objects,
qualities. How are words learned for what is not public? Here I
think the fact that the teaching persons and the learning child
belong to the same animal species is of crucial importance. The
adults around the infant believe that the child is like them,
that his organism functions like theirs, that he feels cold if
it is cold, that he feels hungry when he has not eaten for some
time, that he feels pain if he gets stuck with a pin or bumps
his head or skins his knee. They would supply a word for the
child (to learn) at the appropriate time when the circumstances
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are such that the adults would believe that the child not only
is but must be feeling what the same situation would produce in
them. In addition to the situation (cold, period of time with¬
out food, prick, bump) the child gives behavioral evidence such
as shivering, 'fussing', crying. The situation, the behavior,
and the organism's processes are all public, perceptible to more
than one person. To a mother whose child is shivering, the idea
that an 'outsider' cannot know what the child is feeling and
that the child may be feeling something different from cold
would be incredible and absurd. To her the suggestion that the
child may feel what she would call "pleasure" rather than what
she calls "pain" when he bumps his head is ridiculous. At the
time when words are being learned, convincingly dissembling be¬
havior is not possible to the child. The behavior is on the
animal level, reflexive.
The adults do not hesitate in their labeling, though what
they are labeling is not something public. They give the label
to something which they cannot perceive that they believe occurs
within the child. For them the hunger is not the eagerness with
which the child eats. Nor is the pain his crying. There is for
them other than the action and body of the child, though the as-
A
pect of the child which the adults believe exists and is private
(to the child) is not yet known to be private by the child.
The child can now use some words like "hurt", "hungry",
"thirsty"; he can use them about himself, at the least, since
these words serve as request words which get something done for
him.
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There are two further questions to be answered: 1) how
does the child learn to use these words about others? and
2) how does he learn to think using words to himself without
expressing them aloud to others?
Learning to apply words with private referents to other
persons comes about in situations where such words are applied
to others (than the learning child) by adults. The child hears
someone describe himself or some third person as "hungry",
"thirsty", or "hurt". The person applying the label may do so
to himself on the basis of what le experiences or to another on
the basis of what he (the label-user) perceives in the situation
or in the individual to whom the label is applied, in just the
way that the adult applied the label to the child. And again
the common membership in the species Homo Sapiens (which the
child must realize very early in order to imitate) is crucial.
If the young child hears the same word being applied to another
person, he would have no reason to believe that what he feels is
not felt by another when the word is used about some individual
other than himself. Why should he balk? He has learned to use
the word about himself by imitating others; the same imitating
would bring him to use the word univocally applying to others
as to himself. The method of learning self-descriptive and other
descriptive words is the same, and provides the link between felt
and behavioral sides of the meaning of a word like "pain", the
link between the different methods of gaining knowledge of per¬
sons .
The physical and controllable ground of some private experi-
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ences mentioned above in the section on self-knowledge can also
be used. A child who pinches another child may be pinched in
turn and told, "You see, that hurts." (We believe that pinches
feel the same to everyone.) Most children seem to get the con¬
nection between pinching and pain quickly, and to understand
that this connection does not hold only in one's own case but
also for others. There is no logical or temporal priority of
the self-use over the other-use; the point is that the process
is the same for learning to use the words about oneself and
others.
The first private referents will be then experiences de¬
pendent on the animal organism, e.g., pain, hunger, thirst,
cold, warmth, etc.
Granted now that the child can use words like "hurt"
and "hungry". How does he learn to think using words without
expressing them aloud to others? How can he sever the public
perceptible aspect of the word from its entertained aspect?
The question already reveals that I think that the non-express¬
ing of these inner experiences is learned, though the experience
itself in its occurrence is always, consistently, unalterably
private. For the child the seemingly necessary connection be¬
tween the entertaining of the meaning of a word and the produc¬
ing of its public perceptible aspect (sound, in the case of the
spoken words we have been considering) is severed only through
training.
At this point a further consideration enters: the require¬
ments of social living. There are plainly situations where one
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may not say whatever comes to mind. V/hat comes to mind is
hurtful, disruptive, or perhaps only unwanted. (Whoever has
been around children and has had to endure their ceaseless prat¬
tle will have a vivid grasp of the meaning of "unwanted".) The
child is asked not to talk so much, or not to say what hurts
other people's feelings, and may be punished for speaking 'out-
of-turn*. With the spur of such sanctions, everyone comes to
realize that he can think without speaking, since he must. Be¬
cause it is demanded that the individual censor his speech, he
does.
/
The naxessary connection felt to exist between speech and
thought is perfectly illustrated by something actually said by
a youthful acquaintance of mine. Upon being scolded for some¬
thing or other, and clearly resenting the slight to her amour-
propre, the pre-schooler said, "IVe got eyes, I. can see. I've
got ears, I can hear. I've got a mouth, I can think."
The fact is that we demand reticence and reserve; without
them groups could not function. So the spoken aspect of the
word is held back. No doubt such repression inpairs the flow
and liveliness of some people's thought.
Once language has been acquired, the most natural state is
for the child to say whatever comes to mind for which he has or
can devise words. But in order for an individual to be thought
responsible for what he says, he must be able not to say it.
Until he can not say things, he is not held responsible for what
he does say. And until he is responsible for what he says, he
is not a full-fledged person and not given the privileges of
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full-fledge persons. His utterances cannot be treated with
the gravity and respect that a person's intentional statements
are. When a young child says something uncomplimentary, he
cannot be thought malicious, as is a person whrb is supposed to
have loosed the tie between thought and tongue.
It is very important to realize that pretence with words
and behavior arises after the non-pretending use of words has
been learned. The words are learned by pre-lying children who
in paradigm cases could not be fooling. At the stage when
children are learning words they are animals and cannot dissem¬
ble pains (etc.) as adults can. They do not learn these words
in situations where they can deceive. Rather they can deceive
only when they have learned the words.
With the child there are certain conditions and kinds of
behavior which are sufficient to convince an onlooker that the
child is feeling pain, though then as later, the pain cannot
be seen by the onlooker.
The child cannot lie until he has learned to make a dis¬
tinction between inner or private and outer or public. But he
cannot make this distinction between private and public until
he has learned language. So there is no feigning behavior until
he has learned the language which provides him with the means of
distinguishing private and public. Lying and pretence can only
occur after thought and behavior have been disconnected, and
language is needed to make that disconnection.
Suppose an objection were raised to the private character
of experience as I have given it, which objection might at this
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point be directed to the non-expression of experience, since
that is where our discussion is now. My critic might say that
this non-expression is learned and therefore not natural to per¬
sons. Not giving verbal expression to thoughts (in the broadest
sense) is the result of a special effort and so privacy of ex¬
periences is derivative not original, and perhaps he would go
so far as to say, notreal.
I would answer'. Clearly there is a stage in the develop¬
ment of an individual when he naturally says out loud most of
what he thinks before he learns to censor his speech. So much
my critic and I agree upon. But my disagreement with my critic
would be over the justification of picking that stage (when
thinking is done largely with one's mouth) as the most authentic
or real stage of personhood. It seems to me clear that so long
as the child says whatever he thinks, he is not viewed as re¬
sponsible, and so long as he is not viewed as responsible, he
is not a full-fledged person. So that the state ivhere such
thinking is necessarily and natux-ally accompanied by verbal ex¬
pression is not yet a state of full-fledged personhood.
But it is true that the think-speak stage is earlier than
the censored stage, and the behaviorist who would likely be my
critic may want to stress this, using the temporal priority to
establish logical or ontological priority. Then I would point
out that privacy belongs to a yet earlier stage than the think-
speak stage. The pre-verbal infant has experiences. He does
not begin to have experiences, e.g., dreams, sense perceptions,
only after he has learned language. We believe that infants
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like other higher animals dream and our evidence for their
dreaming is their twitchlngs in their sleep, awakming with a
start, etc. The child does not learn to dream upon learning
the word for dreaming. This experience which no one else he-
sides the dreamer has access to is private. There is however
no intrinsic difference which marks off dreaming from sense ex¬
perience; the child has to learn that the dreamed wolf is not
a sensed wolf. The child's treating both experiences as alike
at first as well as our feeling of complete conviction in the
reality of what we are dreaming while we are dreaming are suf¬
ficient to persuade me that there is an identical private
character to all experience, sense experience as well as dream¬
ing for the pre-verbal child* Dreams are one kind of experience
had by the pre-verbal infant, the think-speak child, and the
adult person alike. At the first stage the infant cannot tell
us what he dreams or dreamed. At the second stage the child -
even if he must (in some sense) report his dream - tells of what
he dreamed, not of what he _is dreaming, so there is no necessary
public expression accompanying the experience, and yet the ex¬
perience occurs. So even at this stage experience has a private
aspect. The animal in order to imitate must perceive, a kind of
experience, what it is going to imitate.
I conclude that experience in the infant begins as private.
When the child has learned to use words, much of its thinking
occurs in terms of words which have a seemingly necessarily-
connected sounded aspect. He then learns to disconnect the sound
from the entertained meaning and enjoy the thoughts - even those
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for which he has words - privately in the way he lived through
experiences prior to having words and lives through experiences
(like dreams) which cannot be expressed while they are occurring.
If my critic were to say that learning to repress the vocal
expressing of thought words is artificial, an imposition on what
is natural to the person, I should reply that language is simi¬
larly artificial and imposed on the person. He neither speaks
nor keeps himself from speaking naturally. Both abilities are
learned from association with persons. To pick one state as
more authentic, original, or real is arbitrary.
We have so far been concerned with the description of how
the child learns language and the non-expressing of thought
words as well as denying that privacy of experience is inauthen-
tic.
Now I should like to go on to show more explicitly how
self-consciousness is gotten, how private experience is connected
to what is public, and how one private consciousness is connected
to another private consciousness.
At the beginning the consciousness of the child is not of
anything; its consciousness simply is a feeling, comfort, dis¬
comfort, warmth, etc. Whatever is present in his consciousness
fills it entirely and becomes thereby the totality of being.
The experience of animals must mostly if not entirely be like
this.
To be conscious of something, to have an object of conscious¬
ness or for requires a certain objectivity. It is not merely a
play on words to say that objectivity is needed if there is to be
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an object. When objectivity is lacking, there is no distance
between consciousness and what fills consciousness. Conscious¬
ness if utterly absorbed in the properties of the experience.
But soon the child has sufficient waking time and equani¬
mity to look at, listen to, touch, taste, smell what is there
for him. These sensed things are objects of consciousness.
Among these objects may be his toes and fingers, though he does
not yet know that they are his, which knowledge of ownership
(of a very close sort) probably comes only through learning to
control them, the coincidence between effort and success.
What he controls are appendages and vocal equipment. He
becomes aware of himself not only as a thing occupying space,
but as a doer and word-producer. As said above it is by means
of imitation of others that he produces words and some actions.
When he has learned language, he must learn to say not all
that he thinks, and he is forced thereby to become aware of him¬
self as the haver of specific thoughts some of which may be ex¬
pressed and others of which may not. The child must learn to
judge which experience may be expressed and which may not, and
in so doing learns that he has various particular thoughts. By
learning that any experience may be kept to himself he is brought
to the realization that experiencing is in its occurrence logi¬
cally private. The realization might be stated as, "They don't
know what I'm thinking unless I tell them."
It is at this point, upon realizing that experience - in
all its occurrences - is private, which he has had to realize
in order to understand the general rule to repress any future
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publicly undersirable thought, that he becomes aware of himself
not only as thing, doer, speaker, haver of present and past
specific thoughts, but as self-identical experiencer, a con¬
tinuing possibility of having as yet undetermined thoughts
which will be connected to past determinate thoughts. This
awareness of oneself as private, continuing, self-identical
experiencing is awareness of oneself as consciousness. The
person is now self-conscious.
In this way language is a necessary condition of acquiring
of self-consciousness, which is in turn a necessary condition of
being a person.
Language also provides much of the material of conscious¬
ness. Without language we would have no jokes, no abstract
concepts like 'democracy', delicacy', 'holiness', 'paradigm',
etc., no literature, no verbal instructions. Words give us the
means of achieving concepts which pre-verbal imaging and word¬
less consciousness could never provide.
Words have their public side which can be used to produce
corresponding concepts in others.
Could the words ever be misunderstood and provoke the
wrong concept in another person? Clearly they sometimes do.
We often misunderstand or fail to understand what particular
words or groups of words mean. But there are many checks on
word usage, and there are entailments among words and concepts
which correct errors of a part. This is the fourth character¬
istic of words given above. The only way for misunderstanding
or non-comprehension between persons to be complete would be
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for the language as a whole to be misunderstood; a part of the
whole would be corrigible. To say, for example, that some other
person sees red as I see lavender (so that he would say "red"
when I say "red" before an object called "red" by everybody, but
he would be having an experience of what I call "lavender")
would require that his other sense modalities by appropriately
skewed. His lavender (called "red" by him) experience would
have to be like the blare of a trumpet, and like a slap instead
of a caress. There are analogies between sense qualities of
one modality and sense qualities of other modalities which ana¬
logies are agreed upon to an extraordinary extent.
The words of a language are interrelated and form a system.
Some of the words are connected, directly or by analogy, with
out animal, unlearned natures, making our common animal nature
a ground and check for our communication. Out of our common
animal nature came the ground for understanding the child who
v
had to learn language and to out common animal nature we return
to check our understanding of words.
But if a person were to express doubt that others under¬
stood his words as he understood them, we would ask why he ex¬
presses these words without a belief that others understand him.
If he were able to see that using words to express to others his
doubt that others could understand his words was incoherent, and
refrained from stating his misgivings aloud but kept on thinking
them, we could (if we were aware of his uneasiness) try to allay
his doubts by pointing out to him that the very material of his
thought is constituted of concepts given to him through the
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words taught to him by others. He may not remember learning
all of the words he knows, but he surely will remember learning
some words - from others. He would have no such miserable
thought unless the means were given to him by others (who must
have understood him) whose understanding he now doubts.
Such an answer is not guaranteed to satisfy him. Some
people are willfully in anguish, forlornness, and despair, too
much so to heed reasonable assurances. But fortunately simple
people (which includes most of us) do not doubt that other per¬
sons understand words in a common shared way. Those who have
fallen from the grace of believing in other persons' under¬
standing of words being like their own should ask themselves how
it is possible that they can doubt it. Where do the means of
their formulating such a doubt come from? It seems to me that
the means - words - plainly come from the very source being
made inscrutable.
Those who give us the matter for our own thoughts and the
means to self-consciousness providing total conviction each of
his own personhood can hardly have their personhood and similari¬
ty to oneself impugned or one's own personhood is simultaneously
impugned or made problematical. Our thoujits are full of the
contributions of others present and past. We understand them;
they made us what we are. Our understanding extends to who¬
ever contributed to our ontogeny.
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Summary
1. A person's behavior is observable in the way objects
are observable.
2. We attribute competences and knowledge to persons on
the basis of their actions.
3. Roles and statuses are logically public kinds of know¬
ledge that we have of persons.
4. That which makes us attribute to persons personness is
the consistency, variety, appropriateness, and originality of
their behavior and language, including the five phenomena (self
correction, embarrassment, practicing, learning many diverse
kinds of things from one another and from verbal descriptions,
and lying) indicative of self-consciousness.
5. One learns about other persons through their behavior
and/or from their reports.
6. Words have four characteristics which are significant
for linking kinds of knowledge of persons: a) their having a
public aspect, b) their referring to things besides themselves,
c) their having an experienced aspect, and d) their systematic
interconnectedness.
7. A conscious infant of the species Homo sapiens imitates
the actions and sounds of those persons around it.
8. Some of the sounds the child imitates are words, which
are distinguished from other sounds (produced by the child) by
the effect on the persons around it.
9. Words learned first have public referents. That words
can be learned for what is private depends on the learner's and
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teachers* being members of the same animal species since these
first private referents will be experiences depending on the
animal organism.
10) The child learns to not express what it thinks from
persons as it learned language in the first place from persons.
11) The child becomes aware of himself as doer, speaker,
thinker of particular thoughts, and then consciousness.
12) Language is necessary as a means to self-consciousness
and also provides much of the material of experience.
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E. Responsibility
The necessary condition, responsibility, which I shall deal
with in this section is a concept sui generis, that is, it cannot
be reduced to any other concept without remainder. Though a
strictly equivalent definition cannot be offered, some explana¬
tory terms will be givn, along with an analysis of what a person
must be or be able to do in order to be responsible.
These are the facts to be used.
1. Sometimes approval or further rewards are given for
behavior thought good.
2. Sanctions are imposable always and sometimes actually
imposed for behavior thought bad.
3. Rewards are effective in encouraging people to choose
the better action; sanctions are effective in deterring people
from choosing the worse action.
4. The kinds of rewards and sanctions which can be effec¬
tive with people are numerous and varied, e.g., teasing, hint¬
ing, shaming, persuasion, ridicule, scolding, snubbing, ostra¬
cism, isolation, threats, physical force.
5. People feel guilt and remorse for what they have said
and done wrong; they apply sanctions to themselves for wrong¬
doing.
6. At least some of the acts thought bad are antisocial,
that as, not conducive to the viability of society.
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Others might have been used but I have chosen to elucidate
responsibility with two related concepts, 1) agency, and 2) an¬
swerability, accountability, desert. Answerability and accoun-
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tability have only the negative side of responsibility; that is,
if someone has done something wrong, he is answerable or ac¬
countable for it. 'Desert' can be used when a man is to expect
and receive (possibly) the deserved consequences - either reward
or punishment - for his actions. The presupposition underlying
both the giving of rewards and the imposing of sanctions is that
people could have done otherwise than they did; and so for doing
what is right they are rewarded, for doing what is wrong they
are punished. If there was no alternative (for a normal person),
no sanction will be imposed. Sanctions are supposed to influence
persons to choose the better act between at least two alternatives.
The first, 'agency', may be understood by noting that we are
thinking of this meaning when we ask, "Who did it?" The person
responsible is the agent or doer of the deed.
The first sense is logically prior since it is only because
people do things in this sense that we hold them deserving of
punishment and reward. Responsibility in this sense is ascribed
only to persons, not to objects, vegetables, or lower animals.
There is a broader sense of "responsible" which can be ap¬
plied to objects, plants, and lower animals but this is not the
same sense that it has when applied in the sense which it is
often given in ordinary practice concerning persons.
A rug can be responsible for someone's tripping; a virus
is responsible for colds; a cat is responsible for a victim-
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mouse's death (in the broader sense of 'tesponsible"). Obvious
and, I think, uncontroversial is the fact that objects and plants
are different from persons in that plants and objects do not have
even the semblance of doing something. Sanctions cannot be ap¬
plied to get them to do differently. Or if "sanction" is used
in a broader sense so that pulling up a plant will count as a
sanction, we may say that threats of sanctions will not get
objects and plants to do differently. But in the case of ani¬
mals, they do seem to do things and sanctions can be applied.
In fact some thinkers would claim that there is no significant
difference between the responsibility of persons and the respon¬
sibility of animals because animals can be trained, taught, con¬
ditioned (whatever term one chooses must be applied to persons
too) in the same ways that persons are. They trade on the sanc¬
tions and rewards (for convenience I shall mostly limit the dis¬
cussion to sanctions) being used to affect the behavior of both
animals and persons. I agree that the possibility of using
sanctions is crucial to responsibility and that the questions
clustering around responsibility can often be illuminated by
considering uses of sanctions. So since I want to claim that
there is a distinctive meaning of "responsible" as applied to
persons, I must show that there are differences in the use of
sanctions as applied to animals and persons. I think that there
are at least five differences: 1) the kinds of sanctions that
can be used, 2) the ends to which such sanctions are directed,
3) who imposes the sanctions on whom, 4) the possibility of
thinking about not yet actualized sanctions and of exercising
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self-control to avoid such sanctions, and 5) the possibility of
learning from the sanctions applied to others.
First, we should freely admit that sanctions are used on
both persons and animals, and that some of the sanctions are
identical. E.g., physical blows (slaps, whippings, etc.) and
loud, sharply-spoken words can be used on both animals and per¬
sons. A dog may be struck or told emphatically, "Get down!" if
it gets on the best chair. Similarly a person may be struck (a
common form of legal punishment until recent times) or be spoken
to in harsh tones.
There are more sanctions that can be directed toward both
animals and persons. But however many we might find that can be,
the fact remains that many can be found that can be used on per¬
sons but not on animals, e.g., logical arguments, persuasion,
ridicule, ostracism, gossip, publicizing, shaming. (We could
include sanctions such as imprisonment and economic sanctions.
But these are not so interesting as psychological sanctions
except insofar as they are psychological sanctions.) The very
reasons why such sanctions cannot be used on animals are the
reasons why animals cannot be responsible in the sense that
persons can be.
Second. We may look at what can be achieved by means of
sanctions. In the case of the dog we expect to set up such im¬
mediate connections between a particular act (in this case, sit¬
ting on the best chair) and discomfort (caused by the punishment)
that the act will lapse, but we can only expect that particular
act to lapse. We do not and cannot expect the dog to infer a
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general rule, "Do not get on sofas, chairs, beds, etc., which
you may spoil." We cannot teach a dog, or other animal, general
principles of behavior. Yet this is the end to which sanctions
are directed in the case of persons. There are so many intri¬
cacies to social life that teaching by applying sanctions to
discourage each particular act could not cover enough ground to
make the person efficient in the social realm. Persons learn
general rules. One learns not to speak out and say what will
hurt someone's feelings - a general rule. There is no finite
list of hurtful sayings which one is given to memorize in order
to avoid them. The list would have to include other ways that
people can be slighted or offended, like facial expressions,
exclusions or inclusions in social affairs, placing at table.
A list of ways to hurt people's feelings could never be finished
because there are always different situations in which hitherto
unmet with ways of hurting someone's feelings appear.
A person is expected in the same manner as an animal to
avoid the very act for which he was punished. But the person
can generalize the point of being punished so that more acts
than one will be forgone. If a person is punished for robbing
a department store, he is expected to realize that the prohibi¬
tion against stealing applies to robbing department stores, banks,
filling stations, restaurants, etc. The importance of that "etc."
cannot be over-estimated; the person is expected to extend the
rule to all applicable situations even though not all are or
could be mentioned explicitly in the law.
Another difference is that we expect a person to be able to
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apply sanctions to himself, so that right-doing does not depend
on sanctions' being imposed by some other person. One cannot ex¬
pect an animal to apply any sanctions to himself in the absence
of an external sanction-imposer. I knew a cat that was not al¬
lowed to get on the beds; when found on a bed it would be scolded
and possibly, if the cat was too slow, slapped. The cat learned.
What did it learn? Never to get on a bed if someone were present,
and more, to get off a bed (as betrayed by a pussy-footed thud)
when someone approached. But the cat suffered no apparent discom¬
fort while lying undetected on the forbidden bed, nor so far as I
could tell, pangs of conscience afterwards.
A person however internalizes some tef the rules of behavior
taught him, in the sense that he requires conformity to it from
and by himself, and feels uncomfortable, deserving of punishment,
if he does what he has learned is wrong, even if never found out
by another person. The significance of this self-imposed sanction
for the viability of society is very great; if there were not such
self-imposed sanctions (we might say, internal to the person),
society would have to provide external sanction-imposers at all
places where it is possible to do so. There are moreover innume¬
rable points at which deterrence from wrong-doing is needed but
external sanction-imposers cannot be present, e.g., within the
family, solitary occupations such as university teaching, etc.
In these cases policing must be left largely to the person him¬
self, as it actually is in the majority of situations now, even
in those that could be publicly policed . If society had to rely
on external sanction-imposers, society as we know it would be
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impossible.
A fourth difference in the use of sanctions is that if
sanctions have been used to deter an animal from an act, it re¬
frains, if at all, automatically; a person does not have to re¬
frain from the act automatically in order to refrain. A person
can 'run through' an act (including speech acts) in his head to
see what the results, outcome, consequences will be. The person
can stop himself before he says aloud the sentence occurring to him
which if said, would hurt someone's feelings, instead of standing
by, as it were, while it comes out, and then having to heap re¬
proaches upon himself and profuse apologies and explanations upon
the injured. One has likely endured some punishment for having
said what one shouldn't. So afterwards one can look ahead, even
though one may not in all cases, and see that sanctions would
have to be imposed again if the proposed act were actualized.
The thrust of the point I am making can perhaps be shown
more clearly by drawing attention to the difference between ac¬
tions refrained from automatically (which are more like animals'
not doing) and actions refrained from after thought and perhaps
some effort of self-control. Having been taught to eat not with
one's hands in one's food but with a fork, one simply does eat
with a fork, reflexively, without conscious thought, of concen¬
tration of self-discipline. But a person may meet with situations
in which he does not act reflexively. A man away from home in a
place where he is anonymous may have to reflect and exercise some
effort if offered a tantalizing possibility of extra-marital sex
(which he thinks wrong). If a sanction has not made the 'right'
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course of action automatic to an animal, and it is tempted, to
do 'wrong', and the 'wrong' is pleasant to the animal, chances
are it will do it. Animals do not and we believe cannot take
thought of what they should do, nor do they exercise self-control
to keep themselves from doing what will meet with sanctions.
Lastly, persons can be influenced by sanctions being applied
to other persons; animals cannot learn from sanctions being ap¬
plied to other animals. For persons punishment directed to one
person effectively deters that person but also other persons from
that action. Persons can say, "He was punished for doing that; _I
shall likewise be punished if I do that." Deterring others from
crimes is given as a principal purpose of legal punishments for
criminals. If each person had to be punished at least one time
for each kind of crime before he could be deterred from it, soci¬
ety as we know it would again be impossible.
These five differences in the use of and results from sanc¬
tions seem obvious. Pointing our these differences was intended
to show that persons are responsible in a way that animals are
not. (That persons are responsible in ways that objects and
plants are not was assumed to be too obvious to argue at length.)
The laying-out of these differences was directed most especially
to those who might want to say that persons are conditioned in
just the ways that animals are conditioned, and that therefore
persons are responsible only in the sense that animals are. My
answer is that there are points which might indeed be said to
be identical but there are significant differences between the
two processes reflecting important differences between animal
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and personal responsibility.
Now I should like to move on to an analysis of responsibi¬
lity as it applies to persons only, making use from time to time
of what has already been argued.
First. In order for punishment or rewards to be meted out
for an act, that is, in order to answer for what one has done,
a person must be self-identical through time. This is not often
if ever explicitly stated, yet it is presupposed by what is ex¬
plicitly said and also done in respect to rewards and punishments.
It surely would be thought unjust, and even logically queer, if
we punished a person yet said he was not the same person who com¬
mitted the crime.
Because it is so fundamental this belief is one that 'goes
without saying'. Since persons do with rare exceptions remain
self-identical throughout a lifetime, there is no need in ordi¬
nary life for making the belief explicit. If persons were to
become non-identical more frequently, such a turn of events might
bring forth widespread discussion. If many or all persons became
somehow discontinuous with themselves, our attributing of respon¬
sibility and giving of rewards and imposing of sanctions would
undoubtedly change.
A person believes that he is the same with his past self
who acted, and also that this present self shall be the same
self in the future. Refraining from present (punishable) plea¬
sures would be pointless unless one believed that the person who
refrains is the same as he who will not be punished.
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The way in which this self-identity is provided is impor¬
tant also since we not only want the person to be punished or
rewarded to be the same person, but we want the person to knoy
himself to be the same person. If it were claimed that, say,
the body alone provides self-identity, then if it were known
that the body of the criminal remained the same, there should
be no hesitation in the inflicting of a penalty upon the body.
Suppose though that a person is apprehended who confesses
to committing a crime. He is convicted, kept in custody (so we
can be quite certain that the body is the same body), and while
in prison loses his memory completely. Would we punish the am¬
nesiac person for the pre-amnesiac person•s crime? We would
certainly want to make sure that the person was not faking his
amnesia, but if we could be sure that the amnesia was not feigned
but genuine, then it seems to me that we would think it improper
to punish the amnesiac person, at least with any respect for
desert. In the case of our hypothetical amnesiac, punishing him
for the pre-amneaiac's crime could be justified only by some no¬
tion that whenever there is an offense against society, someone
must be punished, and since the amnesiac is in a peculiar way
more closely connected than anyone else, he must be punished.
This is a strict retributive theory of punishment which we claim
not to hold. Punishing the amnesiac seems to me as little justi¬
fiable as punishing the relative of a criminal which has been the
practice in some societies.
In Britain and the United States the procedure in the case
of other mental disorders is to have the patient treated until
he is again answerable for his behavior. For example, an insane
person cannot be executed though convicted and sentenced to
death.
"... for nothing is more certain in Law, than that a
person who falls mad after a Crime suppos'd to be committed,
shall not be try'd for it; and if he fall mad after Judgment
he shall not be executed ..." "Remarks on the Tryal of
Charles Bateman" by Sir John Hawles, Solicitor-General in
the reiqn of Kinq William III, 3 State-Tryals 651, 652-53
(1719).
• * «C
However quaint some of these ancient authorities of our law
may sound to our ears, the Twentieth Century has not so far
progressed as to outmode their reasoning. We should not be
less humane than were Englishmenjt in the centuries that
preceded this Republic. And the practical considerations
are not less relevant today than they were when urged by
Sir John Hawles and Hale and Hawkins and Blackstone in
writings which nurtured so many founders of the Republic.
If a man has gone insane, is he still himself? Is he still
the man who was convicted? (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Solsbee
v. Balkcom, Warden, 339 U.S. 9 (1949) quoted in Criminal Law
by Richard C. Donnelly, Joseph Goldstein, and Richard D.
Schwartz, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., p. 316.
It would be in accordance with British and American law that the
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amnesiac be treated as a mental patient 'would be until he regain
his memory and then be punished for the crime he committed ear¬
lier, since when he is suffering from amnesia he is hardly him¬
self, since he is not aware of his being self-identical. What
we want in addition to an identical body is the awareness of
self-identity in the person being held responsible, the know¬
ledge that the one being punished knows himself to be identical
with the one who behaved wrongly.
This must not be construed to mean though that if one claims
to be changed that his responsibility for former deeds and com¬
mitments lapses. One does not get out of keeping a promise by
saying baldly, "I am not the person I was when I made the promise
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We may absolve someone from keeping a promise but he must give
us more contentful reasons that will persuade us than to deny
his being unaltered. His personality may be altered without
his becoming a different person. And if he is the same person,
and knows himself to be, he must keep the promises made by that
person.
As asserted above in the section on knowledge of others,
self-consciousness is achieved through responsibility for one's
utterances. The two, responsibility and self-consciousness, go
hand-in-hand. One cannot be held responsible for an act unless
one is aware of oneself as self-identical; self-consciousness is
acquired by having responsibility ascribed to oneself.
To move on to a second prerequisite of responsibility. In
the section on change above we have already said something about
responsibility, namely, that a person may not change in such ways
and/or so much that he will be labeled immoral or irresponsible.
The limits of change allowed cannot be set prior to observing the
groups in which the person is to function. Limits of permitted
change and areas of behavior in which one may change vary from
one society to another. One can safely say that there will be
limits but where they will be drawn cannot be said _a priori.
On the other hand, given usual circumstances some changes
are required if one is to be responsible. He must learn from
the admonitions and other sanctions directed to him. He must
not fall into the category 'incorrigible', because then non-
changing is itself penalized.
Let us however try another thought experiment to see whether
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change is unconditionally necessary in order to be responsible.
Suppose we have an ordinary (not divine) person who does
not need correction. What he does, though not prfect, is ade¬
quate. Perhaps he lives alone so that small personal failings
never grievously offend anyone. Would he in order to be respon¬
sible have to change? If one takes a large enough unit of time,
and considers rather general modes of doing things, I think one
could say that it is possible that he would not have to change.
Each morning he gets up and drinks his 2% cups of coffee; each
day he goes to work and files the orders received by his depart¬
ment; each week he sends his clothes to the laundry; each month
he goes to a concert; in the spring he plants his garden; in the
fall he prunes the rose bushes. He never fails in the perfor¬
mance of the minimum expected of him, and so is never admonished,
chidden, scolded, berated, snubbed, ostracized, arrested, etc.
For this person who is conceivable though inconceivably
dull-sounding, it is possible that he could be responsible with¬
out chanixj his mode of life, though looking at smaller units of
time, he changes, inrespect to the flow of his experience, his
physiological functions, and his particular actions and communi¬
cations, as said above.
With most real-life people though such an even existence is
impossible. Not only does the material of experience change
(over which one seems to have no control), not only must he move
and reply appropriately, but he must adapt himself in responsi¬
ble ways to changing life conditions. (Changes in one's situ¬
ation are for most people sure as death and taxes.)
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One get$(a job, learns how to discharge the attendant obli¬
gations responsibly, and then the job's obligations are changed
or one gets a new job and has to learn to discharge the new re-
sponsibilites• If a person in the changed circumstances acts in
ways appropriate to the first position, he will be judged to be
not responsible.
A non-employed woman who has no occupational changes to
adapt herself to must modify her character to the persons that
she lives with. Married people change their ways in order to
live together peaceably. People accommodate themselves to the
arrival of offspring.
Changing circumstances and commitments require change from
us if we are to be responsible.
It was asserted above that responsibility meant something
different in the case of persons from what it meant in the case
of objects, plants, or animals. Objects and plants cannot do
anything, so it seems obvious that they could not be responsi¬
ble in the sense that persons are. Doing something seems mini¬
mally necessary to responsibility. But since animals might be
said to do things (animals are mostly self-moving), some fur¬
ther distinction needed to be made between animals and persons.
It was allowed that sanctions can affect what animals do as
sanctions affect what persons do. But there are differences be¬
tween the uses and results of sanctions with respect to animals
and persons. Five differences were given.
The claim is that these uses and results of sanctions which
obtain only with persons indicate important aspects of responsi-
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bility as applied to persons.
The question to be considered now is: what characteristics
or abilities must persons have to make these facts concerning
sanctions possible?
What characteristics must a person have in order to be sus¬
ceptible to the range of sanctions which can be slued on persons?
He must have a body, like other animals, if physical sanc¬
tions are to be used on him. It is impossible to beat what is
bodiless. The fact that the same physical sanctions can be used
on persons and lower animals is based upon their being the same
in respect to having bodies. This is a way in which persons and
animals can be affected by the same kind of sanctions, physical
ones; the similarity should not be completely ignored. Physical
sanctions are likely most frequently used on children who are
presumably closer to animals than adults are.
But here we are not so interested in the points of similarity
as in the differences. The difference to be noted here is that
more kinds of sanctions can be used on persons than animals. Per¬
sons are susceptible to what are called psychological sanctions,
e.g., withdrawal of approval, taunting, ridicule, shaming, reproach¬
ing, snubbing, gossip, ostracism.
In order for persons to be susceptible to these psychological
sanctions they must care about the opinions of and treatment ac¬
corded by at least some other persons. They must be gregarious or
social beings, dependent on other like beings for feelings of com¬
fort and well-being. However much of this feeling for and depen¬
dence on other persons is innate, it is surely forwarded by the
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socialization process.
Persons are not islands. They are created and sustained
by persons; their dependence on others never lapses. People
have learned and never seriously doubt that some kinds of be¬
havior are rewardable, and some are punishable.
What abilities must a person have to form general rules
from sanctions directed against particular acts? A person must
be able to generalize from a particular act to a class of acts
to be avoided, to pick out what is disapproved of and see how
the offense can appear in different forms.
The same kind of ability is needed to learn from the sanc¬
tions applied to others. To be restrained by a sanction applied
to some other person, one has to be able to judge that the act
is the same kind of act whether done by another person or one¬
self. One must judge that the acts and persons can be grouped
in classes. That I_ do it must be seen to be immaterial from the
standpoint of deserving punishment or reward. It is the charac¬
ter of the act - as possibly performed by any number of people -
which makes it rewardable or punishable. (Some disapproved ac¬
tions may be overlooked if the agent is highly esteemed, but the
way he got to be esteemed is by doing rewardable acts and/or by
avoiding disapproved acts.)
Part of this classifying ability includes the ability to
go from the act to consequences. Consequences here are both
natural effects in the environment as well as responses from
persons. Without this classifying as to consequences, one can¬
not know what one is doing,ie. , one cannot behave in response to
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sanctions as persons in fact behave.
And plainly the explicit awareness of not yet actual con¬
sequences which affect one's present behavior depends upon
one's having the ability to think about what is future. Ani¬
mals we believe cannot think about what is future; they are
affected only by what is past.
For persons the ability to think about future consequen¬
ces is logically separate from but logically prior to self-
control which is the ability to do other, more or less, than
what comes automatically. We are able to weigh the future con¬
sequences against present pleasure and to exert some pressure
on ourselves to do what is desirable in terms of future effects.
Persons do not act only automatically; they can envisage the fu¬
ture and choose among present possibilities the course of action
that will make the future closer to their hearts' desire. Atomata,
and in this respect animals are automata, cannot. If there is
no choice among alternatives for persons, e.g., in a determinis¬
tic system (whether material, environmental, metaphysical) per¬
sons are automata. Personal responsibility is reduced to animal
or material responsibility. A person contributes as a part to
the event, but does not j3o anything.
The consideration of these various abilities brings us to
the need to assert some private aspect to the person.
When sanctions are applied by others to a person, an on¬
looker does not have to see any effects in order for there to
be some. One can feel snubbed, hurt, reproached, etc. without
giving any behavioral sign of it.
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When a person considers what he might do and what the con¬
sequences would be, the onlooker probably sees (and hears)
nothing. Adults mostly think without speaking; their calcu¬
lations go on privately.
When a person makes a firm resolve and intends to act in
a way that will net him the least discomfort, only he need know
about his resolution and intention. He may grit his teeth, but
even if he does not, and gives no other hehavioral sign, he may
still have formed the intention.
If a person acts in a way that is disapproved of, either
on purpose or unawares, and chastises himself, no one else need
know. He may suffer secret pain for his shortcomings which no
one else is cognizant of. If one denies that this private as¬
pect exists, one denies that unpublicized self-reproach exists.
Or if it is denied that this private aspect is important, one
denies that applying sanctions privately to oneself is important,
contrary to what is thought in ordinary life.
For all of these a person must be self-conscious, aware not
only of his acts which others can observe, but also of what is
private to him, which need not be given an expression, and which
others will not know about unless it is given expression.
To say that there must be this private aspect to persons in
order for them to be responsible (in the way that persons are re¬
sponsible) is not to say that a person having only this private
aspect (covering here his classifying, projecting into the future,
intending to do a certain act, imposing sanctions upon himself)
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and having no body could be responsible. If a person had never
had a body, he would not have learned language in terms of which
most of his classifying, projecting, intending, self-punishment,
and self-rewarding are done. As said in Chapter 1, there is
seemingly no way of getting hold of a bodiless consciousness,
so there would be no way of allying sanctions to such an enti¬
ty. Even the self-imposed sanctions are learned from others.
Factually it is the case that most of what persons are re¬
sponsible for is the behavior of their bodies. So one needs a
body to behave responsibly.
A body is necessary to learn the sanction-imposing process
in the first place. But even when one has learned that and how
sanctions are imposed, and generally what acts, say, incest,
stealing, are punishable, one must still learn what counts as
incest or stealing. If one stays in one's native setting and
there are no changes in that environment, further learning may
be unnecessary; because while getting the general understand¬
ing that acts can be crimes, and that incest, e.g., is a crime,
one will have learned which specific acts count as crimes, e.g.,
that sexual relations with one's parent, sibling, first and
second cousins but not third cousins count as incest. But if
one changes one's environment or if the environment changes,
one must learn which particular acts will fall under the general
heading (already understood to be punishable). It may be too
that one has to learn new general headings which are thought
wrong by the new group to which one now belongs or new attitudes
of the original group. So one must be able to learn from others
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in order to keep up-to-date. I see no way of getting such in¬
formation without a body. Lacking specific, up-to-date infor¬
mation the best-intentioned person may be acting brutally. If
he were to realize the inapplicability of his knowledge or the
possibility of his total ignorance of the persons around him,
and wished not to hurt or offend them, he could only be complete¬
ly stymied, unless he were able to communicate with those persons
who are presently around him, which communication requires a
body.
Responsibility as we understand it to apply to persons
arises in a social setting; because of what is learned from per¬
sons, an individual comes to be responsible and could not ac¬
quire the abilities and characteristics needed for responsibi¬
lity by himself. But once a person has what it takes to be re¬
sponsible, could he, either embodied or disembodied, be respon¬
sible apart from any other persons? I think that classifying,
projecting, refraining, controlling oneself, punishing oneself
could go on whether or not one had a body. The self-control
would be directed to controlling one's thoughts; like a saint
one might say, "I must think on the glory of God." One could
be answerable, not to others, but to oneself alone, knowing that
some future stafe (however near or far) of oneself can impose
sanctions. So it seems to me an isolated person even disembo¬
died could be responsible, but only to himself. An isolated
person with a body presents no particular problem. A greater
range of possible acts and sanctions would be available to him,
but again, he could be responsible only to himself.
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It would, I conclude, be possible for an isolated person
either embodied or bodiless to be responsible once he has
learned what it takes to be responsible.
The characteristics and abilities that persons normally
have which allow them to be responsible in quite a different
sense from other entities have been laid out. It has been as¬
serted that a person is able to classify acts, to consider thir
consequences, to decide and intend to do something, to exercise
self-control. To say that these abilities which only persons
have are needed in order for them to be responsible is not to
say that a person is responsible for only those acts which he
has reflected upon and consciously intended. A prson must be
able to reflect upon and intentionally do some acts, but plain¬
ly many acts are done without such reflection and conscious in¬
tending. Such unreflectiveness is quicker and quite satisfac¬
tory until something goes wrong. Then if a normal person could
have thought about what he was doing, he should have in order
to avoid such undesirable results. The ability is enough to
make the agent responsible. Actually not every act for which
a person is responsible will be reflected on and consciously
intended. But this actual non-reflection on every act is not
sufficient to nullify his responsibility, though it may serve
to lessen the punishment.
Summary
1. The use of sanctions is based on the presupposition
that alternative courses are possible and that persons can be
142
influenced in their choice by imposable sanctions.
2. The range of sanctions which can be used on persons is
greater than the range of sanctions which can be used on animals.
3. Persons learn general rules from the sanctions applied
to particular acts.
4. A person can apply sanctions to himself.
5. A person can exercise self-discipline to keep himself
from doing what he knows is punishable.
6. Persons can be influenced by sanctions being applied to
other persons.
7. To be responsible a person must be self-identical.
8. To be responsible one must not change in ways that are
judged immoral. If one is sanctioned, one must change so as
k
to s^ow that one has learned from the imposition of the sanction.
If one's circumstances change, one must change one's behavior
accordingly.
9. Persons are affected by psychological sanctions be¬
cause they are fundamentally social beings.
10. To form general rules, to learn from sanctions applied
to others, to go from act to consequences requires the ability
to classify acts and entities.
11. In order to be affected in one's behavior by the thought
of future sanctions, i.e., to act non-automatically, alternative
choices must be available and one must be able to exercise self-
control.
12. Learning from sanctions, calculating, intending, sanc¬
tioning oneself require a private aspect to a person of which
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he is aware.
13. The calculating, intending, self-sanctioning are done
mostly in terms of language which he could not have learned if
he had not had a body.
14. Lacking a body a person could not be punished by some
person other than himself.
15. Most of what persons are held responsible for is bodily
behavior. Without bodies this sphere of responsibility would be
non-existent.
16. One needs a body to be kept informed of the attitudes
of persons presently around one. Such current information is
needed in order to act responsibly toward ons's contemporaries.
17. An isolated person (already socialized) could be re¬
sponsible to himself with or without a body.
18. A person is able to classify, to intend to act, and
to exercise self-control. These abilities are necessary to
responsibility but this is not to say that persons are respon¬
sible for only those acts which they have reflected upon and
consciously intended.
PART II
CHAPTER 3
Part II is devoted to presenting theories of the self of¬
fered by various philosophers and an evaluation of these theo¬
ries in terms of necessary conditions given in Part I.
I begin Part II with Plato because I admire his sugges-
tiveness and breadth of concerns. His philosophy is not care¬
fully systematic, at least not in respect to a theory of persons.
There is no unified position, elaborated from one angle and then
another in successive dialogues. It is rather as if he vaguely
remembered what he had said before, but not being entirely sa¬
tisfied with that might as well begin all over. The theory of
the self was in the background; the theory of the Forms was in
the foreground.
There is a single theme which does reappear, viz., the
person's real nature being some kind of soul-substance. This
theiory seems to be an appealing one, taken over and popularized
equivocally in Christian doctrine, or at least in some sects.
Plato's theory seemed to me worth considering because of
its historical significance, suggestiveness, and intractability.
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Plato is a difficult philosopher, not only because of the
intricacy of his thought but also because of the lack of defi-
niteness in his position. The form which he employs - the
dialogue - allows him a certain looseness; his characters can
change the meanings of their terms, or the argument may go off
the central point, with such smoothness that the reader can be
beguiled, and unless he is suspicious, not detect what is not
quite right. Another advantage (for Plato) of the dialogue is
that the answer given to the interrogator is often an unquali¬
fied agreement with the position offered and this agreement has
a persuasive effect, so that only after one arrives at some¬
thing unsatisfactory, does one go back to these affirmations to
see how they should be qualified.
But in the straight-forward discussion, a definite state¬
ment is more or less discernible at least; the situation is quite
different when Plato makes use of myth. Then exactly what he
means is at best difficult to make out. There are undoubtedly
advantages to this indefiniteness: with the myth "Plato escapes
the danger of a metaphysical dogmatism, just as the artistic
form of the dialogue avoids the fixity of the written word".
(Paul Friedlaender. Plato: An Introduction. Translated from
the German by Hans Meyerhoff. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1958, p. 210.)
As someone wanting to expose Plato's position on a parti¬
cular issue, I should like just such dogmatism and fixity. With
matters as they are, I must make certain conjectures concerning
what Plato was wanting to say, and since Plato did not run the
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risk of seeming dogmatic, by giving fixed positions, I fear that
I must often seem dogmatic in my interpretation of his writings.
Such dogmatism is all the more deplorable in my case since
I have no knowledge of Greek, and am therefore at the mercy of
translators and commentators for my understanding of Plato. But
having owned up to my incapacities, I shall henceforth carry on
as if I had no serious doubts about the interpretations I shall
offer. I think Plato would have encouraged such boldness.
There is at least one matter about which there is no doubt,
namely, Plato's insistence on the existence of the Forms. "The
theory of Forms is commonly regarded as the centre, if not the
sum, of Plato's philosophy ..." (W. F. Hardie. A Study in Plato.
Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1936, p. 9.) Plato offers several
arguments for the existence of the Forms; I shall present only
those pertinent to our problem.
First. There is the argument from recollection which Plato
uses to establish both the existence of the Forms and the immor¬
tality of the soul. Plato makes two assertions of fact: 1) that
through being questioned a man can evince knowledge of matters
which he was never taught in this life (Meno 82-6), and 2) that
some ideas, e.g., equality, are had though they could not have
been produced by material objects even if they might have been
brought to awareness by sensing material objects (Phaedo 74 ff.).
Plato accounts for both of these phenomena with the doctrine of
recollection or reminiscence. Cf. Phaedrus 249. Plato goes on
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to argue from the first fact that if this knowledge displayed
by a man was not acquired in this life, then it must have been
learned before he was a man, and therefore the soul must have
existed before it was in the man, and therefore must be immor¬
tal. (Meno 85-6) This leg of the argument is here a bit short;
Plato does not go on to assert that the knowledge of all things
which the immortal soul has gotten before this life must be in
terms of the Forms, but in the Phaedo the mutual dependence of
the immortality of the soul and the Forms is explicitly asserted.
There Plato argues that when one makes use of a concept of equa¬
lity, the example of the Ideas he uses, different from the im¬
perfect equality contained in the material objects (one observes
that the imperfect equality contained in the material objects
aims at - as Plato puts it - absolute equality), one must con¬
clude that he had previous knowledge of absolute equality or
he could not have referred to that standard equals which are
derived from the senses. The knowledge of the absolutes must
therefore be prior to sense experience which began at birth.
Therefore the knowledge of the standards must have been acquired
before birth, so our souls must have existed without bodies.
Then Plato states explicitly the relation between the
Forms and the pre-existence of the soul. Socrates says:
Then may we not say, Simias, that if, as we are always
repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and
an absolute essence of all things; and if to this, which is
now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer
all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding
these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession -
then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not,
there would be no force in the argument? There is the same
proof that these ideas must have existed before we were
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born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls. (The
Dialogues of Plato. Translated into English by B. Jowett
xn two volumes. New York, Random House, 1937. Phaedo 76,
Vol. I, p. 461. Henceforth all Plato sources unless
otherwise noted will be from the Jowett translation, and
I shall indicate only the dialogue and the Stephanus num¬
ber, the volume and page numer in Jowett, thus, Phaedo 76
I 461.) ^
Simias replies:
k
Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely
the same necessity for the one as for the other; and the
argument retreats successfully to the position that the
existence of the soul before birth cannot be separated
from the existence of the essence of which you speak. For
there is nothing which to my mind is so patent as that
beauty, goodness, and the other notions of which you were
just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence;
and I am satisfied with the proof. (Phaedo 76-7 I 461)
This argument establishes only existence of the soul before
its life as a man, but Plato is not content with just pre-exis-
tence. He also builds an argument for immortality by combining
the conclusion of the last argument (that the soul exists before
birth) with the proposition that birth and coming to life can
only come from death, because she has to be born again. (Phaedo
77) That the soul must continue to exist after death is a con¬
clusion from a preceding argument in which it was asserted that
s*
all concrete things that have opposite^ are generated out of
their opposites. Death and life are opposites. Therefore, they
are generated out of one another. For if the living sprang from
anything besides the dead, and if all living things must die,
then all would at last be dead.
The argument from recollection may be summarized as follows:
because in response to questioning one displays knowledge not
acquired in this life and because one uses in relation to sense
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experience absolute standards not gotten from sense experience,
the soul must have had a previous existence in which it gained
this knowledge of the Forms which provide the standards and the
remembered knowledge.
The second argument for the Forms is based on the need for
patterns at the time of creation.
... what is that which is always real and has no becoming,
and what is that which is always becoming and is never real?
That which is the object of belief together with unreason¬
ing sensation is the thing that becomes and passes away, but
never has real being ... Now whenever the maker looks to
that which is always unchanging and uses a model of that de¬
scription in fashioning the form and quality of his work,
all that he thus accomplishes must be good. If he looks to
something that has come to.be and uses a generated model,
it will not be good. (All quotations from the Timaeus will
be from Plato's Cosmology; The Timaeus of Plato translated
with a. running commentary by Francis MacDonald Cornford,
London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1937, 29A,
p. 22.)
The world is apprehensible by the senses. All that which is sen¬
sible is in a process of creation. Therefore the world was cre¬
ated. That which has been created will be imperfect and not fair
if modelled after a created pattern and will be fair and perfect
if modelled after an unchangeable pattern. But the world is fair
and the creator good, therefore he must have looked to the eter¬
nal and unchanging pattern.
The consideration of the Forms as patterns has brought us
to the cosmology in the Timaeus. By considering how the Demiurge
made the world it may be possible to learn which other things be¬
sides the Forms Plato thought existent, and also to learn some¬
thing about souls and bodies, which will be of special importance
in working out Plato's theory of the self.
Plato's protects himself against a possible charge of in-
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consistency by ruling out the possibility of an entirely con¬
sistent account of creation; 'we must remember that we are only
human and consequently it is fitting that we should accept the
likely story and look for nothing further'.
The Timaeus tells us how the Demiurge formed the body of
the world from earth, air, fire, and water (31-2), and "in the
c
centre he set a *oul and caused it to extend throughout the
whole and further wrapped its body round with soul on the out¬
side". (34B, p. 58) But the soul is not younger than the body,
but "prior to body and more venerable in birth and excellence",
made "to be the body's mistress and governor." (34C, p. 59)
The things of which he composed soul and the manner of its
composition were as follows: (1) Between the indivisible
Existence that is ever in the same state and the divisible
Existence that becomes in bodies, he compounded a third
form of Existence composed of both. (2) Again, in the case
of Sameness and in that of Difference, he also on the same
principle made a compound intermediate between that kind of
them which is indivisible and the kind that is divisible in
bodies. (3) Then, taking the three, he blended them all
into a unity, forcing the nature of Difference, hard as it
was to mingle, into union with Sameness, and mixing them
together with Existence. (35A, pp. 59-60.)
My interpretation of this is like Cornford's (pp. 60-66). Bodies
have divisible Existence, divisible Sameness, divisible Differ¬
ence. Souls (the World-Soul and individual souls which are com¬
pounded from the same ingredients but not so "pure" as we shall
see) have intermediate Existence, intermediate Sameness, inter¬
mediate Difference, and "belong to both worlds and partake of
both being and becoming." (P. 63) There are four species con¬
tained in the ideal living creature; these species are: gods,
winged things, watery species, and land creatures. The Demiurge
himself makes only the gods, and turns over the task of making
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the others to the gods, since if he himself "gave them birth
and life, they would be equal to gods." (41C, p. 140) The
Demiurge will provide the divine seed.
... he turned once more to the same mixing bowl wherein
he had mixed and blended the soul of the universe, and
poured into it what was left of the former ingredients,
blending them this time in somewhat the same way, only
no longer so pure as before, but second or third in de¬
gree of purity. And when he had compounded the whole,
he divided it into souls equal in number with the stars,
and distributed them, each soul to its several star.
(41 D-E, p. 142)
We must know what the World-Soul is made of to know what
individual souls are made of since the ingredients are the
same. We can see from this passage that what is to become hu¬
man souls is mixed all together in one bowl, one mixture, which
is uniform throughout, and divided up into separate souls equal
in number to the stars. (42A) In the first incarnation each
soul would be a man. If he lives well for "his due span of time"
(42B, p. 144), he goes back to his star, but "failing this, he
should shift at his second birth into a woman", and can be fur¬
ther demoted to various beasts (appropriate to his failings),
until he control irrationality, and return "once more to the
form of his first and best condition". (42B, p. 144)
Souls must 'bf necessity" (42B) be "implanted in bodies".
It is quite clear that in the Timaeus souls and bodies are cre¬
ated separately, the soul existing on a star before embodiment.
Plato occasionally writes of a man as being a composite,
e.g., "... is not one part of us body, another part soul?"
(Phaedo 79 I 463) Or he may relate body and soul in an inti¬
mate dependent way:
152
... not that the good body by any bodily excellence im¬
proves the soul, but, on the contrary, that the good soul,
by her own excellence, improves the body as far as this
may be possible. (Republic 403 I 667)
... but to see her (the soul) as she really is, not as we
now behold her, marred by communion with the body and
other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of
reason, in her original purity ... (Republic 611 I 669)
... the soul views some things by herself and others
through the bodily organs. (Theaetetus 185 II 188)
There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only
in the body, and others which are of the soul, and only
in the soul; while there are other mixtures of pleasures
with pains, common both to soul and body, which in their
composite state are called sometimes pleasures and some¬
times pains. (Philebus 46 II 381)
It might be thought that the tripartite division offered
in the Republic is a description bridging body and soul, the
reasoning faculty (only) being the soul, and the spirited and
appetitive elements belong to the body. But there are at least
four places in the Republic where these three aspects of a per¬
son are aspects of the soul, namely, 435, 436, 442, and 580.
Though there are these statements treating man as a compo¬
site of body and soul, much more often Plato seems to want to
draw a distinction between body and soul, not merely to distin¬
guish them but to make them independent and self-sufficient.
If you were going to commit your body to someone, who might
do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider
and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred, and deli¬
berate many days as to whether you should give him the care
of your body? But when the soul is in question, which you
hold of far more value than the body, and upon the good or
evil of which depends the well-being of you all, - about
this you never consulted either with your father or with
your brother or with anyone of us who are your companions.
(Protagoras 313 I 85)
... our souls must also have existed without bodies before
they were in the form of man, and must have had intelli
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gence. (Phaedo 76 I 461)
... the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and
immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble,
and unchangeable; and ... the body is in the very likeness
of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform,
and dissoluble, and changeable, (Phaedo 80 I 465)
The lovers of knowledge are conscious that the soul was
simply fastened aid glued to the body ... (Phaedo 82 I 468)
Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation
from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else.
And after they are separated they retain their several na¬
tures, as in life. (Gorqias 524 I 584)
And is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing
a corpse, and also in degree of meanness and womanishness
in maing an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy
has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind him...
(Republic 469 I 733)
There are more places where Plato makes body and soul indepen¬
dent; see also: Charmides 156-7, Lysis 218, Phaedrus 250, 270,
271, Crito 47-8, Phaedo 65-6, 70, Gorqias 512, Republic 591.
There can hardly be any doubt that Plato treats body and soul as
each independent of the other.
But which did he think was the real self? Fortunately, one
does not have to rely on interpretation only for he says:
... you must get hold of me, and take care that I do not
run away from you... I cannot make Crito believe that I
am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting
the argument, he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom
he will soon see, a dead body... you must be my surety to
him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart; and
then he will suffer less at my death, and not be grieved
when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not
have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial,
Thus we lay out Socrates, or Thus we follow him to the
grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in
themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of
good cheer then, my dear Crito, and say that you are bury¬
ing my body only... (Phaedo 115-6 I 499)
Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that
the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and that
even in life what makes each one of us to be what we are
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is only the soul; and that the body follows us about in
the likeness of each of us, and therefore, when we are
dead, the bodies of the dead are quite rightly said to
be our shades or images; for the true and immortal being
of each one of us which is called the soul goes on her
way to other Gods. (Laws 959 II 693)
In the following bit of dialogue between Socrates and Alcibia-
des, I omit the acquiescent replies of Alcibiades which do not
forward the argument.
Soc. And does not a man use the whole body? ... And that
which uses is different from that which is used? ... Then
a man is not the same as his own body?
Al. That is the inference.
3oc. What is he, then? ... You can say that he is the user
of the body. ... And the user of the body is the soul? ...
Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universal¬
ly granted. ... That man is one of three things. ... Soul,
body, or both together forming a whole. ... But did we not
say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man?
... And does the body rule over itself? ,v. It is subject,
as we were saying? ... Then that is not the principle
which we are seeking?
Al. It would seem not.
Soc.But may we say that the union of the two rules over the
body and that consequently that this is man?
Al. Very likely.
Soc. The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the
members is subject, the two united cannot possibly rule.
... But since neither the body, nor the union of the two,
is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is
man? ... Is anything more required to prove that the soul
is man? ... now inst^ead of aljplute existence, we have
been considering the nature of individual existence, and
this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is
nothing which may be called more properly ourselves than
the soul?
Al. There is nothing.
Soc. Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conver¬
sing with one another, soul to soul? ... And that is just
what I was saying before - that I, Socrates, am not arguing
or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real
Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul. ... He who
bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul? ...
He whose knowledge only extends to the body knows the
things of man, and not the man himself? (Alcibiades I
129-31 II 765-6)
Here are explicit statements and a long argument asserting that
the real self is the soul, that to know anyone really, one must
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know his soul, and that knowing the body is knowing the tool or
possession of the soul.
If one wants to say that the soul is between the Forms and
particulars, one still needs to give an account of how it can be
known. Someone else might be more insightful or more ingenious,
but I do not find any clear indications of how we could know
something falling between the Forms and particulars.
But suppose someone were to argue that quotations given above
also indicate (perhaps not quite so definitely) that Plato wanted
the self to be an irreducible composite of body and soul, and that
with quotations to support both positions one may choose either as
being Plato with as much justification. My reply would be that if
one of two mutually exclusive positions must be chosen, the one
having the support of systematic considerations should be chosen.
That which is most Platonic in Plato's philosophy is, I would
contend, the Forms. So that if there is a choice between a posi¬
tion consistent with the statements concerning the Forms, and a
position inconsistent with such statements, the former should be
preferred. This is the situation with the two possible theories
of the self: the self's being really soul is consistent with the
Forms, while the self's being an irreducible composite of body
and soul is not. Plato gives the reason why:
... this composition of the soul and body is called a living
and mortal creature ... immortal no such union can reasonably
be believed to be5 although fancy, not having seen nor surely
known the nature of God, may imagine an immortal creature
having both a body and also a soul which are united through¬
out all time. (Phaedrus 246 I 251)
The composition that consists of body and soul then cannot be
"reasonably" believed to be immortal. How is immortality related
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to the Forms? Immortality, or at least existence of the soul
prior to its union with the body, is required in order to make
knowledge which must be in terms of the Forms possible. The
Forms cannot be brought to mind de novo by objects of sense,
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therefore the soul must have known these Forms (which it recol¬
lects) in a previous existence. The necessary connection be¬
tween immortality and the existence of the Forms has been con¬
sidered above (pp. 147-8). The Phaedo 76-7 quotations given
there show that Plato himself thought that there was a neces¬
sary connection between the pre-existence of the soul and the
existence of the Forms. The first reason then for requiring
the real self to be soul is so that we can have knowledge of
the Forms.
The second reason for retaining the kind of self that may
be immortal may be a less telling one, depending on what one
thinks most fundamental in Platonic philosophy. It is: immor¬
tality must be a characteristic of the self or there will be
no guarantee that a person will get the just deserts of his
life. This is an ethical consideration, as over against the
metaphysical-epistemological one relating to the Forms. But
if one thinks that Plato's earliest and most earnest effort
was spent on questions of valuation, then the making possible
of judgment in the after-life would be accorded a high rank
in the selection of what to keep.
In at least five dialogues, Phaedo 81-2, 107-8, Gorgias
472-3, 523-7, Republic 614-21, Phaedrus 249, Timaeus 42, Plato
asserts that a man is judged after death for the life he has
lived, so that virtue is rewarded and evil _is punished even if
if hasn't been in this life.
These are the two systematic reasons which can be given
for maintaining that immortality must be able to be attributed
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to the real self, which requires in turn that the soul alone
be taken to be the real self.
What characteristics can be attributed to the soul?
"Self-motion is the very idea and essence of the soul..."
(Phaedrus 245 I 250). "The soul is in the very likeness of
the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and
indissoluble, and unchangeable" and "invisible". (Phaedo 80
1465) "We cannot believe - reason will not allow us - the soul
in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and
dissimilarity." (Republic 611 I 869)
This is the way Plato describes the soul when giving an
explicit statement about what the soul is. But I think Plato
was ambivalent in that he presents a quite different conception
of the metaphysical nature of the soul when what it must be is
only implicit. Plato was, among other things, a moralist, and
therefore must have believed that the soul was amenable to im¬
provement. How could one exhort men to be virtuous (e.g., Gor-
qias 527) unless one believed that men could change voluntarily?
His ambivalence on this matter of changeability is indicated by
his doubts and contradictions relating to the question whether
men could become more virtuous. There are several discussions
concerning whether virtue can be learned or not. In the Laches,
Meno, and Protagoras he expresses doubt that virtue can be
learned. Yet in the Sophist (228-9) and Phaedo (107), he as¬
serts that virtue can be learned. If, as he concludes in the
Meno (99-100 I 380) "virtue is neither natural nor acquired,
but an instinct given by God to the virtuous", then it hardly
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seems fair to judge a man for his being virtuous or not, if
success or failure is predetermined by the gods. So if Plato
repeatedly urges men to live better lives, and if, as he fre¬
quently asserts, men will be rewarded in the after-life for the
virtue or vice they achieve, then it seems inescapable that
Plato would have to hold that the soul must be able to acquire
characteristics voluntarily.
Besides the voluntary changing of the soul's characteris¬
tics, another kind of alteration must be allowed for. In the
myths concerning the after-life (Phaedrus 248-50, Phaedo 113-4,
Gorqias 524-5, Republic 614-21, Timaeus 41-2), the souls are
judged for their lives on earth, and. spend a certain amount of
time receiving the rewards of their earthly lives during which
time the soul is cleansed of its evil. Then the soul chooses
another lot, and drinks from the river which causes it to for¬
get its former life. These changes happen to the soul willy-
nilly. Since these changes in the underworld occur when the
soul is not longer attached to a body, the changeability of the
soul cannot be attributed solely to the body. The soul, in
and of itself, must change. The soul must change also if it is
to forget and remember the Forms.
So there are three reasons internal to the system giving
rise to dissatisfaction with Plato's description of the soul
as unchangeable. The first is that voluntary alterability must
be allowed if moral discourse is to be taken seriously and if
moral judgment is to be fair. The second reason is that Plato
describes changes which the soul undergoes in the after-life.
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Third: the soul must change as it forgets and remembers the
Forms. These changes which the soul undergoes are not of course
possible if the soul is unchangeable.
The question of changeability of the soul is closely re¬
lated to the next problem: the soul's immortality. When Soc¬
rates in the Phaedo wishes to comfort the people with him who
are saddened by his approaching death, he assures them that the
soul is immortal and that he - as soul - would exist after the
body was dead. But how long would he be himself? It may be that
he would, as himself, a philosopher who sought after the Forms
and lived righteously, go to dive 11 on a star forever. But for
the rest, they remain the persons they are for approximately
1100 years (Republic Book X) and then draw lots for a new life
and new identity, either human or animal. How much comfort would
it be to be assured that the soul as someone or some creature
will be immortal? In Plato's account no one stays himself for¬
ever, since the former identity is forgotten when one sets out
on the new life conforming to the lot one has chosen. To say
that the soul who makes a unique individual alive is immortal
does not seem to be the same as saying that the unique individu¬
al is immortal. The consequences of saying that the soul chooses
a new life is that no recognizable individual is immortal. A
person doesn't have a soul to call his own.
Now the relation between changeability and immortality can
be seen. If the soul is immortal, it must be changeable, becom¬
ing different persons in turn. If the soul is unchangeable to
the extent of remaining the same person (though still having to
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allow for moral alteration within the identity), and if one
calls this identity unchangeability, then the soul must be mor¬
tal, since it gives up this identity after a span of years here
on earth and in the underworld.
The meaning that Plato gives to "soul" seems to alternate
between 'the liveness present in each animal which leaves the
animal upon death and gees to the underworld" and "consciousness
including its abilities and what has been learned". The live¬
ness is unchanging, and being liveness is immortal. But if one
considers the soul to be only liveness, then the soul cannot be
itself ai^are since bare liveness does not seem to be the sort of
thing that can be aware. Undifferentiated liveness clearly is
not the whole of a person.
If by "soul" we take Plato to mean "consciousness, its abi¬
lities and ivhat has been learned", then a soul-person has more
content but could not be either unchangeable or immortal. Its
content is still extremely limited since no way of connecting
'li h-V-j ") V
the soul has been given, and even the necessity of this connection
/•V
has been denied, so none of the content of the soul can be depen¬
dent on the body. This has far-reaching implications. True, the
soul has perceived the Forms, but it has also forgotten them and
has to be reminded. The means of being reminded can be neither
sense-perception of particular instances of the Forms (because
sense perception depends on the body) nor dialectic with other
persons because knowledge of or communication with other persons
is impossible. (This is to be shown immediately below.)
Consciousness can think but it would seem that all it can
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think about is its ability to think and that there are many
other things to think about, if only it could remember. There
is no means of its coming to realize that it is unique.
What can a soul-person know about other individual and
unique soul-persons? Nothing.
Adherring strictly to Platonic terminology, we cannot
<v* ^
have knowledge of any particular soul because one have knowledge
A
only of the unchangeable Forms. There are no Forms for indivi¬
dual souls (Parmenides 130; David Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas,
Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1951, pp. 79, 141), but only a Form
"Soul" which includes what is common to all souls, and after
which the mixture, afterwards divided into separate souls, was
patterned. So there would not be Forms for individuals. By
thinking on the Form "Soul", if we can get so far as to remem¬
ber any Forms at all, we can know the characteristics that be¬
long to all souls as portions of the original mixture. We can
know the Forms of Justice, Temperance, Courage, etc. but we
cannot know the degree of these virtues in any one soul, and
so cannot identify a soul, or have any knowledge of any soul
as unique via the Forms,
If Plato had not insisted so strenuously on the separate-
ness and self-sufficiency of body and soul (see quotations pp.
152-3), he could have allowed for opinion which needs the help
of sense (Timaeus 27-8 is one place where Plato characterizes
opinion in this way) concerning the soul. But as it is, the
soul is required for the life of the body but the soul does not
need the body for anything. One must not rely on the body to
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express the soul (Alcibiades I 130). The body seems to be the
case or wrapping required "by necessity" but why the body should
express the soul or how the body could express the soul if each
is different from the other and self-sufficient is no where said.
So if it is the case that there are no Forms of individual
souls, one cannot have knowledge (in the strict sense) of an in¬
dividual. And if body does not reflect soul and is not required
for judging the soul (bodiless after death), then one cannot rely
on the body for learning about the invisible soul, so one cannot
have opinions about the soul.
Of course, Plato thought about how one could learn about
the soul. In the Phaedo (255 I 259) he suggests, "the lover is
his mirror in whom he is beholding himself ...", but unless he
tells us how to behold the lover (beholding his body will not do)
the loved one still cannot behold his own soul.
Plato is not content with such cryptic statements; he of¬
fers a longer discussion in the Alcibiades I_. I quote the whole
discussion since I would not want it to appear that I am treat¬
ing Plato in a cavalier fashion on such an important point. (I
shall again omit Alcibiades answers which add no clarification
to the problem.)
Soc. But hoi"/ can we have a perfect knowledge of the things
of the soul? - For if we know them, then I suppose we shall
know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent
meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just
now speaking?
Al. What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?
Soc. I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and
lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration
from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to
my purpose. ... Consider; if some one were to say to the
eye, "See thyself" what is the nature and meaning of this
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precept? VJould not his meaning be: That the eye should
look at that in which it would see itself? ... And what
are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?
Al. Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.
Soc. Very true; and is there not something of the nature
of a mirror in our own eyes? ... Did you ever observe
that the face of the person looking into the eye of ano¬
ther is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ
which is over against him, and which is called the pupil,
there is a sort of image of the person looking? ... Then
if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and
at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue
of the eye resides? ... And if the soul ... is ever to
know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especial¬
ly at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides,
and to any other which is like this? ... And do we know
of any part of our souls more divine than that which has
to do with wisdom and knowledge? ... Then this is that
pa^t of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who
looks at this and at the whole class of things divine,
will be most likely to know himself? ... And self-know-
ledge we agree to be wis&m? But if we have no self-
knowledge and no wisdom,'' can we ever know our own good
and evil? ... You mean, that if you did not know Alci-
biades, there would be no possibility of your knowing
that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his? ...
Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom
anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves? ... And
if we did not knoi*/ our own belongings, neither should we
know the belongings of our belongings? ... And he who
knows not the things which be1org to himself, will in like
manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?
Al. Very true. (Alcibiades I_ 132-3 II 763-70)
At first glance this seems to offer some promising sug¬
gestions. The analogy of knowing the soul with seeing leads
one on in the hope that the eye of the soul and what is supposed
to be 'seen' will be explained or elaborated. But this hope is
disappointed; one only learns that one must look at the divine
part of the soul and the whole class of things divine, and one
cannot but be more discouraged by the observation that without
knowing the soul, one cannot know his own or ethers' possessions.
To look at the class of divine things means, I take it, to look
at the Forms which as has already been determined will give us
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knowledge about the soulness common to all men but not know¬
ledge about individual souls.
The analogy of 'seeing' with seeing is one of Plato's
favorites. He had used it before in the Republic:
... But to see her (the soul) as she really is, not as
we now behold her, marred by communion with the body,
and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye
of reason, in her original purity. (Republic 611 I 869)
What is one to 'see'? Contemplating a Form of soul has been
found to be inapplicable to individual souls, and 'seeing' the
soul by using one's bodily eyes has been ruled out also.
It seems that one must conclude that it is not possible to
learn about individual souls. Plato fails in his efforts to ex¬
plain how one may have knowledge or opinion about the soul.
There is evidence that Plato thought the concern with indi¬
vidualities undesirable and unphilosophical;
For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next-
door neighbour; he is ignorant, not only of what he is
doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a man or an ani¬
mal; he is searching into the essence of man, and busy in
enquiring what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer
from any other. (Theaetetus 174 II 176-7)
Here Plato is at the least deprecating a philosopher's interest
in his neighbours, and asserting that the essence of Man - that
common to all men - is the philosopher's business. His atti¬
tude toward the plurality of individuals comes out in another
place:
The true lover of knowledge is always striving after being.
He will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which
is an appearance only. (Republic 490 I 750-1)
If one views the multiplicity of individuals as appearances,
i.e., as something not really real, one denies the real unique-
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ness of himself and others.
As for knowledge - the philosopher contemplates the Form,
Soulness, and knows this is real and necessarily present in all
men. The appearing individualities he has no way of apprehending,
since there is no way for the soul's appearances to appear, either
directly or through the body.
Changeability is explicitly denied as well as assumed. But
though there are reasons for requiring both changeability and
changelessness, no means of allowing real change are described.
One can only conclude that changeable, knowable individuali¬
ties are intellectually unaccounted for; they are simply relegated
to an inferior status.
Frankly I should like some other conclusion, as I feel sure
many students and admirers of Plato would. But I do not see how
any other alternative is possible, while keeping the Forms and
the epistemology following from and required by the theory of the
Forms and Plato's ethics. My exposition and criticism of Plato's
theory of the self seems excessively simple-minded, but whatever
subtleties and sophistications I try to introduce always incor¬
porate unfaithfulness to a central doctrine. I have no alterna¬
tive but to wait to see this view of Plato shown wrong making way
for another vie** which does not have to retain these objectionable
elements, or failing this to have this view accepted but incor¬
porated into a more adequate theory of the self in a way I have
not been able to do. I am encouraged in my attempts by Plato's
urging Theaetetus to be bold, couseling not caution but courage.
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Summary
1. Plato's first concern was to account for knowledge
\tfhich he does by means of the theory of the Forms.
2. In order to know the Forms, the soul must be immortal.
3. All souls come from a single uniform misture; they are
therefore identical one *?ith another and there is no distin¬
guishing between any two souls.
4. According to Plato the person is really his soul.
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5. The person must really be soul in order that a) the
person can know the Forms which could be known only by an im¬
mortal soul, and b) the person in the afterlife can get the
just deserts for his deeds.
6. The soul is defined as unchangeable, but must change
a) if moral discourse is to be taken seriously, b) if the
soul is to undergo the changes in the underworld, and c) if
it is to forget and remember the Forms in the way that Plato
describes.
7. If the soul is unchangeable, "soul" seems to mean
"liveness" in which case any individual identity or conscious¬
ness is impossible.
8. If "soul" means "consciousness with its abilities and
learned content", then it is changeable but not immortal. How
the mind unconnected to the body remembers the Forms is not
given and would seem to be impossible within the system.
9. If the soul is consciousness, its abilities and what
it has learned, the person can be aware of himself as thinking.
10. If a person's soul is not connected in any necessary
way with his body, he has no way of knowing, or being known by,
any other soul.
CHAPTER 4
In this chapter I shall present and evaluate the theories
of Hume, Whitehead, and Leibniz. I treat these three together
because all of them claimed that a person was really experience,
or made up of some entity or entities constituted of experience.
I use these three together also because Whitehead shares with
each of the other two a striking similarity so a certain eco¬
nomy is affected by pairing up two philosophers, showing that
their views on a particular issue are the same, and criticizing
this view. One thereby reveals the weakness in two philosophers'
views with one expose.
Hume's theory is in fact presented as a theory of persons.
Whitehead's and Leibniz's theories are parts of general meta¬
physical systems. Hume's theory is more compactly presented,
less piecing together and constructing has to be done, at least
if one takes him at his word. In the sections of the Treatise
of Human Mature in which Hume discusses the problems reMied to
persons, he makes certain explicit claims. In other places
where what he would say the person is remains implicit, marked¬
ly different beliefs seem to appear. But mostly these implicit
views would not fit with his explicit statements. I restrict
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myself therefore to the explicit theory.
Whitehead, at first glance and long afterward, has an ap¬
parently inscrutable metaphysical system. His theory is spread
out and needs to be constructed. (Much of what I say about
Whitehead is taken from my M.A. thesis, The Metaphysics of
Alfred North Whitehead in Relation to Certain Experiences of
the Self, written under the direction of Arthur E. Murphy at
The University of Texas in 1959.)
Leibniz's theory of persons too needs some, but far less,
making explicit. I rely on his Monadology.
For Hume a person is "nothing but a bundle or collection of
different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconcei¬
vable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."
(David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, The Clarendon
Press, p. 252. Since all the references will be to this Selby-
Bigge Edition of the Treatise, I shall give only page numbers.)
All these are different,and distinguishable, and separable
from each other, and may be separately consider'd, and may
exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support
their existence. (252)
He is denying any consciousness (which is what he most often
means by "self" though sometimes he uses "self" as if he meant
it to be equivalent to "person") to which particular percep¬
tions belong. The reason he denies a self is that he never ob¬
serves it, but rather when he enters most intimately into what
he calls himself, he always stumbles on some particular percep¬
tion or other. Hume means by "perception" "experience".
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Hume does not mention body at all as part of a person but
I shall not make much of this because in this place where he
writes most explicitly of what persons are, he is trying to
give an account of personal identity, especially to deny that it
is the self which provides identity. He does not take the trou¬
ble to deny that it is the body which provides personal identity.
So when he writes throughout this section,"Of Personal
Identity", about perceptions, it is perceptions experienced by
the person privately of his own that are connected so as to
provide for his endurance through time not one person's, A's,
perceptions of another person, B, providing B's identicalness.
The perceptions are logically separate. How are they con¬
nected? By relations of "resemblance and causation".
To begin with resemblance; suppose that we cou'd see
clearly into the breast of another, and observe that suc¬
cession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or
thinking principle, and suppose that he always preserves
the memory of a considerable part of past perceptions;
'tis evident that nothing cou'd more contribute to the
bestowing a relation on this succession amidst all its
variations. For what is the memory but a faculty, by
which we raise up the images of past perceptions? And
as an image necessarily resembles its object, must not
the frequent placing of these resembling perceptionsjin
the chain of thought convey the imagination more easily
from one link to another, and make the whole seem like
the continuance of one object? In this particular, then,
the memory not only discovers the identity, but also con¬
tributes to its production, by producing the relation of
resemblance among perceptions. The case is the same whe¬
ther we consider ourselves or others. (260-1)
We could ask whether Hume is entitled to 'memory' any more
than another philosopher is entitled to 'self'. There is no
impression of 'memory', only remembered experiences. But there
is no need to force Hume on the basis of his avowed sensation-
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alism to give up 'memory' as the means of connecting perceptions
so as to produce identity because Hume gives it up himself.
As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and
extent of this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be con¬
sider 'd, upon that account chiefly, as the source of per¬
sonal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou'd have
any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of
causes and effects, which constitute our self or person.
But having once acquir'd this notion of causation from the
memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and
> actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in
general to have existed. For how few of our past actions
are there, of which we have any memory? Who can tell me,
for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the
first of January 1715, the 11th of March 1719, and the 3d
of August 1733? Or will he affirm, that because he has
entirely forgot the incidents of these days, the present
self is not the same person with the self of that time;
and by that means overturn all the most establish'd notions
of personal identity? In this view, therefore, memory does
not so much produce as discover personal identity, by shew¬
ing us the relation of cause and effect among our different
perceptions. "Twill be incumbent on those, who affirm that
memory produces entirely our personal identity, to give a
reason why we can thus extend our identity beyond our memo¬
ry. (261-2)
Memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity,
by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our percep¬
tions . Now the real connector among experiences is cause and
effect.
Only a little examination of our intimate selves will show
perceptions occurring which are not connected causally to the
preceding perceptions, at least not in the sense that Hume needs.
I sit here writing. Suddenly the atmosphere is split by a sonic
boom produced by a jet plane breaking the sound barrier. The ex¬
perience of the boom is not produced by or an effect of the ex¬
periences which went before. If it were, I would not be so
startled. How could an experience of comparatively orderly
thinking of Hume's philosophy be the cause of the experience of
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the sonic boom? The sonic boom is classifiable because of
concepts learned earlier, but to count any concept learned at
some earlier time as a remembered concept, therefore connected
to other experiences by memory even if one cannot remember learn¬
ing the concept, i.e., has no impression of learning the concept,
would be to give up both Hume's sensationalism and atomism which
he did not want to do.
Nor can one say that one has a concept gotten from no ex¬
perience in particular. If Hume were to allow this, the philo¬
sophers wanting to claim a self would say the concept of self
is gotten from all of the experiencedness which accompanies
every experience.
To say that causation is the connection among perceptions
is to be forced to allow that whatever experiences are not cau¬
sally related to preceding experiences of which one retains the
impressions are not part of the same person. Hume has pointed
out the absurdity of such a result in his objection to memory's
providing identity. This would, as he says, "overturn all the
most establish'd notions of personal identity".
Hume's account is defective. He says so himself in the
appendix to the Treatise. (His extraordinary candour is to be
lauded.) He shows us just what is wrong.
First he gives us the sensationalist principle: "every
idea is derived from preceding impressions." But "we have no
impression of self or substance, as something simple and indi¬
vidual. We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense."
(633)
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Next the atomistic principle and its application to percep¬
tions .
Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and what¬
ever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or
imagination. All perceptions are distinct. They are,
therefore, distinguishable, and separable, and may be con-
ceiv'd as separately existent, and may exist separately,
without any contradiction or absurdity. (634)
Coming to himself.
When I turn my reflexion on myself, I never can per¬
ceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor
can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. *Tis
the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self.
(634)
This principle I shall call the experientialist principle. It
may be stated as: the self is made up only of experiences.
So far then Hume has all ideas coming only from impressions,
all perceptions existent as separate entities, no impression of a
unitary self, and the self constituted wholly of separate percep¬
tions, the composition of which make up the self.
But having thus loosen*d all our particular perceptions,
when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which
binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real
simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is
very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence
of the precedent reasonings cou'd have indue•d me to re¬
ceive it. If perceptions are distinct existences, they
form a whole only by being connected together. But no con¬
nexions are ever discoverable by human understanding. (635)
He concludes:
In short there are two principles, which I cannot ren¬
der consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of
them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct
existences, and that the mind never perceives any real
connexion amoncj distinct existences." Did our perceptions
either inhere m something simple and individual, or did
the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there
wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must
plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this
difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend
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not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable.
Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflexsions,
may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those
contradictions. (636)
His reasoning is valid and so far as I know Hume found no
way of resolving these difficulties. And if one maintains the
facts and principles that he does, I cannot see that one can
account for personal identity, the enduringness of the same
person from birth to death.
The defectiveness of Hume's account becomes more patent
if one tries to say anything further about a person.
If there is no enduring identity to a person, it cannot
be that a person changes. All one has are perceptions changing.
An experiential atomistic account of persons will always suffer
from this defect unless the separate perceptions can be con¬
nected.
The fundamentalness of personal identity can be seen too
if one attempts to say how a person could have self-knowledge
or knowledge of others. The present perception is known, and
(let us grant) some past perceptions are remembered and/or
causally related to the present one. Can one say about this
broken chain of experiences all one wants to say about oneself?
Can this broken chain of experiences be known by others? Hume
would to all appearances have the mind-body problem.
But even in those areas where what is experienced private¬
ly would be enough for the kind of knowledge, say, intentions
to think such-and-such, how could one get the right hold on fu¬
ture perceptions? One cannot know that the present perception
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will cause any subsequent perception nor that the present per¬
ception will be remembered. The relation between perceptions
are so chancy. We cannot know other people will have specific
characteristics just because they had or have them. There is
no thrust into the future.
When it comes to responsibility, such contingency would
cancel most of what we require. If I cannot be sure of being
able to continue so as to carry out what I intend, how can I
require any effort from myself? The present self may be re¬
placed by a new self. What difference would it make to me
whether that new self is punished or rewarded?
Summary
1. Hume's theory of persons is sensationalistic (that is,
all ideas, including that of self, must come from impressions),
atomistic (all perceptions are logically separate), and experi¬
ential (the self is made up of perceptions).
2. Hume denies that he has any impression of a continuing
self, so he must connect in some other way the separate impres¬
sions to give an identity to the self.
3. He suggests causation or resemblance (provided by memory)
but himself decides that these are defective.
4. No principle to provide identity can be given within
the Humeian system.
5. Without identity, neither change, self-knowledge, know¬
ledge of others nor responsibility can be accounted for.
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Whitehead's account is likewise atomistic and experien-
tialist but not sensationalist. His theory must be educed
from his general metaphysical system.
All of reality is constituted of actual occasions. The
"actual entities - also termed 'actual occasions' - are the
final real things of which the world is made up." There is
nothing more real or more fundamental. Even "God is an actual
entity". What are these actual entities? They are "drops of
experience, complex and interdependent." (Alfred North White¬
head, Process and Reality, New York, The Humanities Press, 1957,
p. 28. Henceforth I shall refer to this book as PR.) This is
Whitehead's atomism and experientialism.
With his 'ontological principle", Whitehead insists that
"everything in the world is referable to some actual entity"
(PR 373) or stated another way that "actual occasions form the
ground from which all other types of existence are derivative
and abstracted" (PR 116). This principle together with the
definition of actual entities as "drops of experience" indicates
that if we understand what the experience of actual occasions
is, we can understand the entire universe.
In Whiteheadian language, experience is prehension, e
broader term than (sense) perception or conscious apprehension.
Every actual entity is some group of prehensions.
The becoming or concrescence of an actual entity is
termed its formal existence; this is what it is for itself.
The having become or concrete is termed the objective existence;
this is what it is for others. All actual entities have both
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sorts of existence.
All actual entities besides God are limited in time. They
endure for a period of time and then perish. This period of
time cannot be more than one half second. How are the actual
occasions connected to form a self-identical enduring person?
Whitehead certainly wanted to allow for personal identity.
Yet personal unity is an inescapable fact. ... Any
philosophy must provide some doctrine of personal identity.
In some sense there is a unity in the life of each man,
from birth to death. The two modern philosophers who most
consistently reject the notion of a self-identical Soul-
Substance are Hume and William James. But the problem re¬
mains for them, as it does for the philosophy of organism,
to provide an adequate account of this undoubted personal
unity, maintaining itself amidst the welter of circumstance.
... This personal identity is the thing which receives all
occasions of the man's existence. (Alfred North Whitehead,
Adventures of Ideas, New York, Mentor Books, 1958, pp. 188-
"W, Henceforth I shall refer to this book as AI.)
But can he make room for personal identity within his system?
To give an answer we can begin by giving the kinds of
perception allowed. There are for Whitehead two modes of per¬
ception: Perception in the Mode of Causal Efficacy and Percep¬
tion in the Mode of Presentational Immediacy. The two are not
of equal importance; Perception in the Mode of Causal Efficacy
is the more important and is the basis for Perception in the
Mode of Presentation Immediacy, which is mainly a characteris¬
tic of more advanced organisms.
Whitehead characterises perception in the mode of causal
efficacy in this way:
This direct perception, characterized by mere sub¬
jective responsiveness and by lack of origination in the
higher phases, exhibits the constitution of an actual en¬
tity under the guise of receptivity. In the language of
causation, it describes the efficient causation operative
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in the actual world. In the language of epistemology, as
framed by Locke, it describes how the ideas of particular
existents are absorbed into the subjectivity of the perci¬
pient and are the datum for its experience of the external
world. In the language of science, it describes how the
quantitative intensity of localized energy bears in itself
the vector marks of its origin, and the specialities of
its specific forms; it also gives a reason for the atomic
quanta to be discerned in the building up of a quantity of
energy. (PR 178-9)
Two uses of the concept of causal efficacy are pertinent
here; they are causality and receptivity. The efficient causali¬
ty within the self, i.e., subjective causality, is entirely in¬
cluded within receptivity.
According to this account, perception in its consciousness
of the causal efficacy of the external world by reason of
which the percipient is a concrescence from a definitely
constituted datum. The vector character of the datum is
this causal efficacy.
Thus perception, in this primary sense, is perception
of the settled world in the past as constituted by its
feeling-tones, and as efficacious by reason of those feel¬
ing tones. Perception, in this sense of the term, will be
called 'perception in the mode of causal efficacity.w
Memory is an example of perception in this mode. For me¬
mory is perception relating to the data from some historic
route of ultimate percipient subjects ML, , M^, etc.,
leading up to M which is the memorizing percipient. (PR 184)
From these two passages concerning causal efficacy we see
that the datum is given in the mode of causal efficacy and that
this datum is the "raw material" for the concrescence.
This datum, which is the primary phase in the process con¬
stituting the actual entity, is nothing else than the ac¬
tual world itself in its character of a possibility for
the process of being felt. (PR 101)
Perception in this mode is causal because of the vector character
to a feeling, the indicating of direction. The vector quality of
the feelings show where the feelings have come from. That this
mode of perception includes memory is consonant with causal ef-
178
ficacy's being the mode in which the datum is perceived by the
actual entity in its formal constitution. This may be under¬
stood intuitively if one thinks of remembering past instants
that make up one's present self.
The other mode of perception, presentational immediacy is
not entirely separate.
Presentational immediacy is an outgrowth from the complex
datum implanted by causal efficacy. ... The supplemental
phase lifts the presented duration into vivid distinct¬
ness, so that the vague efficacity of the indistinct ex¬
ternal world in the immediate past is precipitated upon
the representative regions in the contemporary present.
(PR 262)
If there can be no new datum perceived in the mode of presenta¬
tional immediacy but criy the same datum (of the past) perceived
in the mode of causal efficacy, there can be no prehension of
contemporary concrescent actual occasions.
But if it is not contemporary actual entities which are
perceived, what is it that is perceived in this mode? The an¬
swer is extensive relations. These extensive relations which
are prehended make up the extensive continuum, Whitehead's
alternative to Newton's absolute space. The extensive continu¬
um is derived or abstracted from the ordered world, and has
no reality apart from actual entities. Presentational immedi¬
acy gives us information about extensive relations of the con¬
temporary world but not about the actual feelings of actual
entities as individual.
From what has been given concerning perception in the
mode of causal efficacy and perception in the mode of presen¬
tational immediacy, one conclusion may be drawn here, namely,
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that there can be no mutual prehension by actual entities, or
in other words, that prehension is an asymmetrical relation.
The reasons for this can be reviewed. Causal efficacy gives
data about past actual entities; presentational immediacy
gives only bare extensive regions so that perception of con-
crescent contemporaries is ruled out. Only contemporaries,
that is, actual entities enjoying formal existence in the same
duration, could prehend each other, but prehension of actual
entities must always be of past actual entities.
The analysis of the formal constitution, or concrescence,
is called "genetic analysis'; the analysis of the concrete, or
what has become, is called the "morphological or coordinate
analysis'. "The four stages constitutive of an actual entity
... can be named, datum, process, satisfaction, decision."
(PR 227) The datum is given in the mode of causal efficacy and
is made up of earlier actual entities. The initial datum in¬
cludes the whole of the antecedent world. Some past actual
entities are more relevant than others. Some actual past en¬
tities are positively prehended, that is, go to make up the
objective datum. Other actual entities are negatively pre¬
hended, that is, excluded from contribution to the subject's
own real internal constitution. The subjective aim determines
which actual occasions will be included and which excluded.
The initial datum minus what is negatively prehended (excluded)
is the objective datum. The subjective form is how the actual
occasion feels about the objective datum.
If the subjective aim controls the entire concrescence
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including the subjective fonp the subjective aim must be novel
because each concrescence must be novel. The same aim cannot
be held by any two actual occasions. (PR 354)
The subjective aim must always be sized to one actual en¬
tity, not to several of them since the aim must be satisfied at
the end of one concrescence.
Thus the notion of 'order' is bound up with the no¬
tion of an actual entity as involving an attainment which
is a specific satisfaction. This satisfaction is the at¬
tainment of something individual to the entity in ques¬
tion. (PR 129)
The problem which the concrescence solves is, how the many
components of the objective content are to be unified in
one felt content with its complex subjective form. This
one felt content is the 'satisfaction,' whereby the actual
entity is its particular individual self; ... In the con¬
ception of the actual entity in its phase of satisfaction,
the entity has attained its individual separation from
other things. (PR 233)
The importance of this requirement will be seen when the attempt
is made to connect actual occasions in such a way as to provide
for an enduring person.
A person is a society which is one kind of nexus (plural
nexus). A nexus is a set of actual occasions unified by pre¬
hensions which can be qualified by one or more eternal objects.
Eternal objects are ideas (rather like Platonic Forms) prehended
by the antecedent nature of God. (Eternal objects could not be
self-subsistent, independent of all experiencers, as Platonic
Forms can be because this would violate Whitehead's ontological
principle. Cf. above p. 175.)
A 'society,' in the sense in which that term is here used,
is a nexus with social order; and an 'enduring object,' or
'enduring creature,' is a society whose social order has
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taken the special form of 'personal order.' ...
A nexus enjoys 'person order' when Ccc) it is a
'society,' and when the genetic relatedness of its
members orders these members 'serially.' ... Thus the
nexus forms a single line of inheritance of its defining
characteristic. (PR 50-1)
A society is not a kind of entity which exists independent
of actual entities. A society or nexus is made up of actual
entities and the description of 'societies* and 'nexus' cannot
be contrary to or independent of what can be said about actual
occasions. Whitehead explicitly says: "the society is only ef¬
ficient through its individual members." (PR 139) A society
has no formal existence as a society, but has only objective
existence. A society after the satisfactions of its members
(after their perishing) has existence as one, but has formal
existence only as a plurality. Providing the order of a society
from the plurality of its members is another way of stating the
problem of the enduring identity of the self.
The society-self has an identity because of 1) a complex
eternal object inherited by all the members, and 2) the genetic
relatedness of its members. The actual occasions forming the
society must share a common character.
The members of the society are alike because, by reason
of their common character, they impose on other members
of the society the conditions which lead to that like¬
ness. (PR 137)
This statement says that the common character may be "imposed"
on the members of the society. But Whitehead does not want to
always maintain that the character can be imposed on the mem¬
bers , in the sense that their own present subjective form is
determined by the antecedent members of the society. He some-tM«cf
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says that the given is 'imposed" (AI 204, 205) on the concres-
cent actual occasion, and sometimes says that the given "energi¬
zes" the present (AI 184), and also says that the given "allows"
(PR 127) the concrescent actual occasion to become what it does.
If the complex form providing unity can be imposed on the mem¬
bers of the society so the response is pre-determined, there
cannot be a novel subjective form as required (PR 131, 159, 355,
354). The subjective form is always given with a 'vector' quali¬
ty as coming from 'there'. An earlier subjective form does not
have to be positively prehended, it may be negatively prehended.
If it is positively prehended, it is prehended first as another's
feeling and only is ordered into the present subject's objective
datum (i.e., made its own) "by introduction of adaptation for the
attainment of an end." (PR 127) The subjecty^e form for the
concrescent actual entity can only be determined in relation to
its own subjective aim, so the the identical form (which violates
the requirement that the subjective form be novel) can be present
within a society only if the appropriate aims are present within
each member of the society.
The subjective aim for each actual occasion comes from God
(this will be shown below in relation to responsibility), so to
the extent that the identity of the self (society) is possible,
it rests on God's giving the same subjective aim to successive
actual occasions.
This identity of subjective form depending upon God's giving
the proper subjective aim throughout the society is, however, as
has been pointed out, inconsistent with his (Whitehead's) require-
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ment that the subjective form be novel. It will be recalled
that the order of a society was to depend on two factors: 1) the
complex eternal object inherited by all of the members (which
has been criticized) and 2) the genetic relatedness among the
members. This second factor then might be offered as a basis
for order among the actual occasions constituting a society,
since the first requires that some part of Whitehead's system
be repudiated. Can the process of inheritance then provide
order? To point up the meaning of this possibility one may ask
the question: if there can be no aspect of the actual entity,
the inheritance of which can provide for endurance, could in¬
heritance itself be the basis of order? Whitehead gives an un¬
equivocal answer: "'Order' means more than 'givenness,' although
Ls presupposes 'givenness,' 'disorder' is also 'given.'" (PR 127)
I take this to mean that the givenness of any datum would connect
it to the past, but would not insure continuation of an ordered
nexus. Societies disintegrate though there is inheritance. If
there is disorder in the universe, it has to be the result of
inheritance from the past which indicates that what is to be in¬
herited rather than the process whereby it is inherited must
account for endurance.
The process of inheritance as such cannot give identity.
To achieve identity within a society, one must suspend Whitehead's
requirement that the subjective form of every actual occasion be
novel, and allow God to give successive actual occasions the same
subjective aim which will determine them to feel the same sub¬
jective form.
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To allow for this experience of life-long identity, it
would hardly help to stretch the duration of actual occasions
unless one stretched the duration to a human lifetime. And
period less than that would offer no solution whatever just be¬
cause this identity of a person lasts a lifetime. Unless one
actual occasion endures for the lifetime of a person, the prob¬
lem of more than one actual occasion's having the same subjective
form arises.
To get enduring identity one must depend on God to provide
the same subjective aim to successive actual occasions. If one
is content to rely on God to provide this _ad hoc identity, I
think that much of what is required for self-knowledge is possi¬
ble.
The situation is curious when it comes to knowledge of others
since there is no direct perception or prehension of contempora¬
ries. Experience is made up of past entities.
The process of experiencing is constituted by the reception
of entities, whose being is antecedent to that process,
into the complex fact which is that process itself. ...
Two conditions must be fulfilled in order that an entity
may function as an object in a process of experiencing:
(1) the entity must be antecedent, and (2) the entity
must be experienced in virtue of its antecedence; it must
be given. (AI 180)
One knows something about one's contemporaries because one knows
something about their ancestors. Whitehead calls this indirect
prehension.
There is an indirect prehension of contemporary occasions,
via the efficient causation, from which they arise. For
the immediate future of the immediate past constitues the
set of contemporary occasions for the percipient. ... Thus
the prehension of contemporary occasions is the prehension
of those occasions in so far as they are conditioned by the
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occasions in the immediate past of the prehending sub¬
ject. (AI 219)
The conclusion is that the contemporary world is not
perceived in virtue of its own proper activity, but in
virtue of activities derived from the past, the past which
conditions the contemporary percipient. (AI 220)
But the concrescent actual occasion selects from what is given
(the whole of the past) that which will satisfy its own subjec¬
tive aim. How can an actual occasion know that its contempora¬
ries are concrescing in accordance with its expectations based
on the past. Perhaps for their experience they select from the
past what we do not anticipate. The impossibility of prehending
one's contemporaries makes one's knowledge of them uncertain and
the actual occasion's own concrescence lonely. One needs to
rely on God to give aims that will seem natural outgrowths of
the past so that contemporaries cannot be too far off.
The part that God plays is seen to be quite overwhelming
when we consider the possibility of human responsibility within
the Whiteheadian system.
The subjective aim determines the concrescence. The ques¬
tion to ask if we want to decide how responsibility is to be
fixed is: what determines the subjective aim? Everything fol¬
lows from it so how is it gotten? I contend that the subjective
aim is given by God. Whitehead's statements supporting this po¬
sition will be given, and then the systematic considerations
which make only this position tenable will be given.
Each temporal entity ... derives from God its basic con¬
ceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with inde-
terminations awaiting its own decisions. (PR 343)
God ... is that actual entity from which each temporal
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concrescence receives that initial aim from which its
self-causation starts. (PR 374)
The quantum is that standpoint in the extensive continuum
which is consonant with the subjective aim in its original
derivation from God. (PR 434)
Suppose that some one, foreseeing difficulty, were to protest
God's determining the subjective aim, could he find another
responsible agent, remembering that actual entities are the only
reasons?
The past actual entities could not give the aim, because
which actual entities will form its past is not known until the
subjective aim has selected the actual entities which are to
constitute its objective (determining) datum, in accordance with
its subjective aim. The past actual entities determine what
may be included, but not that they will be included.
Future occasions are only hypothetical and are themselves
based on the completed present subjective aim so they could not
be the source of the present subjective aim.
If it is said that an actual entity chooses its own sub¬
jective aim, we must ask what there is to an actual entity in¬
dependent of its subjective aim. There can be no subjective
form or objective datum, which are both dependent on the sub¬
jective aim. It might be argued that the region which is going
to be occupied by an actual entity determines its subjective
aim. This is, of course, contrary to the system, for the re¬
gion antecedent to its concrescence is "nothing, nothing,
nothing, bare nothingness" since only an actual entity can be
a reason, and an actual entity without a feeling (i.e., a bare
region) is nothing. If one wants to make the region something
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in its own right apart from actual entities, one repudiates
Whitehead's stand against absolute space. If the region ante¬
dates the process of concrescence, the extensive continuum
cannot be an abstraction from the satisfaction, and must rather
be viewed as absolute and independent of what is in it for its
existence. I believe that Whitehead would rather allow the
subjective aim to give rise to the concrescence and region than
accept absolute space.
But if the region of an actual entity cannot choose the
subjective aim, then there is no aspect of the actual entity
which could choose its own subjective aim. Past and future
entities have already been ruled out, so God is not only a
source offered within the system but is the only possible source
allowed by the system.
It seems that there is no escape from God's determining
the subjective aim, but now the question might be asked: in
what form is the subjective aim gotten from God? It might be
argued that the subjective aim as derived from God is indeter¬
minate, so that the concrescent actual entity is allowed a
great deal of "freedom" in making determinate the indeterminate
subjective aim. But one must keep in mind the requirement that
the subjective aim determine the datum which constitutes the
actual entity, and with this in mind it can easily be seen that
the aim cannot be entirely indeterminate (e.g., "to be" as op¬
posed to "to not be" or "to be satisfied" as opposed to "to
not be satisfied") since with such a vague aim, there would be
no criterion for selecting or rejecting past feeling^which are
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to make up the objective datum which constitutes the actual en¬
tity. Rather the aim must be something specific which will in
itself provide a basis for including or excluding feelings.
How specific must the subjective aim be?
In the becoming and completion of an actual entity, the
subjective aim is the guide.
In its self-creation the actual entity is guided by its
ideal of itself as individual satisfaction and as trans¬
cendent creator. The enjoyment of this ideal is the
•subjective aim' by reason of which the actual entity is
a determinate process. (PR 130)
The satisfaction is determinate as regards every feeling of
the antecedent universe.
The final phase in the process of concrescence, constitu¬
ting the actual entity, is one complex, fully determinate
feeling. This final phase is termed the 'satisfaction.1
It is fully determinate (a) as to its genesis, (b) as to
its objective character for the transcendent creativity,
and (c) as to its prehension - positive or negative - of
every item in its universe. (PR 38)
Since the satisfaction is entirely determinate and is determined
by the subjective aim, the aim must be determinate. If Whitehead
supporters contend that the datum and the working out of it af¬
fects the subjective aim, we must counter that this effect can
be of little extent or significance since the datum which is
effecting the modification of the aim has been selected with a
view to contributing to just that subjective aim.
The aim, as given by God, must be fully determinate in or¬
der to include and exclude just those feelings which will con¬
tribute to its goal.
The aim cannot be modified or thwarted. The actual occasion
cannot perish before satisfaction has been reached. Nor can an
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actual occasion refuse to be satisfied, for then "not be be
satisfied" would have been the aim, and would have been satis¬
fied. What the requirement of satisfaction amounts to is what¬
ever satisfaction is reached, that was the aim really given to
be satisfied. So that the actual occasion may rebel, reject,
object as it will, satisfaction of the aim is inevitable. The
aim must always have been that which is fulfilled by the satis¬
faction reached. The mechanism is nom the less deterministic
for being teleological, since the process must proceed and the
satisfaction be reached.
Clearly no alternatives are possible. There are no choices,
nor can there be any effort to do or failure to do. The only
kind of responsibility there can be is the kind that we attri¬
bute to objects and plants that are parts of an events but do
not _do anything.
The difficulties of providing for responsibility within the
limits of an atomistic theory have been considered in the criti¬
cism of Hume, and need not be repeated here. If endurance of a
person cannot be provided, neither can much of what we need for
responsibility. Endurance depends on God's giving the appropri¬
ate subjective aims to successive actual occasions which make
up the person, so responsibility is dependent on God indirectly
as well as directly, through his giving the determining aim.
Summary
^Whitehead's metaphysics is atomistic and experientialist.
2. All reality including persons is constituted of actual
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occasions.
3. The concrescence of an actual occasion is determined
by a completely specified subjective aim given by God.
4. A person is a tfinporally extended nexus of actual oc¬
casions .
5. The life-long identity of a person depends on God's
giving appropriate subjective aims to the successive actual
occasions constituting that person.
6. Contemporaries are not directly perceived. Knowledge
of contemporaries depends on God's giving aims to one's con¬
temporaries which will seem outgrowths of the past, so that
the percipient actual occasion can correctly infer what his
contemporaries are.
7. Choice among alternatives is impossible because the
determining subjective aim is given by God.
8. Satisfaction of the given aim is required and certain
so effort and self-control have no place in the system.
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The next philosopher we consider in our trio of experi-
entialists is not an atomist. So for him, Leibniz, self-
identicalness is no problem because his ultimate constituents
of the universe, monads, are characterized as enduring for at
least as long as a person's lifetime. The monad is in fact
immortal, can be destroyed only by an act of God. Rather the
problem is that monads last too long, so that the successive
persons which 'have', 'own', or 'are' that monad,like the suc¬
cessive persons that 'own' a Platonic soul, haven't a monad to
call their own. The monad like the Platonic soul belongs to a
serial community.
The monad is a "simple substance". "By 'simple' is meant
'without parts.'" <Leibniz: The Monadoloqy and other Philosophi¬
cal Writings translated by Robert Latta, Oxford University Press,
paragraph 1, p. 217. Since this Latta edition of the Monadology
is the only source I shall refer to in this section on Leibniz,
I shall indicate it by M with the paragraph number preceding and
the page number following, thus, 1 M 217.) "These Monads are
the real atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things."
(3 M 218)
Leibniz's theory is experientialist in that the monads are
all experiencers.
If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which
has perceptions and desires in the general sense which I
have explained, then all simple substances or created
monads might be called souls; but as feeling is something
more than a bare perception, I think it right that the
general name of Monads or Entelechies should suffice for
simple substances which have perception only, and that
the name of Souls should be given only to those in which
perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory.
(19 M 230)
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Persons must be made up entirely of perceptions, because
everything is. One monad (and therefore the soul or dominant
monad of a person) differs from another in its perceptions, or
more exactly, in its viewpoint, since what is perceived, the
universe is the same for all monads.
Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things
to each and of each to all, means that each simple sub¬
stance has relations which express all the others, and,
consequently, that it is a perpetual living mirror of the
universe.
And as the same town, looked at from various sides,
appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous
in aspects; even so, as a result of the infinite number
of simple substances, it is as if there were so many dif¬
ferent universes, which, nevertheless are nothing but
aspects of a single universe, according to the special
point of view of each Monad. (56-7 M 248)
Not all this universe is perceived equally clearly though.
Different monads perceive different parts of the universe more
clearly, or more confusedly.
Indeed, each Monad must be different from every other.
For in nature there are never two beings which are perfect¬
ly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal
difference, or at least a difference founded upon an intrin¬
sic quality. (9 M 222)
To assure that the perspective of each monad be unique, it might
be necessary to stipulate that the universe not^be symmetrical
(like a chess board, sphere, or cube) but asymmetrical (like a
right or left hand) so that there would be no description of
one position which would perfectly match the description of
another position. The uniqueness of each viewpoint would be
guaranteed by the creator of the universe. (Cf. the discussion
of individuating descriptions in Leibniz's system in Chapter 4
of P. F. Strawson's Individuals.)
I think it fair to allow that Leibniz has provided for the
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self-identicalness of a monad-person, and by providing that
each monad must have a unique point of view allowed for an
identifiable nature.
Further, the monad must change.
I assume also as admitted that every created being,
and consequently the created Monad, is subject to change,
and further that this change is continuous in each.
(10 M 222)
The changes of the Monads come from "an internal principle, since
an external cause can have no influence upon their inner being."
(11 M 223) And now we begin to see where the difficulty will
arise, viz., in the communication with other monads. The monads
could not be affected by an external cause because "the monads
have no windows, through which anything could come in or go out."
(7 M 219)
Though every monad feels more or less clearly what goes on
in every other monad, it feels their feelings not because it is
affected directly by them directly but only via God.
But in simple substances the influence of one Monad
upon another is only ideal, and it can have the effect
only through the mediation of God. ... For since one
created Monad cannot have any physical influence upon the
inner being of another, it is only by this means that the
one can be dependent upon the other. (51 M 246)
The perceptions had by each monad are just what they would be
if the monads were actually interacting. But what is really
happening is that each monad unfolds what was put into it by
God. Everything fits together because of the pre-established
harmony, guaranteed by God.
To the extent that one is content with interaction and
communication being illusory, one will be content with the
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windowlessness of the monads. Such windowlessness is clearly
not what we take to be really the case in ordinary life.
And what about responsibility? The situation here with
Leibniz is the same as with Whitehead. If I read Leibniz cor¬
rectly, there can be no possibility of alternative choices,
which I have argued is necessary to what we call personal re¬
sponsibility. Why hold a monad responsible if it can do no
other than what God has determined it to do?
Thus the final reason of things must be in a neces¬
sary substance, in which the variety of particular changes
exists only eminently, as in its source; and this substance
we call God. (38 M 238)
Thus God alone is the primary unity or original sim¬
ple substance, of which all created or derivative Monads
are products and have their birth, so to speak, through
continual fiulgurations of the Divinity from moment to
moment, limited by the receptivity of the created being,
of whose essence it is to have limits. (47 M 243-4)
Accordingly, among created things, activities and
passivities are mutual. For God, comparing two simple
substances, finds in each reasons which oblige Him to
adapt the other to it. (52 M 246)
God must make sure that one monad adapts itself (seemingly) to
the rest. Otherwise harmony could not be guaranteed.
Another systematic consideration. Suppose somehow the
choices of the monads could really affect something, and the
harmony still obtained. But the course of events might take
a turn for the worse and steadily deteriorate, all the while
things fitting together. If limited monads are controlling
affairs, there is no guarantee that this is the best of all
possible worlds, which Leibniz wants it to be. Only the con¬
trol of God can guarantee that the universe be as good as it
can be.
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If my interpretation of Leibniz is correct, everything
must be pre-determined down to the last detail. There is no
room for responsibility, as we know it.
Summary
1. Monads are self-identical, identifiable experiencers
whose perceptions change.
2. Monads constitute everything that there is so persons
are monads.
3. Though there is an unfolding within the monad of the
whole of the universe, there is no real interaction between
one monad and another.
4* The perceptions of the monads which constitute the whole
of these entities are entirely pre-determined by God. Responsi¬
bility is impossible.
CHAPTER 5
This chapter is primarily about Descartes* theory of the self
though it has also a rather lengthy discussion of Kant's *1 think'.
Why Descartes? I might be asked. Because I admire his work.
And secondly, because of his enormous effect on the history of
philosophy. Much of the response to Descartes has been reaction
against him. The modern reaction against Descartes has been strong
and polemical. There are few contemporary writers who are sympa¬
thetic to him. (One exception might be Jaako Hintikka. See his
"Coglto, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?", The Philosophical
Review, 1962, pp. 3-32. It looks to me as if Hintikka is trying
to understand rather than refute or ridicule what Descartes is
saying.)
I should like to show what Descartes was trying to do as well
as his successes and failures, emphasizing those parts of his
system which relate to his theory of the self. I should also like
to point out the mistakenness of some of the charges brought by
Kant and others who are similarly misinformed or uninformed con¬
cerning Descartes' position.
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Perhaps I should add a cautionary note here anticipating what
I shall say later hut perhaps allaying the fears of some x*ho will
think my enthusiasm for Descartes excessive. I do not think that
Descartes' emphasis on the private experiencing aspects of self
at the expense of the public behavioral aspects of self well-
advised. A person is not equivalent to his consciousness. But
'
all the same it is worthwhile to consider and give proper due to
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this aspect of a person. To overlook it is as serious a failing
as overlooking the public, behavioral aspects of persons.
Descartes was wanting to build a system of knowledge on sure
foundations. His intellectual world must have seemed precarious
because of the ferment due among other things to the rising
sciences and religious disturbances. To describe the intellectual
milieu then commentators point out that the attitude of curiosity
and challenge contrasted with one of greater acquiescence and
submission to authority which had characterized the Middle Ages
in large part. Even if original Descartes could be read with
comprehension by his peers when he begins his Meditations on
First Philosophy
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It is now some years since I detected how many were
the false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth ad¬
mitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had
since constructed on this basis; and from that time I was
convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to
rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly ac¬
cepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation,
if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure
in the sciences. (The Philosophical Works of Descartes.
Rendered into English by Elizabeth S. Haidane and G. R. T.
Ross in two volumes. Cambridge University Press, 1911.
Volume I, p. 144. Henceforth I shall refer to this edi¬
tion as HR, giving volume and page number thus, I 144.)
The doubt which Descartes felt concerning many of his beliefs
was limited to no particular subject. The question was not only
whether the beliefs were consistent with one another but also
whether they were about real things. Demonstrations in any
branch of knowledge might be described in the way Descartes de¬
scribes mathematical demonstrations:
... having noticed that this great certainty which every¬
one attributes to these demonstrations is founded solely
on the fact that they are conceived with clearness, ...
I also noticed that there was nothing at all in them to
assure me of the existence of their object. (HRI103)
For these demonstrations there was no lack of clearness. Some
other science might lack the mathematical certainly even. But
in addition, any corpus of knowledge could be merely logical
possibilities, internally consistent but not existentially
grounded.
Satisfying the doubts attaching to opinions "conflicting ...
regarding the self-same matter, all supported by learned people"
(HR I 86) and existentially grounding certain demonstrations -
both these tasks could be accomplished, Descartes thought, by
such a metaphysical inquiry as he sets about.
What does Descartes think must be done to bring about "the
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general upheaval of all former opinions"?
... it is not necessary that I should show that all of
these are false. ... But inasmuch as reason already per¬
suades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my
assent from matters which are not entirely certain and
indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly
to be false, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the
whole. ... I shall only in the first place attack those
principles upon which all my former opinions rested.
(HR I 145)
No knowledge is to be acceptable to Descartes unless it is
certain and indubitable; if there is the slightest doubt re¬
garding any matter, it must be treated just as if it were
false. Not only will beliefs be doubt4d, but to facilitate
the inquiry, the bases of these beliefs will be attacked.
What can be doubted and must therefore be rejected as a
basis of knowledge? First, the senses; "because our senses
sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing is just
as they cause us to imagine it to be". (HR I 101) To cast
doubt on all things of the senses may seem unreasonable and
extravagant, unless we remember that we sleep and dream, and
in our dreams have "all the same thoughts and conceptions which
we have while awake ... without any of them being at that time
true." (HR I 101)
So ordinary experience cannot guarantee its truthfulness
either, because it is always possible that one could be dream¬
ing.
Cannot reason itself withstand doubt? Though our reason¬
ings seem quite certain, still we cannot know whether these
things actually exist or not. It may be too that God - or an
evil genius - has caused deception in the very things seemingly
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best known. Examples abound of people who are deceived in
judging that things really exist in the way they think.
... at the end I feel constrained to confess that there
is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true, of
which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that, not merely
through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons
which are very powerful and maturely considered. (HR I 147-
8)
What can be said about the Cartesian ioubt? It seems that
Descartes doubts four things, generally stated. They are: whe-
there anything can be known with unimpugnable certainty, whether
anything exists, whether there exists an actual thing such that
its nature can be truly known, and how anything can be know.
' A.
Since doubt has undermined all of Descartes' beliefs,
nothing is left to him: no God, no people other than himself;
no method of arriving at truth; not the senses, not ordinary
experience, not rational demonstration.
In attempting to appraise the Cartesian doubt, I think it
likely that most thoughtful people, including philosophers,
would say that beliefs which are tested are more reliable than
unexamined beliefs. An unexamined belief may not be itforth
holding.
But how complete can the doubt be? Can one "start from
scratch"? Does Descartes hold no unexamined beliefs, as he
claims? Plainly not. He uses the laws of thought, certain
argument forms, and even in the depths of doubt does not cease
framing and answering questions put in symbolized form. We
can concentrate on this last unexamined tool. Words do not fail
to have meaning for him. But the use of language itself does
not earn the label 'knowledge' nor does he recognize language
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as any kind of presupposition or basis of knowledge- nor as
implying any knowledge of other persons. He carries on as if
language never fails to be meaningful, and yet he has no beliefs
concerning others. Descartes is not compelled to grant that
language proves the existence of others. He could say that
God gives language; that would be systematically permissible.
But his systematic doubt is not so thorough or complete as he
claims.
But we can go along with him in his doubting to see where
it leads.
But immediately afterwards I noticed that whilst I thus
wished to think all things false, it was absolutely es¬
sential that the 'I' who thought this sould be somewhat,
and remarking that this truth '_I think, therefore _I am1
was so certain and so assured that all the most extrava¬
gant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were
incapable of shaking it, I camt to the conclusion that
I could receive it without scruple as the first princi¬
ple of the Philosophy for which I was seeking. (HR I 101)
For even if
there is some deceiver or other, very powerful and very
cunning, who ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me,
then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and
let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause
me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something.
So that after having reflected well, and carefully exa¬
mined all things, we must come to the definite conclusion
that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true
each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally con¬
ceive it. (HR I 150)
Now Descartes has certain knowledge of an existent thing, i.e.,
he knows that there is at least one really existent thing, him¬
self, which he cannot doubt because by the very doubting the
certainty of his existence is established. But what of the na¬
ture of this existent thing?
... I do not yet know clearly enough what I am, I who am
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certain that I am; and hence I must be careful to see
that I do not imprudently take some other object in place
of myself, and thus that I do not go astray in respect of
this knowledge that I hold to be the most certain and most
evident of all that I have formerly learned. (HR I 150)
Whatever can be doubted cannot be asserted to belong to the
nature of the self, nor can it be denied; no judgment is possi¬
ble.
... perhaps it is true that these same things which I sup¬
posed were non-existent because they are unknown to me,
are really not different from the self which I know. I am
not sure about this, I shall not dispute about it now; I
can only give judgment on things that are known to me.
(HR I 152)
What experience the self has gives the self knowledge of itself,
so that Descartes says "nothing is easier for me to know than my
own mind." (HR I 157) So far he knows that
I am a thing that thinks, that is to say, that doubts, af¬
firms , denies, that knows a few things, that is ignorant of
many [that loves, that hates^, that wills, that desires,
that also imagines and perceives; for as I remarked before,
although the things which I perceive and imagine are per¬
haps nothing at all apart from me and in themselves, I am
nevertheless assured that these modes of thought that I
call perception and imaginations, inasmuch only as they are
modes of thought, certainly reside [and are met with"] in me.
(HR I 157)
This is certain knowledge of the nature of an existent thing.
But what guarantees the truth of this knowledge?
Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that
assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct
perception of that which I state, which would not indeed
suffice to assure me that what I say is true, if it could
ever happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly and
distinctly could be false; and accordingly it seems to me
that already I can establish as a general rule that all
things which I perceive very clearly and very distinctly
are true. (HR I 158)
It is through doubting that Descartes arrives at coqito
ergo sum, the first principle of his philosophy. For that he
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must exist while he doubts, he cannot doubt. The existence of
the thinking self is immediately intuited.
What does Descartes do by means of coqito ergo sum? He
succeeds in establishing four things: an indubitable proposi¬
tion, the actual existence of some thing, knowledge of the true
nature of that existent thing, and a method of arriving at
truth.
To my knowledge no one says that the Cartesian coqito ergo
sum (which I shall call the cogito for short) is self-contradic¬
tory or false. Yet it does not meet with universal acclaim,
though even now its philosophical interest has not died. A. J.
Ayer's treatment of the cogito in The Problem of Knowledge is
worth considering because he agrees that the cogito is certain
but charges that it does not come to very much.
Descartes used the cogito to establish a certainty in the
midst of and from doubt. To have established a certain truth
from that very doubt seems an achievement to me. As Professor
Ayer says:
... neither 'I think' nor 'I exist' is a truth of logic;
the logical truth is only that I exist if I think... What
makes them indubitable is their satisfying a condition
which Descartes himself does not make explicit, though his
argument turns upon it. It is that their truth follows
from their being doubted by the person who expresses them.
The sense in which I cannot doubt the statement that I
think is just that my doubting entails its truth; and in
the same sense I cannot doubt that I exist. There was
therefore no need for Descartes to derive 'sum' from 'cogito';
for its certainty could be independently established by the
same criterion. (A. J. Ayer. The Problem of Knowledge.
Penguin Books. 1956. P. 46.)
If he means that there is no need to phrase the cogito "dubito
ergo coqito ergo sum", he is entirely right, since doubting is
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for Descartes one kind of thinking so that one may move di¬
rectly from dubito to sum. But as Professor Ayer has said, the
doubting is necessary to establish the sum; by itself it is not
a logical truth. "Coqito" may be dispensed with because it is
just another way, here, of saying "dubito", but not both
"dubito" and "coqito" may be dispensed with if the proposition
is to be both true and indubitable. One great merit of the
cogito is that doubting - the sceptic's method - is the means
of achieving certainty. Dubito ergo sum is self-validating.
If I understand Professor Ayer's position, he would be
willing to agree that "dubito ergo sum" establishes with cer¬
tainty an existent thing.
"But this certainty does not come to very much", Professor
Ayer says.
It is conceivable that I should not have been self-conscious,
which is to say that I should not know that I existed; but it
would not follow that I could not know many other statements
to be true. In theory, I could know any of the innumerable
facts which are logically independent of the fact of my
existing. I should indeed know them without knowing that I
knew them, though not necessarily without knowing that they
were known; my whole conception of knowledge would be im¬
personal. (Ibid. P. 47.)
For Descartes, of course, with his doubt, there were not innume¬
rable other facts. All the other facts, "independent of the fact
of existing" had been rejected as dubitable. Only indubitable
facts, "I doubt" or "I think", could be admitted, and it turned
out that these facts were not logically independent of the fact
of his existing, and that he could not know them without knowing
that he knew them.
What may be included under thinking is made explicit in
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the Arguments ... in Geometrical Form following Reply to
Objections II:
UaAIt
Definition I. Thought is a word that covers every¬
thing that exists in us xn such a way that we immediately
conscious of it. Thus all the operations of trill, intel¬
lect, imagination, and of the senses are thoughts. (HR II
52)
And again in the Principles of Philosophy:
By the word thought I understand all that of which we are
conscious as operating in us. And that is why not alone
understanding, willing, imaging, but also feeling, are
here the same thing as thought. For if I say I see, or I
walk, I therefore am, and if by seeing and walking I mean
the action of my eyes or my legs, which is the work of my
body, my conclusion is not absolutely certain; because it
may be that, as often happens in sleep, I think I see or
I walk, although I never open my eyes or move from my
place, and the same thing perhaps might occur if I had
not a body at all. But if I mean only to talk of my sen¬
sation, or my consc -lously seeming to see or to walk, it
becomes quite true, because my assertion now refers only
to my mind, which alone is concerned with my feeling or
thinking that I see and I walk. (HR I 222)
The last portion of this principle makes it clear why
Gassendi's criticism of the cogito in the Objections V is not
well-taken. For as Descartes replies:
When you say that I_ could have inferred the same conclu¬
sion from any of my other actions, you wander far from the
truth, because there is none of my activities of which I
am wholly certain (in the sense of having metaphysical
certitude, which alone is here involved), save thinking
alone. For example, you have no right to make the infer¬
ence: _I walk, hence X exist, except in so far as our
awareness of walking is a thought; it is of this alone
that the Inference holds good, not of the motion of the
body, which sometimes does not exist, as in dreams, when
nevertheless I appear to walk. Hence from the fact that
I think that I walk I can very well infer the existence
of the mind which so thinks, but not that of the body
which walks. (HR II 207)
What it takes to establish the cogito is an indubitable, known
activity.
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Professor Ayer suggests that something might be known
without its kriown to be known. "Strange, but not self-contra-
dictory". Descartes would likely argue that impersonal know¬
ledge for persons is self-contradictory, that for selves know¬
ledge must be known (or knowable) to be knowledge. Without
self-consciousness persons would lose their personality, and
be impersonal. This is the third point of the cogito, a
statement of what it is to be a person or self, which might be
formulated as: a person is that which knows it thinks.
To say that a thing could know without knowing that it
knows would not be to deny what Descartes says in the cogito,
since he would say that it is not a person which knows without
knowing that it knows, and every one may know this for himself
by direct inspecti'on. If this is a correct account of Descartes'
cogito, then I take it Professor Ayer's contention that know¬
ledge may be held impersonally would not be opposed to Des¬
cartes' position.
It seems then that Professor Ayer does not deny that the
cogito establishes an existent thing and that this existent
thing, a person, is such that when it knows, it knows or can
know that it knows.
But what he argues, I think, is 1) that the cogito is like
any other proposition embodying a demonstrative, and 2) that
there is no such thing as having an experience of oneself in
the way that Descartes claimed.
Because of Descartes' initial doubt, there is not a variety
of propositions which he could begin with, though he might have
206
been willing to concede that any indubitable proposition using
any demonstrative could have the same effect of establishing
the existence of something, but that this is not to agree en¬
tirely with Professor Ayer and give up the cogito as unique.
It is the 'I* which might alone serve in the first principle
of philosophy because demonstratives besides "I" are all lo¬
gically dependent on "I"; i.e., that "this", "these", "that",
"those", "here", "there", "now", "then", etc. are only meaning¬
ful in relation to "I". E.g., "this" means "whatever is
near(er) me", "that" means "whatever is further from me",
"here" - "close to me", "now" - "in the moment I am experien¬
cing", "then" - "at a point in time away from now", etc. "I"
cannot be given meaning with some other phrase, because no
proper name expresses what "I" expresses, and because no de¬
scriptive phrase can be equivalent to "I" unless it contains
a demonstrative which is itself dependent on "I" for meaning,
which means that the terms can be freely substituted but that
we stay in the realm of words without being able to ground our
circle existentially. To ground the words we must be able to
have a point at which existence and understanding intersect,
namely, in the self. To get this point experience of the self
is required.
This position is argued very well by S. V. Keeling in his
lecture "Descartes", and I should like to call on him to elabo¬
rate this answer to Professor Ayer's contention that even if
there is self-conscious experience for selves, there is no such
thing as experience of self.
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For he who denies he is directly aware of himself makes
numerous statements intelligible and true in which the
pronoun "I" occurs, and he uses this pronoun intending
his hearer to understand it to refer to himself. There¬
fore he must know himself in some way. Now it is impos¬
sible that all the statements he makes about 'I' should
express^only descriptive knowledge. In a masterly refu¬
tation, (1. J. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence,
ii, pp. 62-70; and Philosophical Studies, pp. 69-96.)
McTaggart has, I believe, conclusively demonstrated that
unless we were directly aware of ourself, we never could
tell in the end whom these descriptions do describe, nor
ever be justified in using the first personal pronoun.
For even if two descriptions could be known to describe
one and the same person, and not each a different person,
it would remain quite unknown who that person is. Those
descriptions, and the information that some 'one and the
same person' is described by them, would not enable me
to identify that 'one and the same person' with myself.
I can know that 'one person* to be the very person he in
fact is, if and only if, I perceive myself to be that
person; i.e. only if I know myself otherwise than by de¬
scription. Where Descartes was content to assert that
the self i£ directly known, McTaggart demonstrated that
it must be so known. The initial proposition of the
metaphysic, then, is one the certainty of whose truth is
intuitively certified. (S. V. Keeling, "Descartes".
From the Proceedings of the British Academy. Vol. xxxiv.
London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, p. 15.)
If one attends to the word "identify" and takes it to
mean "to pick out a particular or individual", the Keeling-
McTaggart view can be expanded by reference to a conclusion
in Individuals by P. F. Strawson. Mr. Strawson is considering
the assertion that there is no uniquely referring description
because all time may be cyclical and all events may be exactly
repeated. He thinks illusory, the belief
that however elaborate a description we produce of a net¬
work of spatially and temporally related things and inci¬
dents , we can never be sure of producing an individuating
description of a single particular item, for we can never
rule out the possibility of another exactly similar net¬
work. To experience this theoretical anxiety is ... to
overlook the fact that we, the speakers, the users of the
dating and placing systems, have our own place in that
system and know that place; that we ourselves, therefore,
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and our own immediate environment, provide a point of re¬
ference which individuates the network and hence helps to
individuate the particulars located in the network.
(P. F. Strawson. Individuals. London, Methuen & Co.
1959. P. 30.)
This is, I think, another way of saying that descriptions are
uniquely refdrring only because the users know their own en¬
vironments , and that this knowledge cannot be in terms of a
further description expressed without demonstratives, and
therefore, as McTaggart and Keeling would say, must rest upon
direct knowledge of oneself. By direct knowledge of the self
we are able to give meaning to "I", other demonstratives depen¬
dent on "I", and individuating descriptions.
If this analysis is correct, the reason why the descrip¬
tion of intuition by which one knows oneself is not more de¬
scriptive and why no evidence of the sort Professor Ayer wants
(which he does not characterize but which I expect would have
to be like evidence for an object) is forthcoming for self-
consciousness will be clearer. The reason is that self-con¬
sciousness or consciousness (intuition) of self or consciousness
of consciousness is the basis of all description and evidence.
All description if it is to individuate must presuppose our
knowing our own place in the spatio-temporal network. And
evidence (of the sort that seems to be wanted) can only be in
terms of individuated particulars, knowledge of which depends
on individuating descriptions which depend on knowledge of one¬
self, one's own unique consciousness.
Though it may not be possible to give a thorough descrip¬
tion of this knowledge of the self (at least not like descrip-
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of objects), what can be said about it?
Descartes describes what happens when we consider the
cogito:
But when we become aware that we are thinking beings,
this is a primitive act of knowledge derived from no
syllogistic reasoning. He who says, 'I think, hence
i 2E exist,' does not deduce existence from thought
by a syllogism, but, by a simple act of mental vision,
recognizes it as if it were a thing that is known per
se. (HR II 38)
Here the knowing experience is called a "primitive act of
knowledge" and "a simple act of mental vision". These are not
meant as definitions of the experience, and he explains why he
does not offer definitions of simple terms in The Search After
Truth by the Light of Nature:
... we must know what doubt is, what thought is, before
being fully convinced of the truth of this reasoning I
doubt therefore I_ am; or what comes to the same, _I thTnk
therefore _I am. But do not go and imagine that in order
to know this we must do violence to our mind and put it
to torture in order to ascertain the proximate species
and the essential difference, and form rrom it a defini¬
tion by rule. ... But whoever desires to examine things
by himself and judge of them as he conceives them, cannot
be so devoid of mental power not to see clearly whenever
he is willing to give attention to it, what doubt is, or
thought or existence, and to be required to learn their
distinctions. Further I declare that there are certain
things which we render more obscure by trying to define
them, because, since they are very simple and clear, we
cannot know and perceive them better than by themselves.
Nay, we must place in the number of those chief errors
that can be committed in the sciences, the mistakes com¬
mitted by those who would try to define what ought only
to be conceived, and who cannot distinguish the clear
from the obscure, nor discriminate between what, in or¬
der to be known, requires and deserves to be defined,
from what can be best known by itself. And in the num¬
ber of the things which are clear in the way above ex¬
plained and which can be known by themselves, we must
place doubt, thought, and. existence. ... Indeed, I
add that one learns those things in no other way than by
one's self and that nothing else persuades us of them
except our own experience and this knowledge and inter-
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nal testimony that each one finds within himself when he
examines things ... in order to know what doubt is, or
thought, it is only requisite to doubt and think. (HR I 324-5)
What it seems Descartes is here saying is that some things cannot
be defined because then they are mediated by words and other words
make no clearer what we are to understand, that instead, to under¬
stand what things like thought, doubt, existence are, we must know
them immediately. So in order to know what is contained in the
cogito, one has only to think, and by thinking, what is contained
in the cogito will be immediately experienced.
Thinking cannot be the whole of a person (given that the facts
are what they are) but this is not the same as saying that think¬
ing is no part of a person. Descartes was probably right in say¬
ing that thinking is a necessary condition of being a person (and
Ayer is failing to understand that Descartes is referring to how
persons know when he (Ayer) says that knowledge might be imper¬
sonal). If an x does not think and know what it is to think, i.e.,
self-consciously, that x is not a person, Descartes is saying.
Descartes also seems to be saying in the cogito that thinking
is a sufficient condition of being a person, which is probably not
false, properly understood. The difficulty with giving a suffi¬
cient condition is that one does not include with the sufficient
condition its necessary and/or sufficient conditions. [To say
that a protuberant heel (the kind we have) is a sufficient condi¬
tion of being a member of the species Homo sapiens is all right
when one understands what the necessary conditions of having a
protuberant heel are.] Concerning the necessary and/or sufficient
conditions of self-conscious thinking Descartes made errors of
210a
commission and omission. He denied (and asserted) that having a
body is a necessary condition of having the kind of thinking that
we have. He says that mind could be what it is "absolutely dis¬
tinct from body" (HR I 190) (which is enough to make an admirer
of Descartes weep) and he seems to say in Meditation VT that the
mind is dependent on extended substance. He also says that mind
and body are each "incomplete substances viewed in relation to the
man who is the unity which together they form (HR II 99). His
ambivalence on this question encapsulates our major difficulties
with the Cartesian theory of persons. Most contemporary philo¬
sophers want to assert that body is necessary to thinking, or at
least not assert that body is not necessary to thinking.
He does not explicitly deny the necessity of other persons
to the development of his mind, but so far as I know he no where
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asserts it, as most contemporary philosophers,
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So Descartes makes mistakes when it comes to the necessary
conditions of thinking, but to my mind he is right in claiming
that thinking is both a neceesary and sufficient condition of be¬
ing a person. Of course, one wants to have more said.
But because Descartes either does not say more or is wrong
about what more he does say, Peter Geach seems to be altogether dis¬
satisfied with the cogito in Chapter 26 of Mental Acts, saying that
since 'I* serves to mark off one person from another, it is impro¬
per to mark off one aspect of the person from another aspect, the
intangible from the tangible, by means of 'I*.
The word "i", spoken by P.T.G., serves to draw people's at¬
tention to P.T.G.j and if it is not at one clear who is
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speaking, there is a genuine question "Who said that?" or
"Who is 'I'?" Now consider Descartes brooding over his
poele and saying: "I'm getting into an awful muddle - but
who then is this 'I' who is getting into a muddle?" When
"I'm getting into a muddle" is a soliloquy, "I" certainly
does not derve to direct Descartes's attention to Descartes,
or to show that it is Descartes, none other, who is getting
into a muddle. We are not to argue, though, that since "I
does not refer to the man Rene Descartes it has some other,
more intangible, thing to refer to. Rather, in this context
the word "i" is idle, superfluous; it is used only because
Descartes is habituated to the use of "I" (or rather, of "je"
and "moi") in expressing his thoughts and feelings to other
people. In soliloquy he could quite well have expressed
himself without using the first-person pronoun at all; he
could have said: "This is really a dreadful muddle 1", where
"This" would refer back to his previous meditations. (We
have here an example of the puz2ling demonstratlo ad intel-
lectum which I mentioned in ^15.) (Peter Geach. Tflental
Acts. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957> p. llHT}
As I understand this, Geach is saying what Strawson also claims,
namely, that the concept of a person is logically prior to the
concept of a person's consciousness and that 'I' should not be
used equivocally to mean 1) the whole person, and 2) the person's
consciousness. I agree that 'person' is logically prior to
'consciousness' but the priority of 'person' does not make 'con¬
sciousness' superfluous. Strawson allows that 'consciousness'
might have a "logically secondary existence, if one thinks, or
finds, it desirable." (Individuals. P. 103) (Some questions I
have concerning the relations between 'person' and 'consciousness'
are presented below when I am discussing Individuals in Chapter 6.)
The demonstratio ad intellectum which Geach relies on to
label the meditating does not seem different, except in name,
from Descartes' drawing attention to the thinking going on in
him. That this thinking going on in him is not the whole of his
personness, and not, in this sense, the whole meaning of 'I', I
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would readily grant. Perhaps both Geach and Strawson would say:
Don't use 'I' to refer to the meditating or thinking aspect of a
person, even if you are not confused.because it may confuse others."
To avoid confusion one might state Descartes' claim a little dif¬
ferently; in a person thinking is known immediately, and this
knowing what thinking is is a necessary condition of being a
person.
We may go on to consider the relations between consciousness,
particular kinds of thinking activities, and particular thoughts.
Consciousness underlies particular activities and particular
thoughts, or as Descartes states
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it in a (now old-fashioned sounding) metaphysical way: "It is
certain that ... no activity, no accident can be without a
substance in which to exist." (HR II 64) Descartes goes on
%
to say in this Reply to Hobbes:
Further, there are other activities, which we call think¬
ing activities, e.g., understanding, willing, imagining,
feeling, etc., which agree in falling under the descrip¬
tion of thought, perception, or consciousness. (HR II 64)
Because I am not certain of what Descartes means always, there
is likely more than a little interpretation in what I shall say
these remarks on thinking thing, substance, and consciousness
come to, namely, that the self which is directly experienced
in the cogito is consciousness, that this is the substance which
holds all the thoughts together, that this consciousness or sub¬
stantial self is what accompanies all one's thoughts and makes
them all one's own and private to oneself, makes each person's
thoughts separate from everyone else's thoughts, and makes each
person unique.
Etienne Gilson approvingly quotes Levy-Bruhl aa offering a
view like the one I am presenting.
M. Levy-Bruhl observait justement (Descartes, Cours inedit):
<&Le Cogito est la premiere verity d'existence par ordre, en
ce sens que les autres viennent apres; ... (cf. A Mersenne,
juillet 1641 ...:«il est impossible que nous puissions
jamais penser a aucune chose, que nous n'ayons en meme
temps 1'idee de notre ame, comme d'une chose capable de
penser a tout ce que nous pensons>». Si done on veut
rapprocher ici, Descartes de Kant, la seule analogie que
l'on puisse legitimement etablir est celle du cogito avec
le: Je pense, accompagne toutes mes representations.
(Etienne Gilson. Reni Descartes: Discours de la Methode.
Paris, Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin. 1947. P. 301.)
It seems to me that looking at the similarities and dissi¬
milarities between the Cartesian cogito and the Kantian "I
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think" can be fruitful.
I have claimed that the Cartesian thinking substance can pro¬
vide for persons what I have asserted in Part I was necessary to
persons, namely, the connectedness of experiences or enduring
self-identity, the logically private occurrence of each personte
experiences, the separateness of each person, and the uniqueness
of each person.
In order to see whether the Kantian 'I think1 can do what
the Cartesian thinking substance can do, we should point out a
distinction in Kant's theory which might be thoughl/to affect this
issue.
It must be possible for the 'I think* to accompany all
representations; for otherwise something would be represented
in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equiva¬
lent to saying that the representation would be impossible,
or at least would be nothing to me. That representation
which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intui¬
tion. All the manifold of Intuition has, therefore, a ne¬
cessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in
which this manifold is found. But this representation is
an act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as be¬
longing to sensibility. I call It pure apperception, to
distinguish it from empirical apperception, or, again,
original apperception, because it is that self-consciousness
which, while generating the representation 'JI think' (a re¬
presentation which must be capable of accompanyingall other
representations, and which in all consciousness is one and
the same), cannot itself be accompanied by any further re¬
presentation. The unity of this apperception I likewise en¬
title the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in
order to indicate the possibility of a priori knowledge aris¬
ing from it. For the manifold representations, which are
given In an intuition, would not be one and all mjr represen¬
tations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness.
(Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by
Norman Kemp SmitTu London, Macmillan & Co., 1956, p. 152-3.
B 131-2. Hereafter I shall refer to this edition of the
First Critique as KS with page number and the page numbers of
the first (A) and second (B) editions, thus, KS 152-3 B 131-2)
As I understand Kant's position it would be the original or
pure unity of apperception which would correspond to the Cartesian
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substance far consciousness) which underlies particular thoughts
or thinking activities. Pure apperception not empirical appercep¬
tion is described as identical, ie., as accompanying all one's
experiences.
This thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a
manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of
representations, and is possible only throughjfc the conscious¬
ness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness,
which accompanies different representations, is in itself
diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject.
(KS 153 B 133)
An important question to consider is whether we can be con¬
scious of this pure apperception. Someimtes Kant seems to allow
consciousness of the unifying or pure apperception.
This transcendental unity of apperception forms out of
all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one
another in one experience, a connection of all these repre¬
sentations according to laws. For this unity of conscious¬
ness would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the
manifold could not become conscious of the identity of
function whereby it synthetically combines it in one know¬
ledge. The original and necessary consciousness of the
identity of the self is thus at the sarnie time a conscious¬
ness of an equally necessary unity of the synthetis of all
appearances according to concepts, that is, according to
rules, which not only make them necessarily repreducible
but also in so doing determine an object for their intui¬
tion, that is, the concept of something wherein they are
necessarily interconnected. For the mind could never think
its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and
indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have be¬
fore its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordi¬
nates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to
a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their
interconnection according to a priori rules. (KS 136-7 A 108)
Nor is it merely empirical consciousness of which one is conscious
since Kant also allows consciousness of the original apperception.
All representations have a necessary relation to a possible
empirical consciousness. For if they did not have this, and
if it were altogether impossible to become conscious of them,
this would practically amount to the admission of their non¬
existence. But all empirical consciousness has a necessary
relation to a transcendental consciousness which precedes all
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special experience, namely, the consciousness of myself as
original apperception. (KS l42n A 117n)
One might be inclined to think that Kant and Descartes were not
differing on this point, each allowing a consciousness of the
fundamental consciousness, were it not for Kant's insistence that
the existence of the pure apperception is only formal, i.e.,
logical. His alternative label 'transcendental' unity also seems
to require that the existence of this apperception is merely
posit/ed to account for what is actual, namely, the unity of a
person's experiences, rather than experienced as something real.
Then the difference between Kant and Descartes could be expressed
in a simple formula: Cartesian consciousness has real existence;
Kantian pure apperception has only logical existence. That this
is Kant's view may be seen from the following:
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... since the one condition which accompanies all thought
is the 'I* in the universal proposition 'I think*, reason
has to deal with this condition in so far as it is itself
unconditioned. It is only the formal condition, namely,
the logical unity of every thought, in which I abstract
from all objects; but nevertheless it is represented as
an object which I think, namely, I myself and its uncon¬
ditioned unity. (KS 362 A 398)
This much, then, is certain, that through^ the 'I®,
I always entertain the thought of an absolute, but logical,
unity of the subject. (KS 337-8 A 356)
Consciousness is indeed, that which alone makes all repre¬
sentations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the
transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found;
but beyond this logical meaning of the 'I', we have no
knowledge of the subject in itself, which as substratum
underlies this 'I*, as it does all thoughts. (KS 334
A 350)
Kant's view is that'the representation «i«" is "mere
thought" so that the 'I* has only logical status and no real
existence.
Throughout the Paralogisms Kant is discussing "the concept
or, if the term be preferred, the judgment, *1 think'." (KS 329
A 341 B 399) But it is not clear that the rational psychology
which Kant attacks is Descartes' philosophy, though he does men¬
tion Descartes and the cogito explicitly several times, but at
least some of these times with incomplete understanding or dis¬
tortion as I shall show below. Whether or not Kant meant to
criticize the cogito does no matter. We can look at what he
says to see to what extent the objections to rational psychology
apply to the cogito, and then to what extent the 'I think' will
do what substance can do which needs to be done, if what is true
of persons is to be covered by the Kantian view.
We can begin with an obvious case of Kant's inadequate un¬
derstanding of the Cartesian cogito.
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The 'I think' is, as already stated, an empirical
proposition and contains within itself the proposition 'I
exist'. But I cannot say 'Everything which thinks, exists'.
For in that case the property of thought would render all
beings which possess it necessary beings. My existence
cannot, therefore, be regarded as an inference from the
proposition 'I think', as Descartes sought to contend - for
it would then have to be preceded by the major premiss
'Everything which thinks, exists' - but is identical with
it. (KS 378n B 422-3n)
But Descartes had written in the Replies which Kant may not have
been familiar with:
But when we become aware that we are thinking beings, this
is a primitive act of knowledge derived from no syllogistic
reasoning. He who says, 'I think, hence I am, or exist,'
does not deduce existence Trom thought by a syllogism, but,
by a simple act of mental vision recognizes it as if it were
a thing that is known per se. (HR II 38)
Clearly Descartes does not contend what Kant claims.
It seems rather that Kant and Descartes agree that a person's
existence is immediately seen in his thinking.
The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my exis¬
tence. Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in
which I am to determine this existence, that is, the manifold
belonging to it, is not thereby given. (KS l69n B 1^7n)
In the Paralogisms Kant attacks rational psychology, asking
in the First Paralogism:
But what use am I to make of this concept of a substance?
That I, as a thinking being, persist for myself, and do not in
any natural manner either arise or perish, can by no means be
deduced from it. Yet there is no other use to which I can put
the concept of the substantiality of ray thinking subject, and
apart from such use I could very well dispense with it. (KS
333-4 A 349)
Now if substance's not being able to give immortality would neces¬
sitate giving up substance, Descartes would have to give up sub¬
stance too since he admitted that he could not establish the im¬
mortality of the soul:
But I admit that I cannot refute your further contention,
viz. that the immortality of the soul does not follow
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from its distinctness from the body, because that does
not prevent its being said that God in creating it has
given the soul a nature such that its period of exis¬
tence must terminate simultaneously with that of the
corporeal life, (HR II 47)
Descartes then does not think that the concept of substance will
guarantee immortality. Yet he continues to describe the self
as substantial for other reasons.
The point of the second paralogism is that
through the 'I', I always entertain the thought of an
absolute, but logical, unity of the subject (simplicity).
It does not, however, follow that I thereby know the ac¬
tual simplicity of my subject. ... It is obvious that
in attaching 'I' to our thoughts we designate the sub¬
ject of inherence only transcendentally, without noting
in it any quality whatsoever - in fact, without knowing
anything of it either by direct acquaintance or other¬
wise. (KS 337-8 A 355-6)
Kant concludes:
Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple
nature of the soul is of value only in so far as I can
thereby distinguish this subject from all matter, and so
can exampt it from the dissolution to which matter is al¬
ways liable. (KS 338 A 356)
Descartes certainly must be understood to be denying that
the simple nature of the soul is of value only in so far as this
will exempt it from dissolution. Kant wants immortality from
the soul and if he cannot get that, the concept of soul is of
no value.
Is it the case though that by means of the cogito Descartes
asserts the separateness of consciousness from matter?
Firstly, you warn me Jxa remember that it was not
actually but merely by a. mental fiction that _I rejected
the claim of bodies to be more than phantasms, in order
to draw the conclusion that I_ was merely a. thinking being,
so as to avoid thinking that it was a. consequence of this
that I_ was really nothing more than mind. But m the
Second Meditation I have already shown that I bore this
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in mind sufficiently; here are the words: - But perhaps
it is the case that these very things, which I thus sup-
pose to be non-existent because they are unknown to me,
do not in very truth differ from that self"~whichI know.
I cannot tell; this is no"t the subject 1 am now discuss-
Tng, etc. By these words I meant expressly to warn the
reader that in that passage I did not as yet ask whether
the mind was distinct from the body, but was merely in¬
vestigating these properties of mind of which I able to
attain to sure and evident knowledge. (HR II 30)
Descartes is not using the simplicity of the soul to dis¬
tinguish it from matter.
There is a point that Kant makes which I think is well-
taken. He argues:
I think myself on behalf of a possible experience, at
the same time abstracting from all actual experience;
and I conclude therefrom that I can be conscious of my
existence even apart from experience and its empirical
conditions. In so doing I am confusing the possible
abstraction from my empirically determined existence
with the supposed consciousness of a possible separate
existence of my thinking self ... (KS 380 B 426-7)
Probably Kant is really denying the possibility of any know¬
ledge of a substantial self, in which I think he is wrong. But
one look at the passage given immediately above and interpret
l-
it to mean a denial of the possibility of consciousness of
one's existence apart from any actual experience. In this I
think he is right.
Descartes might be under±ood to be asserting that our ex¬
perience of experiencing, our consciousness of consciousness,
is logically independent of all actual experience. That is,
we might have nothing and never have had anything to think
about but thinking itself. His sceptical starting point might
give rise to this view by seeming to start from nothing, no
setting to his thoughts, language, mental abilities. But even
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in his scepticism he suspends belief only in the real existence
of the thought objects, not in the real existence of his
thoughts. But he has the advantages of his sceptical starting
point; he must be willing to accept the disadvantages of being
understood (or misunderstood) to have claimed that this think¬
ing, consciousness, or self, might have existed pure, not only
conceivable per se, distinguished from particular experiences,
but conceivable without particular experiences, at all, ever.
Why does Kant deny knowledge of any substantial self?
Because knowledge must have two parts, and we can have neither
of consciousness.
First, his statement concerning what we must have for
knowledge:
To think an object and to know an object are thus
by no means the same thing. Knowledge involves two fac¬
tors: first, the concept, through which an object in
general is thought (the category); and secondly, the in¬
tuition, through which it is given. For if no intuition
could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept
would still indeed be a thought, so far as its form is
concerned, but would be without any object, and no know¬
ledge of anything would be possible by means of it.
(KS 161-2 B 146)
Just as for knowledge of an object distinct from me I
require, besides the thought of an object in general (in
the category), an intuition by which I determine that
general concept, so for knowledge of myself, I require
besides the consciousness, that is, besides the thought
of myself, an intuition of the manifold in me, by which
I determine this thought. (KS 169 B 158)
He asserts that we can have no concept of the self or 'I',
which he calls "the simple and in itself completely empty re¬
presentation 'I'; and we cannot even say that this is a concept,
but only that it is a bare consciousness which accompanies all
concepts." (KS 331 A 345-6 B 404)
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At the beginning of the Paralogisms paralogisms are de¬
scribed as "syllogisms which contain no empirical premisses,
and by means of which we conclude from something which we know
to something of which we have no concept, and to which, owing to
an inevitable illusion, we yet ascribe objective reality."
(KS 327 A 339 B 397 Underlining mine.)
He goes on to further describe this kind of syllogism.
In the first kind of syllogism I conclude from the transcen¬
dental concept of the subject, which contains nothing mani¬
fold, the absolute unity of this subject itself, of which,
however, even in so doing, I possess no concept whatsoever.
(KS 328 A 340 B 397-8)
I do not find any equivocation on this point; Kant says
quite consistently that one has no concept of 'I' but only an
empty representation.
One reason why we could not have a concept of *1* is per¬
haps the same reason that 'space* could not be a concept, name¬
ly that there is only one. (Vide the third argument for space
being an a priori intuition rather than a concept A 24-5 B 39.)
There are not spacejs any more than there are • Iboth are
necessarily one. For Kant apparently there can be no such
thing as a uniquely referring concept. He defines "concept"
as that which "refers to it (the object) by means of a feature
which several things may have in common." (KS 314 A 320 B 377)
So there could not be a concept which refers to an object by
means of a feature which only that thing has. All concepts are
class concepts, Kant seems to say.
This requirement alone makes it clear why there could be
no concept of 'I', because Descartes' claim is that 'I' has as
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object something unique which other persons might also know,
but each person only immediately in his own case, which unique
thing is unitary, not manifold, his own consciousness. Probab¬
ly for Descartes 'I' would be some kind of rule concept, which
could be general but still necessarily uniquely referring.
The lack of a manifold united by the concept 'I' (taken
in this substantial sense) would also keep 'I' from being a
concept. For, according to Kant, as well as referring to a
class, a concept must unite a manifold. (A 68 B 93) A con¬
cept must bring together by means of a unitary act various re¬
presentations} 'I* cannot be a concept "for through the 'I*,
a simple representation, nothing manifold is given." (KS 155
B 135)
The thinking which constitutes the substantial self for
Descartes has particular thoughts as its accidents and also
modes, e.g., degrees of intensity. But thinking itself is just
that, thinking, and has no manifold.
The second requirement for knowledge besides concepts is
an intuition (of a manifold). Descartes would, I think, say
that we have separate intuitions of thinking and intuitions of
different modes of thinking but there is no manifold. Kant
might deny the possibility of having a unitary (non-manifold)
intuition just as he denies the possibility of a uniquely re¬
ferring concept.
There are many places where he denies that we have an in¬
tuition of the 'I'.
The '!• is indeed in all thoughts but there is not in this
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representation the least trace of intuition distinguishing
the 'I' from other objects of intuition. (KS 334 A 350)
This is his more common position but sometimes it seems as
if he allows some intuition of the self.
... the supposed substance - the thing, the permanence of
which has not yet been proved - may be changed into nothing,
not indeed by dissolution, but by gradual loss of its powers,
and so, if I may be permitted the use of the term, by elan-
guescence. For consciousness itself has always a degree,
\ which always allows of dimution, and the same must also hold
of the faculty of being cdhscious of the self, and likewise
of all the other faculties. (KS 373 B 4l4-5)
Which consciousness - the pure or empirical - is Kant referring to
here? Could a merely formal unity admit of degrees?
Another place where there seems to be a puzzling admission is
B 422-3.
The 'I think' is, as already stated, an empirical proposi¬
tion, and contains within itself the proposition 'I exist'.
... The 'I think' expresses an indeterminate empirical in¬
tuition, i.e. perception ... And' indeterminate perception
here signifies only something real that is given, given in¬
deed to thought in general, and so not as appearance, nor as
thing in itself (noumenon), but as something which actually
exists, and which in the proposition, 'I think', is denoted
as such. (KS 378 B 422-3)
I cannot see how Kant can say both that something real is
given in the 'I think' and that pure apperception has only formal
or logical existence as established above.
Kant seems to disallow an experience of pure consciousness
because he thinks that then it would follow that one could have
knowledge of things in themselves and this would undermine the
whole of the Critical Philosophy. I think that he is entirely
right in denying that we can know that our souls are immortal or
that thinking substance is entirely separate and different from
extended substance or that thinking substance needs nothing be¬
sides itself in order to think, merely from the examination of
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thinking itself. And if acceding so much to Kant means that we
have no knowledge of noumenal thinking substance, I am entirely
will to allow that we have no knowledge of noumenal thinking
substance. My inquiry is concerned with knowledge of persons,
and all I require is some knowledge of substance which will make
possible what we believe to be true of persons. I have given
statements of Kant's which seem to allow and even assert some
kind of experience of consciousness though it is difficult to
know definitely whether he means pure or empirical consciousness.
I have given these statements because I think that Kant had
certain insights which slipped through perhaps in spite of his
system. The concept of thinking substance (albeit a moderate
and modified cariety) is both natural and necessary to what is
needed for persons. It sometimes looks as if even Kant, ignor¬
ing systematic considerations, lapses into it.
Above it was argued that the facts of ordinary life re¬
quire that persons be first separate from one another, second,
that they endure (in most cases for a lifetime), third, that
each per-
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son's experiences occur privately, known in their occurring
by only the one person whose experiences they are, and 4) that
each person be unique (or stated in logical terms, that univer-
sals be grounded by means of demonstratives themselves ground¬
ed in the person's self-knowledge).
Substance is the natural kind of ultimate entity to call
on. It is, so to speak, made to order since substance is tra¬
ditionally that which connects and holds together accidents
and modes, substances are logically separate from one another
(like Plato's souls), and no one substance is identical with
another. That Descartes should have called the thinker or
consciousness 'substance' is not surprising, since substance
for centuries had had at least some of the properties he wanted
consciousness to have. I see no reason why he must give up the
label 'substance' for the sake of what someone else disallows
to consciousness if he himself does not mean to attribute these
disallowed properties.
Kant disallows thinking substance and says that nothing
can be known about consciousness as it is, ore can only express
consciousness in the 'I think'. But he does agree that
consciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all re¬
presentations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as
the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be
found, but beyond this logical meaning of the 'I', we
have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which as sub¬
stratum underlies this *1', as it does all thoughts."
(KS 334 A 350)
This is the thoughtness of all thoughts; they are all connected,
and this 'logical meaning' of 'I* is allowed.
But I ask: how much is this logical meaning of 'I' worth?
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It may be that this logical meaning is all that we can express
of substance but if logical meaning were all there were to the
substratum, how could this logical meaning do what we know is
done? Something real must hold things together. Kant may not
be naming what holds things together so much as naming the fact
that experiences are held together with his transcendental
unity of apperception.
In sum my objection is that a transcendental unity of ap¬
perception is not the kind of thing that can hold together ex¬
periences .
Second. Kant wants to allow that the 'I* is self-identi¬
cal subject.
That the 'I* of apperception, and therefore the 'I*
in every act of thought, is one, and cannot be resolved
into a plurality of subjects, is something already con¬
tained in the very concept of thought, and is therefore
an analytic proposition. (KS 369 B 407)
We certainly want a self-identical subject. But Kant gives
us too little or too much. If he claims that the *1* which ex¬
periences every act of thought cannot be experienced to be the
same, then he may have thoughts occurring separately, with
nothing to connect them. This would be Ske Hume's or White¬
head's bits of experience. What makes the experiences of a
person get connected? It is not analytic for Hume, Whitehead,
or (possibly) Ayer that thoughts are had by a simple subject.
In the third paralogism Kant denies that one can know "the
identity of one's own substance, as a thinking being, in all
change of its states." (KS 369 B 408) He argues as follows:
The identity of the consciousness of myself at dif-
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ferent times is therefore only a formal condition of my
thoughts and. their coherence, and in no way proves the
numerical identity of my subject. Despite the logical
identity of the 'I', such a change may have occurred in
it as does not allow of the retention of its identity,
and yet we may ascribe to it the same-sounding 'I',
which in every state, even in one involving change of the
(thinking) subject, might still retain the thought of the
preceding subject and so hand it over to the subsequent
subject. (KS 342 A 363)
He seems to be thinking that the subject could be serial bits,
and in this sense not numerically identical. That he is
thinking of such bits is made clearer in the footnote to the
passage.
An elastic ball which impinges on another similar
ball in a straight line communicates to the latter its
whole motion, and therefore its whole state (that is, if
we take account only of the positions in space). If,
then, in analogy with such bodies, we postulate substan¬
ces such that the one communicates to the other repre¬
sentations together with the consciousness of them, we
can conceive a whole series of substances of which the
first transmits its state together with its conscious¬
ness to the second*? the second its own state with that
of the preceding substance to the third, and this in
turn the states of all the preceding substances together
with its own consciousness and with their consciousness
to another. The last substance would then be conscious
of all the states of the previously changed substances,
as being its own states, because they would have been
transferred to it together with the consciousness of them.
And yet it would not have been one and the same person
in all these states. (KS 342 A 363-4)
The similarity to Whitehead is obvious. One could call the
substances which communicate their representations together
with the consciousness of them to other substances actual
occasions. (Whitehead would have been appalled at calling his
actual occasions "substances".) The question in this kind of
arrangement is though, as we have seen, what transmits the re¬
presentations with consciousness of them? Can we say anything
about it? Shall we even recognize it? Whitehead recognizes
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it and calls it 'inheritance*. Descartes calls it thinking
and because it continues and is the same, thinking substance.
Kant does not talk about the force which would transmit
the representations probably thinking that this is indulging
in speculative metaphysics. Instead of talking about the
force which would be self-identical if it transmits the repre¬
sentations and consciousness of them in the same way from one
bit of substance to the next, he gives us the name again.
This time the transcendental unity of apperception names the
fact that all one's thoughts are had by one subject.
Surprisingly, Kant has recourse to quite another ground
for identity or permanence at one point, namely, the body. He
says:
Its (the soul's) permanence during life is, of course,
evident per se, since the thinking being (as man) is
itself IxkewTse an object of the outer senses. (KS 373
B 415)
We know the soul is the same throughout life because we sense
its identity through the outerness, or what is public, is what
I understand Kant to mean. The truth of the matter seems just
the opposite of that, as I have argued above. We judge the pub'
lie person to be the same on the basis of his judging his pri¬
vate self to be the same. A person's body may change to such
a degree that it is not recognizable as the same body. And yet
we may be willing to call it the same person. For we count an
individual as the same person (and I assume by "man" in the
above quotation, Kant means "person") when and in difficult
cases only because he gives us evidence of recognizing himself
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earlier and later as the same. He remembers now as present
subject what he experienced then as the same subject. If it
were the case that he could remember only that someone experi¬
enced it, that the memory of the experience which occurred in
the past is now preceded by 'I think' not by 'I think now the
memory which the same 'I' thought then as first-time-round-
experience', we would not count him as the same person, though
we might (because of finger prints, etc.) count him as the
same organism. In brief, we may say that an identical body is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of saying that
the person is the same, or more cautiously, a body which can
be recognized to be the same is neither a necessary nor a suf¬
ficient condition of saying that the person is the same.
Nov; to return to the KS 369 B 407 statement given above
on page 223 in order to make the other alternative criticism.
Suppose that Kant has the experiences connected by means of
•I*. In Kant's account all we get is one 'I*. He has said,
"The 'I' in every act of thought is one". In the A 350 quote
given above (page 222) he has said, "Consciousness is, indeed,
that which alone makes all representations to be thoughts, and
in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our per¬
ceptions must be found ..." (Underlining mine.) He speaks of
consciousness in the singular as that which connects all our
perceptions. Is this supposed to mean that there is only one
logical subject, no plurality of persons?
The defender of Kant will say: but you push Kant unfairly;
he means that each person's connects all his experiences,
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not that there is one super-subject which connects all experi¬
ences .
My reply. How on the Kantian analysis can plural sub¬
jects be allowed? From his statements one gets either solip¬
sism or a super-subject; either all thoughts are my thoughts
or all thoughts are thought in common by some Total Thinker.
If we allow that the Kantian 'I' can connect experiences,
the next problem in logical order is to pluralize the subjects,
since we certainly want to say that there are more persons than
one. Then after pluralizing, we must make independent (so as
to give privacy to each person), and then we must individuate,
that is, give uniqueness to each person.
f>v
There seems to be so sign that Kant was concerned with the
problem of pluralizing subjects, though, of course, he knew that
there are persons in the world. He however was not concerned to
make room for them in his system. At one place he says what is
either false or culpably misleading:
... the simplicity of the representation of a subject is
not eo ipso knowledge of the simplicity of the subject
itself, for we abstract altogether from its properties
when we designate it solely by the entirely empty ex¬
pression 'I', an expression which I can apply to every
thinking subject. (KS 337 A 355)
It is not the case that I can apply 'I1 to every thinking sub¬
ject, and mean what we mean by ,I'. Kant here treats 'I' as
a class concept. It is certainly true that I know that each
person is a thinking subject who can apply 'I® to himself.
This notion of the concept 'I* is general but it does not take
'I® to mean or refer to a class but rather to mean a rule though
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referring to an individual. The way in which the concept 'I'
is general cannot be expressed without incorporating this de¬
monstrative element; one says to explain the generality of
'I' that 'I' is to me as *1' when used by some other person
is to that same other person.
The •I' of Kant cannot separate one person from another
because there is nothing determinate in it and when a person
uses it he does not mean anything plural. For Kant 'I' seems
to be a class term; he makes no systematic provision for sepa¬
rating the class into individuals.
Kant might try to separate the class of subjects into
separate individuals by means of bodies. This would not work
because there is no one to one ratio between bodies and sub¬
jects. The cases of multiple personalities (within one body)
make that clear.
And if Kant cannot give us plural persons, he cannot give
us separate persons who are independent in the sense that they
have private experiences. The *1' experiences all experiences.
'I' is all there is: either one person, regular size with au¬
tomata all around, or one person, giant size. Your experiences
and his experiences and her experiences are never mentioned.
To give uniqueness (to pass over separateness and privacy
and go on to the next problem) Kant might rely upon a person's
being a unique collection of universals. But this uniqueness
would be only contingently unique and this is not what we mean
in ordinary practice. Even if every true description of some
other person were also true of me, I should never think that £
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was that other person, though there would be nothing I could
say about myself that the other person could not say about her¬
self. Normally we would have recourse to demonstratives and
say that the referents of these demonstratives are not the same
when I use them as when she uses them even though the words are
the same. If the uniqueness is to be logical uniqueness but
still in terms of non-demonstrative universals, we are back
with Leibniz who had to rely on God to guarantee the uniqueness
of each monad's viewpoint.
The case would be the same if Kant were to want to use the
body (with its behavior and mannerisms) to individuate. If ano¬
ther body appeared exactly like mine and. recited experiences
that sounded like mine and acted like me, I should never be con¬
fused into thinking that that "object of the outer senses" was
me. I should know - in the strongest possible sense - that
that person is different from me, but there would be no concept
that I could give Kant which would express this difference.
And since I would lack a concept, he would deny that I knew.
Kant cannot individuate by means of an 'I' that he has in¬
sisted is empty. And if he cannot individuate by means of 'I',
he cannot individuate at all. This is what I take Descartes,
McTaggart, Keeling, and Strawson to be saying.
I suspect that Kant really wanted consciousness, or con¬
scious substance, to be an object like the objects of the outer
senses.
Nov; it is, indeed, very evident that I cannot know as an
object that which I must presuppose in order to know any
object, and that the determining self (the thought) is
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distinguished from the self that is to be determined
(the thinking subject) in the same way as knowledge is
distinguished from its object. (KS 365 A 402)
Consciousness, or the thinking subject, is like objects of the
outer senses in some ways, e.g., we experience it. We have no
right to assert the logical or ontological independence of con¬
sciousness (though we may entertain the possibility) but con¬
sciousness is also different from matter. And why not? The
only reason is a systematic one, so if one rejects that system,
there is no reason. Why sacrifice persons to epistemology?
Rather we might claim that I also know myself in a way dif¬
ferent from the way I know objects and just this difference,
self-consciousness, is one of the attributes that makes me dif¬
ferent from objects. One can refuse to reduce consciousness to
an 'bbject of the outer sense" while allowing that it may be re¬
lated though we cannot say from an examination of consciousness
how. And since we cannot know the ground of this relatedness
nor how consciousness gives rise to our ways of thinking, cate¬
gories, if you like, Kant may be justified in claiming that we
do not know noumenal consciousness. But we do know what it is
to think, this knowledge we have first-hand; we know the cate¬
gories and connections natural to minds like ours, though we
cannot say from the categories alone why we should have just
these. Granted: we do not know all about consciousness. But
to say that we do not know all about consciousness is not to
say that we know consciousness not at all.
Many persons will want to insist that in addition to the
logical meaning which can be given to consciousness to provide
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a real (not merely formal) ground to the continuity, privacy,
and uniqueness of persons, we also have an intuition of our
own thinking per se. Some people would simply deny that "The
'I* is indeed in all thoughts, but there is not in this repre¬
sentation the least trace of intuition, distinguishing the 'I'
from other objects of intuition." (KS 334 A 350) Those who
would deny Kant's assertion might try to describe conscious¬
ness analogically, or poetically, as the "searchlight" or "the
turned-out-aess which I always find in myself when I look".
Comparisons are difficult because each person experiences only
one consciousness, his own, and it is exactly like nothing else.
Its character among his experiences is unique.
The cogito then tells us part of what it is to be a per¬
son: it is to be self-conscious, to intuit one's existence in
one's thinking, to intuit one's consciousness which 1) pro¬
vides the continuity of oneself, 2) separates each person from
every other person, 3) accounts for the privacy of all our
thoughts, and 4) provides the ground of each person's unique¬
ness .
Descartes, having met with such success in achieving cer¬
tain, if limited, knowledge of the substantial self, is pre¬
pared to assert that whatever renders the cogito certain must
render any proposition that has the same property similarly
certain. It is the clearness and distinctness with which the
cogito is grasped which guarantees its truth. So any proposi¬
tion which is clear and distinct in the same way must also be
true.
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The criterion of clear and distinct perception applies to
two spheres (or the same sphere seen in two ways): 1) the un¬
derstanding of concepts, and 2) self-evident propositions.
When a person clearly and distinctly perceives the mean¬
ing or content of a concept, that is the meaning or content of
that concept. There is no possibility that the concept could
be otherwise, since with concepts the formal existence (what
the concept is) and the object existence (what the concept ap-
(*■
pears to be) coincide. So with all experiences; they are what
they appear to be.
Secondly, self-evident propositions are necessarily true
just because they have this property of being clearly and dis¬
tinctly perceived. There must be certain propositions for
which no evidence can be given nor proof constructed; they must
simply be 'seen1 to be true, e.g., the laws of thought, the
validity of fundamental argument forms. What else could guaran¬
tee the truth of such propositions?
Descartes could not have meant that the way to determine
the truth of all propositions was just to sit and try to think
cbarly. In some cases empirical research is needed before one
can decide whether a proposition is true. I think that Descartes
would have limited the criterion of clear and distinct perception
so that it would not have been a sufficient criterion of truth
for contingent propositions.
The evidence for saying that he would have limited the cri¬
terion of clear and distinct perception is indirect.
First. Descartes was extremely interested in biological
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research.
For almost twenty years, as the Anatomica records, he had
been making observations on the order in which this and
that organ makes its first appearance, and on the modifi¬
cations through which it passes in the course of its de¬
velopment. ... His observations were chiefly on chicks
taken from the egg in the first and following days of
their hatching, and on the embryos of calves taken from
the womb two months, three months, after conception.
(Norman Kemp Smith. New Studies in the Philosophy of
Descartes. London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1952. P.T55.)
If he had thought that any proposition could bear the marks of
truth within it, he would not have needed to make organized ex¬
periments; he could just have conceived of rival hypotheses and
whichever one was more clearly and distinctly perceived would
have been true. But he did not rely solely on the clearness
and distinctness with which propositions were conceived, which
fact I take to be evidence for the assertion that Descartes
did not intend for this criterion to apply to contingent factu¬
al propositions about the world.
Second. In the passage where he is considering what in
the cogito gives him truth he asserts that this would not be
sufficient to assure him of its truth if it could ever be false.
Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that
assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct
perception of that which I state, which would not indeed
suffice to assure me that what I say is true, if it could
ever happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly and
distinctly could be false; and accordingly it seems to me
that already I can establish as a general rule that all
things which I perceive very clearly and very distinctly
are true. (HR I 158)
Because of this passage I interpret Descartes' intention to be
to limit the method of clear and distinct perception to what
could never turn out to be false, since if he applied this
method to ascertain a 'truth' which was later disqualified as
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a truth, nothing at all could be known to be true any more,
not even the cogito itself; reason itself would be untrust¬
worthy, since the clear and distinct perception making the
cogito (the first truth to come out of doubt) true would have
been invalidated as a criterion of truth by having even once
given falsity.
This clear and distinct perception (having proved itself
in the cogito) may be applied to other matters so long as fal¬
sity is not posable. Limiting the m&hod does not make it
vacuous because it is the means of knowing concepts as imme-
j
diate experience and self-evident truths.
What I have interpreted Descartes as achieving in the
cogito is: 1) an indubitable proposition, 2) certainty that
at least one thing, his self, exists; 3) some certain know¬
ledge concerning the nature of this self, and 4) certainty
that clear and distinct perception is an adequate method of
acquiring truth in respect to certain kinds of ideas.
The rest of Descartes' system depends on God. It has
only as much force as one gives credence to the three argu¬
ments for the existence of God. Almost no one is persuaded
by them, I am not, so I shall omit them entirely, and con¬
tinue the exposition of Descartes' theory of the self, his
dividing it into extended and thinking substance, his account
of our knowledge of things outside us (including persons),
and the attempt to join mind and body into an interacting whole.
Because whatever is clearly and distinctly apprehended can
be created by God just as it is apprehended,
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it suffices that I am able to apprehend one thing apart
from another clearly and distinctly in order to be cer¬
tain that the one is different from the other ... and,
therefore, jyst because I know certainly that I exist,
and that meanwhile I do not remark that any other thing
necessarily pertains to my nature or essence, excepting
that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my
essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking
thing. And although possibly (or rather certainly, as I
shall say in a moment) I possess a body with which I am
intimately conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I
have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I
am only a thinking and unextendea thing, and as, on the
other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it
is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain
that this I ..., is entirely and absolutely distinct
from my body, and can exist without it. (HR I 190)
Descartes fundamental error is claiming that thinking is
known to be unextended, a gratuitous error - from our point of
view.
The argument intended to get one to knowledge of objects
begins with the claim that the faculty of perception is passive.
This receiving and recognizing faculty would be useless if there
were not an active faculty which produces the ideas. This cause
must be outside the self because the active faculty does not
presuppose thought and because the clieas occur in him willy-
nilly. This cause must reside in a substance outside of him
and must contain actually what is represented in his ideas of
it. This substance might be extended or it might be God or
some other more noble creature. But it cannot be either God
or another nobler creature because God has given no faculty
able to recognize that these ideas are not conveyed from cor¬
poreal objects and if the ideas came from other than corporeal
objects God who is responsible for our faculties would be de¬
ceitful. Therefore corporeal objects exist as we judge them to
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be, if our faculties all agree after careful consideration
since God is able to produce whatever is distinctly perceived.
Included among these particulars must be other people
since there is no other provision made for knowing them. God
has to guarantee our knowledge of other persons.
The crux of the argument is that the ideas of sensible
things must be guaranteed by a non-deceiving God. The know¬
ledge of sensible things can be no more certain that the argu¬
ments for God's existence and for His trustworthiness since
He is the "sole ground" of their truth. I believe that none
of Descartes * three arguments for the existence of God is
sound. God cannot be known to exist. And even if one be¬
lieved that there is a God, yet it would be "presumption to
desire to determine and understand that which God can and
ought to do" (HR I 138) so that one could not rely on attri¬
butes foisted on to God for knowledge of what objects are.
Going on to the second matter completed by the end of
the Meditations we find the rest of his theory of the self.
There seem to be inconsistencies in his claims concerning what
a person is.
The first position seems to appear when he says things
like "my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a
thinking thing" (HR I 190) which thinking does not include
"the faculties of imagination and feeling, without which I
can easily conceive myself clearly and distinctly as a com¬
plete being." (HR I 190) And when the two substances, think¬
ing substance and extended substance, are described as "en-
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tirely different", and he is, of course, thinking substance.
Though Descartes might sometimes want, or seem to want, to make
his real self consist of pure intellect, this would leave cer¬
tain admitted experiences unexplained, e.g., imagining, sensing,
voluntary motion. Then the definition of thinking as including
imagining, feeling, willing, would have to be modified.
The second and most common interpretation of what Des¬
cartes was offering as his real self is a contingent interaction
between mind and body. On this interpretation, Descartes ar¬
rives at the association of mind with body by examining certain
faculties he finds "in him", imagination, feeling, change of
position, which would be what they are only if mind is associ¬
ated with body. If one is willing to say that these faculties
imply the association of body and mind and goes on to try to
understand the interaction of mind and body, one is stymied.
Thinking substance is unextended; extended substance is unthink¬
ing. If they are entirely different, how can they act on one
another?
The Princess Elizabeth, one of Descartes' correspondents,
puts the question pointedly:
... I beg of you to tell me how the human soul can deter¬
mine the movement of the animal spirits in the body so as
to perform voluntary acts - being as it is merely a con¬
scious substance. For the determination of movement seems
always to come about from the moving body's being pro¬
pelled - to depend on the kind of impulse it gets from
what sets it in motion, or again, on the nature and shape
of this latter thing's surface. Nov/ the first two condi¬
tions involve contact, and the third involves that the
compelling thing has extension; but you utterly exclude
extension from your notion of soul, and contact seems to
me incompatible with a thing's being immaterial. (Des¬
cartes : Philosophical Writings. Translated by Elizabeth
Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach. Edinburgh, Nelson. 1954.
Pp. 274-5.)
238
When Descartes gives an answer, it is in effect to say that
no philosophical answer is possible.
... it is just by means of ordinary life and conversation,
by abstaining from meditating and from studying things
that exercise the imagination, that one learns to conceive
the union of soul and body. (Ibid. P. 280.)
So on this two-substances-interacting view, reason and philoso¬
phy must abdicate in favor of "ordinary life and conversation".
Here Descartes has a name, "interaction", for the fact instead
of an accounting for the fact. He asks us to accept what he
has made impossible.
There is a third possibility: a substantial union of body
and soul. This view is implied in two passages from the Sixth
Meditation:
... I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel,
but that I am very closely united to it, and so to speak
so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one
whole. (HR I 192)
... myself in my entirety, inasmuch as I am formed of body
and soul ... (HR I 192)
There is also a passage in the IV Reply which states that body
and mind are each incomplete when viewed as parts of man's to¬
tal essence.
I do not ignore the fact that certain substances are
popularly called incomplete substances. But if they are
said to be incomplete, because they cannot exist by them¬
selves and unsupported by other things, I confess it seems
to me to be a contradiction for them to be substances; i.
e. for them to be things subsisting by themselves and at
the same time incomplete, i.e. not capable of subsisting
by themselves. But it is true that in another sense they
can be called incomplete substances; viz, in a sense
which allows that, insofar as they are substances, they
have no lack of completeness, and merely asserts that
they are incomplete insofar as they are referred to some
other substance, in unison with which they form a single
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self-subsistent thing distinct from everything else.
Thus, the hand is an incomplete substance, when taken
in relation with the body, of which it is a part; but, re¬
garded alone, it is a complete substance. Quite in the
same way mind and body are incomplete substances viewed
in relation to the man who is the unity which together
they form; but taken alone, they are complete. (HR II 99)
This can only mean that man would consist of body and mind
united in a new substance, more real - when united in this way
in man - than either substance.
The advantage of this view is that it could account for
all the facts and could carry on from the cogito, such a good
beginning. If the self is thinking substance, and if thought
includes intellecting, imagining, feeling, willing, then only
a substantial union can allow consistently all of these activi¬
ties to be part of the real self.
But Descartes gives us no systematic way to connect the
two substances, so the evaluation must be directed to the two
substance view, a task quickly done.
The difficulties standing in the way of having public know
ledge of persons seem insuperable. If thinking substance is
not connected to extended substance in some necessary way, one
cannot be sure of expressing one's thoughts by means of the
body, nor that one is learning what another thinks by observing
the behavior of his body. Unless one can be sure of the respon
siveness of his body to his decisions and choices, a person can
not be held responsible for the behavior of his body.
Dualism will not do for either public knowledge of persons
or responsibility.
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Summary
1. Descartes1 starting point is doubt but several unex¬
amined beliefs are actually part of his system, e.g., the laws
of thought, certain argument forms, the meaningfulness of
language.
2. With coqito ergo sum Descartes establishes a) an in¬
dubitable proposition, b) certainty that at least one thing,
his self, exists, c) certainty concerning the nature of his
self, which is to think, and d) certainty that clear and dis¬
tinct perception is an adequate method of acquiring truth in
respect to certain kinds of ideas.
3. For persons knowledge cannot be impersonal, i.e.,
known without being known to be known.
4. All demonstratives besides "I" are meaningful only in
relation to "I".
5. "I" is meaningful only because one directly intuits
oneself. This immediate knowledge of oneself gives "I"
meaning, thereby grounds demonstratives and other universals.
"I" cannot be translated without remainder into some descrip¬
tion not incorporating a demonstrative.
6. *1' in the cogito stands for thinking, thinking sub¬
stance, consciousness, which terms are equivalent.
7. Kant's Transcendental Unity of Apperception, expressed
by 'I think', has only logical or formal existence.
8. Kant and Descartes (at the point of the cogito) agree
that the examination of consciousness cannot provide knowledge
of its (consciousness•) immortality, nor knowledge that con-
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sciousness is independent of matter.
9. It is not possible to be conscious of consciousness
without having had particular thoughts.
10. Kant denies that we have knowledge of the substantial
self because we do not have either a concept of *1* or an
intuition of this consciousness.
11. Descartes or his supporters would not only agree that
we do not have a (class) concept of 'I', they would deny that
it is either possible or desirable to have such a concept.
They would assert that we do have an intuition of conscious¬
ness.
12. The Transcendental Unity of Apperception cannot pro¬
vide continuityj separateness, privacy, or uniqueness of per-
sons. It can at best name the fact that persons experiences'
are connected.
13. God is needed to guarantee that outer things inclu¬
ding persons are as we know them. Our knowledge of other per¬
sons then is only as well-founded as our knowledge of His
existence and nature.
14. If mind and body are strongly separated, a way is
needed to connect them. Mo means is provided by Descartes.
15. Descartes* system provides what is required for
identity and knowledge of one's private self.
16. At least change of thoughts is allowed itfithin the
Cartesian system since a self-identical thinker who thinks
particular changing thoughts is provided.
17. Neither public knowledge of persons nor responsibi-
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lity can be accommodated v/ithin a strongly dualistic system.
CHAPTER 6
Many of the views I am espousing in this thesis are not cur¬
rently fashionable in Britain or America (though there are signs
that fashions may be changing). It might be well therefore to
compare my position with some contemporary writers who have at¬
tracted widespread attention to show similarities and differences,
and where there are differences to show either the shortcomings
of their views which would remove that and like views as rivals
to my own, or alternatively, to show the superiority of my view
over theirs in its adequacy to the facts of ordinary goings-on
among people.
Before examining the particular philosophers I shall consider
in this chapter, I should like to make some prefatory remarks.
Much of the philosophy of mind (or philosophical psychology,
or metaphysics of persons, or theory of the self - whatever one
chooses to call it) since Descartes has been directed to overcom¬
ing dualism. If one moves from the assertion that mind is known
in a way different from (as well as like) the way of knowing mat¬
ter to the assertion that mind is totally different from and in¬
dependent of matter, then there is knowledge of only one mind,
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one's own. Knowledge of matter or knowledge of another's mind
becomes philosophically ungrounded. How is extended matter to
affect unextended mind? How is unextended mind to move extended
body, e.g., in voluntary motion? The expression of one's experi¬
ences by means of and in one's body and knowing another's experi¬
ences via his body become problematical. Solipsism seems to be
the logical and inescapable consequence. That mind and matter
interact is not denied by Descartes, as we have seen above, but
the fact is not philosophically explicable, and is indeed mysteri¬
ous on Descartes' principles.
Objections are raised and rightly so to this abandonment of
philosophy and cleaving to common sense (as we have seen Descartes
did) when philosophy which is supposed to be superior to common
sense has led to a dead end. Better it is thought, to have dif¬
ferent principles which do not have to be forsaken or ignored to
accommodate the facts, such as, that I can tell others what I
think, that we have knowledge of the persons around us via bodies
they control.
The presently fashionable way to avoid the difficulties of
dualism is behaviorism. There are varieties of behaviorism though
so I should like to make some distinctions within behaviorism which
may facilitate our discussion of the specific philosophers below.
Since the dualism between private experience and the behavior
of the body is what gives rise to solipsism, the existence of pri¬
vate experience may be denied. All that there is to persons -
including oneself - is what is public: body, its behavior, and
something further (with a status which is apparently different),
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the possible ways of behaving. This view could be labelled 'meta¬
physical behaviorism' since the claim is that only behavior (and
possible behavior) can be real. Or instead of explicitly denying
private experience (which sounds pretty crude) the position may
be disguised by saying that everything that is known about any
person including oneself is learned in the same way. (This way
of stating it puts into sharp relief one difference between this
presently 'in' position and my own: I have claimed that one gains
some kinds of knowledge of oneself in a way different from the
ways used in the case of other persons which are also used for
some kinds of knowledge about oneself.) That the disguise is not
really a change is unquestionable, because if there is only one
way of finding out about persons, it must be public and all that
is true of a person must be public. There can't be anything pri¬
vate left over. (There is a refinement or equivocation about
keeping things to oneself which may seem to modify this form of
crudity but I do not think it helps or helps enough to relieve
the inadequacy of the position.)
But in spite of the inadequacies (which I shall try to show
beloxtf) there are attractions in the position. It does, of course,
entirely evade the bog of solipsism. It stays on the high public
road of behavior and does not wander into private path which may
lead to a solipsistic solitude.
Though it is no doubt clear that for me the cost - the loss
of private experience - is too high for the result - the assurance
of a community of like minds (which result can be gotten in a less
costly way) - I yet want to admit some advantages of this kind of
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metaphysical behavioristic analysis to another position. The
behavioristic analysis of the means of coming to know persons is
illuminating, useful, and true, I think.
One can incorporate some of what the metaphysical behaviorists
assert without going all the way with them. That is, one can say
that the only basis for what we know about other persons is their
speech and behavior without saying 1) that these exhaust xtfhat is
true of persons, or 2) that everything that we find out about our¬
selves is found out in the same ways that we find out about other
persons. This modified behaviorism could be labeled 'epistemolo-
gical behaviorism* meaning that the observation of behavior (here
including verbal acts and reports) is one way of getting knowledge
of people and the only way of getting reliable knowledge of other
persons besides oneself. (Believers in extra-sensory perception
will disagree but even they must rely on behavior to get know¬
ledge of other persons most of the time.) Epistemological be¬
haviorism then allows the existence of private experiences.
My position would count as one kind of epistemological be¬
haviorism.
Within epistemological behaviorism differing stands may be
taken. All of them grant that private experiences occur and are
real. But A) one can grant that persons can know what they ex¬
perience, or B) one may say that private experiences are not
known, only had. C) One may deprecate the importance of private
experiences, or D) one may allow the highest value and signifi¬
cance to be put on private experience.
Regarding A and B. There may very well be reasons for not
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using 'know1 to apply to private experiences, reasons having to
do with requirements of publicness and corrigibility for knowledge.
If knowledge must be public and corrigible, then an incorrigible
a^^areness which occurs privately and may not be publicized cannot
count as knowing. But I think that there is nothing more certain
nor anything about which one can speak with greater authority than
one's private experience; and if this certainty and authoritative-
ness suffice to give knowledge, then private experience is known.
Perhaps a motive for saying that private experiences are only had
not known is a desire to depreciate the importance of private ex¬
periences .
If the importance of private experiences is deprecated, one
may ask; for what is private experience unimportant? I presume
that the answer would be: for social life, what I have called the
viability of society. It is true that most of what makes society
'go' viewed at a more obvious level is what is public in persons,
their actions, abilities, roles, statuses. But I can think of at
least one telling counter-example, namely, what is required for
responsibility. If persons are to be responsible, they must be
able to exercise self-control and must be able to apply sanctions
to themselves (whether anyone else knows about it or not). Take
away these two phenomena, and responsibility, and consequently
society are changed. So some private experiences are necessary
to society's on-goingness.
And surely to our private lives private aspects of persons
are of the utmost importance. What an intimate can tell us about
his experiences which we can get in no other way is what makes
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him more special than non-intimates. We can, almost, live through
his experiences.
Leaving out or trying to minimize the importance of this pri¬
vate aspect of persons truncates and distorts what we mean by
•person'.
We cultivate people to deserve their confidence and confi¬
dences. Why do we take the trouble? Because we want our own
lives expanded through another's Erlebnis. How is it possible
that we can knox-j that others are persons like oneself, that this
particular being before one is a person like oneself, that one can
understand his expressions of what he experiences privately and
still make mistakes or be deceived sometimes?
Behaviorism arises from concern with such questions.
We may now move to the consideration of the first book to
be treated in this chapter, Norman Malcolm's Dreaming.
We have at least two purposes in considering Dreaming. One
is to determine exactly what he says about dreaming; I think this
book is sometimes misrepresented. Another purpose is to see how
his view differs from my view given in Chapter 2 above. He does
not explicitly claim that his is the commonly-accepted view though
he seems to suggest with the Latin quotation from Descartes on the
title page that he is with the rustics in not ignoring self-evi¬
dent matters and unlike the lettered persons who find ways of be¬
ing blinded. In the original Descartes with whom he is in dis¬
agreement on the matter of dreams was probably aligning himself
with the rustics against the lettered persons too. And I claimed
that my view of dreams given in Chapter 2 is the ordinary view.
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I should have preferred to present only the points in Dreaming
which clearly and immediately could "be seen to contribute to the
accomplishment of one of our purposes but this is not possible be¬
cause there is too much interconnection (what is argued for in one
chapter is used to establish a further point later) and so it
would be only fair to give as much of the chain of argumentation
as is needed. Also the exact point Malcolm is making is often
elusive so it is helpful to give the views he offers as opposed
to his own. One can see from the views that he disagrees with
where he stands.
Chapter One, Introduction, gives views of dreaming held by
Descartes (Mind's essence is consciousness and so long as a mind
exists there must exist 'modes' of that essence; a dream is part
of that mental life, consisting of thoughts, feelings and im¬
pressions that one has when asleep), Aristotle (the soul makes
assertions in sleep), Kant (the mind's greatest perfection might
be exercised in sleep), Moore ("'We cease to perform them [men¬
tal acts] only while we are asleep, without dreaming; and even in
sleep, so long as we dream, we are performing acts of conscious¬
ness'" Norman Malcolm Dreaming, N.Y., Humanities Press, 1959* 1962,
p. I feel it is necessary to add here a bibliographical note.
The second Impression with some corrections appeared in 1962. The
copy I am using is from the third impression, 1964. Hereafter
when referring to Dreaming in this discussion of it I shall give
only the page number.), Russell ("'What, in dreams we see and hear,
we do in fact see and hear, though, owing to the unusual context,
what we see and hear gives rise to false beliefs. Similarly, what
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we remember in dreams we do really remember; that is to say, the
experience called "remembering" does occur1" p. 3)a Freud ("•Obvi¬
ously, the dream is the life of the mind during sleep1" p. 3),
Hadfield, a contemporary psychologist ("'Dreams are a form, pro¬
bably the most primitive form, of ideation in which experiences
and situations of the day and of life are repreduced on the screen
of the mind during sleep as images, usually in visual form1" pp. 3-
4), and Yost and Kalish ("'Dreaming is a real experience. And
since dreams can be remembered, they must be conscious experien¬
ces.'" p. 4). I might add that these views of men incontroverta-
bly litterati are not markedly different from the "dream" entry
given in The American College Dictionary which says: "dream ...
-n. a succession of images or ideas present in the mind during
sleep. 2. the sleeping state in which this occurs..." But per¬
haps the lexicographers who compiled The American College Dic¬
tionary consulted only the litterati and the rustics do have a
different understanding of dreams.
It is useful to offer the views of these various thinkers
xtfhich Malcolm gives in his first chapter because it provides the
backdrop for his argumentation. It isn't until Chapter 16 that
he makes clear his opposition to these views and his underlying
aim in opposing them. He aims to undercut the scepticism arising
from the belief that "dreaming and waking might be 'exact counter¬
parts'" (p. 120). When he first gives these statgments in Chapter
1, he says he wants to "examine" them. The thrust of his argumen¬
tation can, I think, be better understood if his opposition to
these views is kept in mind.
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Chapter Two argues that it is impossible to make the asser¬
tion 'I am asleep1 because it is absurd that a sleeping person
could claim that he is asleep. Nor can a man judge that he is
asleep., according to Chapter Three. Malcolm argues that if a man
can make judgments during sleep, then it ought to be possible for
him to judge that he is asleep. The premiss only if one under¬
stands the sentence 'I am asleep1 can one judge himself to be
asleep is left implicit, but if it were to be made explicit and
defended it would be at this point since Malcolm goes on to
argue:
... I will raise the question of whether it can be verified
that someone understands how to use the sentence 'I am
asleep' to describe his own state. If there is that use of
the sentence it ought to make sense to verify that someone
has or has not mastered it. An indication that someone
understands the use of a sentence to describe some state of
affairs might be the fact that he utters the sentence some¬
times when, and only when, that state of affairs does exist
and utters the negation of the sentence sometimes when, and
only when, that state of affairs does not exist: for example,
he says "The wind is blowing hard" sometimes when and only
when the wind is blowing hard; and he says "the wind is not
blowing hard" sometimes when and only when the wind is not
blowing hard. In general such a correlation is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for understanding the
use of a sentence: it is possible that a particular sentence
should be understood and yet each time it is uttered the de¬
scription it expresses should be false, just as it is possi¬
ble that a particular order ('Put your hand in this fire'!)
should always be disobeyed, even though it is impossible that
all orders should always be disobeyed Wittgenstein §3^5).
Still the correlation would, in some circumstances, provide
Evidence of understanding. Could we obtain evidence of this
sort in the case of the sentence 'I am asleep*? (Pp. 9-10.
This quotation does not appear in this form in the first
edition.)
At this point it might be well to consider what kinds of con¬
nections Malcolm is claiming. He says that "it ought to make
sense to verify that someone understands the use of the sentence
'I am asleep' to describe his ovm statg. But the exact signifi-
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cance of this way of expressing it is unclear to me expecially in
light of the argumentation which follows.
Perhaps he means only that we normally expect to he able to
verify that someone understands how to use a sentence. But if
u
this is what means, then showing that we cannot verify that some-
l-
one knows how to use a sentence is not sufficient to establish
that we will not allow that he knows how to use the sentence. It
might simply be a queer sentence not allowing us to verify that
someone knows how to use it, but such that we are willing to grant
that he knows how to use it anyhow.
Or does Malcolm mean something as strong as 'it must make
sense to verify that someone understands the use of the sentence
etc.', i.e., that verifying that one has mastered the use of a
sentence is a necessary condition of our allowing that he knows
how to use this sentence? Malcolm admits explicitly (if I under¬
stand correctly "such a correlation is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for understanding the use of a sentence")
that verifying (correlation is the only method of verifying he
has mentioned) that someone understands the use of a sentence is
not a necessary condition of allowing that he understands the use
of that -sentence, but the argumentation which follows seems to
consist in trying to establish that because one cannot correlate
the use of 'I am asleep' with the proper state of affairs, one
cannot verify that someone understands the sentence, and that
therefore one cannot know that a person knows how to rightly use
that sentence. It looks as if verification is treated as necessary
(in the course of his argument) and that correlation is the only
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possible method of verifying that someone understands the use of
•I am asleep'.
To restate this point. Only if Malcolm claims that verifi¬
cation of understanding a sentence is necessary to our allowing
that a person using the sentence understands it is Malcolm justi¬
fied in concluding that we will not allow that a person using a
sentence understands it if we lack verification. He seems to deny
that verification is a necessary condition. Therefore he is not
entitled to the conclusion that we will not allow that understand¬
ing exists if we lack verification. If I am correct, it is con¬
sequently superfluous for him to show that such verification is
impossible.
The strong claim: that verifying that someone knows the use
of a sentence is necessary in order for us to allow that he knottfs
how to use that sentence, is what Malcolm might like (if I under¬
stand the subsequent argumentation) but this strong claim is pro¬
bably false, as I have suggested above. We rarely if ever require
verifying that someone knows how to use a sentence in order for us
to allow that he does. We simply allow that an adult user of his
native language does know the use of the sentences he uses. And
even if somehow we come to doubt, we would hardly ask for verifi¬
cation that he knows the use of a sentence in the form of correla¬
tion of the sentence with the 'correct* state of affairs. If we
suspected that he didn't know the use of the sentence, we would
probably question him about the component words, to see if he un¬
derstood them.
Leonard Linsky argues that it isn't correct to speak of the
use- of a sentence but only of the use- of words.
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Surely, there are other things about a person's verbal be¬
havior, besides his saying what is true in saying a sentence,
which would justify my belief that this person understands
the sentence.
On Malcolm's view, a sentence which has never been ut¬
tered in the course of making a true statement is one that
we can never know that another person can use significantly,
i.e., with understanding. But this is plainly false. Take
for example the sentence 'I see a ghost'. No one has ever
uttered it making a true assertion) there are no ghosts.
But this certainly does not alter the fact that many people
know what it means, and that we know they know what it means.
(Leonard Linsky. Malcolm and the use of words", Analysis,
December 19&5• 6l.) "
This seems to me sufficient to impair the force of Malcolm's
argument if he is claiming that verifying in the form of correla¬
ting that someone knows the use of a sentence is necessary in
order for us to allow that he knows how to use the sentence.
He thinks that he does show that such verification of under¬
standing of 'I am asleep' is impossible.
Noitf how could one verify that a man says, 'I am asleep'
to himself when he is asleep? How could one find out that
he did this even once? If he talked in his sleep, saying
aloud 'I am asleep', this would not count either for or
against his understanding of that sentence, since a man who
is talking in his sleep is not aware of what he is saying.
Here I am merely commenting on the idiomatic use of the ex¬
pression 'talking in his sleep'. We do not affirm it of
someone who is aware that he is talking. (P. 10)
The error or confusion I should like to comment on here is Malcolm's
use of "is aware of". It is quite true that in one sense a person
who talks in his sleep is not aware that he is talking. That is,
he is not aware of where his body is and who is really hearing him
(probably)) he has in his sleeping mind another setting and inter¬
locutor (most likely). But to say that he is not aware at all is
surely mistaken since if one wakes a sleep-talking person and asks,
"What were you dreaming? You were talking," the awakened person
will normally be able to describe his dream and explain why he was
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saying what he said. The sleep-talker will say something like:
"Oh, I said that because such-and-such was happening in my dream."
And in that sense he was aware, aware of what was happening in his
dream, and aware of what he said. It would be thought self-con¬
tradictory to say, "I know what was happening in my dream just
when you woke me, and I know that I said £ because of what was
happening but I wasn't in any sense aware of it." Granted that
dreaming awareness is not waking awareness. But Malcolm cannot
assume at this point that dreaming awareness is no awareness at
all, since this argument about talking in one's sleep is one in
a chain which is supposed to establish that dreaming awareness is
no awareness at all.
It may be thought that we could appeal to the sleeper's
testimony after he awakened. Suppose he told us that he had
said 'I am asleep' while he was asleep. But this report
would presuppose that he already knew when to say 'I am
asleep', and so it could not be used to establish the point
at issue without begging the question. That is to say, his
claim that he said certain words while asleep, implies that
he was aware of being asleep and so implies' that he knows
how to apply the sentence 'I am asleep'. If he does not, his
report is worthless. If we have no way of establishing that
he knows how to use the sentence other than by appeal to his
testimony, then we cannot appeal to his testimony. (P. 11)
If I understand Malcolm correctly, he is saying here that we can¬
not, not only in the case of 'I am asleep* but in the case of any
sentence, rely on a person's testimony alone to find out whether
he knows how to use a sentence. This is of special interest be¬
cause later Malcolm not merely allows but insists that we rely
solely on another person's testimony to know that he uses the sen¬
tence (or an equivalent) 'I had a dream' correctly.
It may be thought that from the fact that a person could
be taught and learn how to use the third person sentence, 'he
is g^leep' we could safely conclude that he would know how to
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use the first person sentence. This conclusion would have
no justification at all. The use of the sentence 'He is
asleep' is governed by criteria of the following sort: that
the body of the person is question is relaxed, his eyes closed,
his breathing steady; and that he is unresponsive to moderate
sounds and happenings in his vicinity. It cannot be supposed
that these criteria are to govern the sjqe of the first person
sentence. How absurd it would be for someone to judge that he
himself if asleep from the fact that his eyes are closed and
that he does not react to various sounds! If 'I am asleep'
were used to make a judgment, this use would differ so great¬
ly from that of 'He is asleep' that an understanding of the
latter would not argue an understanding of the former.
(Pp. 11-12)
Malcolm's point here is, I take it, that the use of a third person
sentence is governed by behavioral criteria which cannot be applied
in the case of first person sentences. (The criteria must be the
same for first person sentences as for third person sentences.)
So the first person sentence cannot be used to make a judgment.
Nov/ if the criteria governing 'He is asleep' are behavioral,
must the criteria governing 'He was asleep' also be behavioral? I
presume Malcolm would say that they must be. If not, how is it
that a new criterion can be employed when one changes tenses? And
if the criteria governing 'He was asleep' are behavioral, then
must not th& criteria governing 'I was asleep' be behavioral? Un¬
like 'I am asleep', 'I was asleep' is often used in ordinary
language. What criteria do we employ? Is it any less absurd to
say that 'I was asleep' is governed by behavioral criteria than
to say 'I am asleep' is governed by behavioral criteria?
Malcolm will not allow that one describe himself as "being
asleep" on the basis of some conscious experience, because "having
some conscious experience or other, no matter what, is not what is
meant by being asleep, i.e., the statement 'Jones is asleep' is not
false because there is some experience or other that Jones does not
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have.,: (P. 12) There is no need to say that there is a conscious
experience of sleeping, or what it is if there is such a thing.
We can say what it must not be: sleeping experience must not be a
clear and distinct perception of what is actually going on around
the sleeping person. Consider the case Malcolm offers. A person's
body is relaxed, his eyes are closed, he is snoring, he does not
react to various movements and voices close by, and he does not
stir when some possessions he greatly values are noisily destroyed
near his bed but later were "able to relate what was said and done
in his presence while he was in bed, without either inferring it
or being informed of it". (P. 26) Most people, unlike Malcolm,
would simply agree with the man who claims that he was only pre¬
tending to sleep. Since most of us have probably succeeded in
fooling other people into believing that we were asleep when we
weren't, we wouldn't be surprised if we ourselves were fooled by
someone else. People who have no theory to save had rather be¬
lieve what is surely possible, that the man was pretending to
sleep, and be perplexed about the man's motive in allowing his
possessions to be destroyed than give up one criterion of being
asleep (namely, the inability to relate what is said and done in
one's presence, or putting it more exactly, being able to relate
what is said and done in one's presence sufficing to show that the
person is not asleep) and call the pseudo-sleeping state "an ex¬
traordinary phenomenon that escapes classification". (P. 26)
But we can let rest the discussion of whether the judgment
•I am asleep' is possible. (I do not want to assert that this
judgment is possible. So far my efforts have been directed to
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pointing out shortcomings in Malcolm's argument which is intended
to show that the judgment is impossible.) Malcolm wants to say-
that the judgment is impossible and goes on to say that any judg¬
ment made while a man is asleep is absurd in the same way that the
judgment 'I am asleep' is absurd. Judgments made in dreams [and
they are usually not like the ones Malcolm offers, such as, 'My
wife is jealous' but rather judgments about something happening
(perhaps accompanied by character analyses) like, 'I saw this old
friend and thought to myself, "My, how long her hair is!" and then
she turned around and I saw that she wasn't really my friend but
this person that I met yesterday and then ...'] are not usually
accompanied by the judgment 'I am asleep'.
The point here is that one who holds views like those given
in Malcolm's Chapter One does not have to argue that the judgment
'I am asleep' is a necessary precondition of making dream judg¬
ments. Malcolm wanted to show that to make the judgment 'I am
asleep' is impossible and consequently so are all judgments while
asleep by the same schema of proof. I believe that ray view is
like the views in Malcolm's Chapter One, vrhich is also the common
sense view: namely, that when one dreams, one makes judgments
(dream judgments) but one does not always judge at the same time
that one is asleep. Par from this judgment (that one is asleep)
being logically fundamental or even like dream judgments, it would
actually change our concept of dreaming radically if dreaming al¬
ways were or could be accompanied by the judgment 'I am asleep*.
Dreaming would not be the non-veridical or hallucinatory experi¬
ence that it is (i.e., an experience which makes us believe what
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is not the case) if one could consistently judge that one is
sleeping.
Arguing from the impossibility of judging that one is
asleep we arrive at an important result, namely, that it is
nonsensical to suppose that while a person is asleep he could
make any judgment. Remember that the logical absurdity de¬
tected in the sentence 'I am asleep' amounts to this: that in
order for the sentence to have a correct use one would some¬
times have to say it \tfhen the thing one said was true. (Pp.
35-6)
Here is one place where Malcolm seems to assert that a correlation
between the use of a sentence and the fact that it asserts (i.e.,
its truth) is a necessary condition of having a correct use; I
believe that he denied this on pp. 9-10, quoted above p. 251.
One more quotation to show that Malcolm is asserting (what
I believe to be false and inconsistent with our present concept
of dreaming) that the impossibility of the judgment 'I am asleep'
proves that it is nonsensical to suppose that any judgment could
be made while asleep. (The following quotation also provides the
next point I want to object to.)
We noticed that it would be self-contradictory to verify that
a man was both asleep and judging that he was, because what¬
ever in his behavior showed he was making the judgment would
equally show that he was not asleep. Now this would be so
whatever the judgment was. In order to know that he had made
any judgment one x\rould have to know that he had said certain
words and that he had been aware of saying them. But what¬
ever it was in his demeanour that revealed his awareness of
saying them would also establish that he was both aware and
not aware of saying certain words. ... It would be self-
contradictory to verify that he made any judgment while
asleep. It Is not that there is something unique about the
fact of being asleep that keeps one from taking note of that
fact while asleep. If a sleeping person could note that it
is raining or judge that his wife is jealous, then why could
he not judge that he is asleep? The absurdity of the latter
proves the absurdity of the former. (P. 36)
Here the impossibility of making any judgment is clearly
claimed to be connected to the impossibility of making the judg-
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merit that one is asleep. "The absurdity of the latter proves the
absurdity of the former."
Next, Malcolm insists on a univocal meaning for "aware".
R. M. Yost, Jr. in his review of Dreaming (Philosophical Review,
October i960, p. 535) gives away Malcolm's meaning; "mentally alert
(conscious)" are the words he uses for Malcolm's "aware". Malcolm
uses "alert" as equivalent to "awake" on p. 15 of Dreaming. Of
course, no one would want to say that one can be mentally alert
(in the sense that one is mentally alert while one is awake) while
one is asleep; but this is not the same as granting that one can¬
not be aware in any sense. As I argued above: if one talks in
one's sleep, if awakened, one knows usually why one said what one
said. To say that one knows what one was dreaming and why one
said what one said but that one was not aware at all of the dream
or of vrtiat owee said, is to use the word "aware" in a non-standard
way, to narrow its meaning for the sake of one's theory.
But the argument is not solely about the word "aware". The
question is whether dreaming is sufficiently like what goes on
while one is awake to warrant describing the mind with at least
some of the same predicates, e.g., 'experiencing', 'judging', etc.
And if not, why not?
So far the argument against using such predicates seems to
consist in asserting that in order to judge one needs to be able
to use the appropriate sentences, but nothing could show that a
sleeping person knows how to use sentences while he is sleeping,
because to use any sentence, he must be able to use 'I am asleep',
To know that a person uses 'I am asleep' correctly, vie should have
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to observe him Judging that he is asleep while he is asleep which
is "absurd", "impossible", "nonsensical".
As I have already argued above, 'I am asleep' jLs (contrary
to what Malcolm says) a peculiar Judgment, which far from being
on all fours with other Judgments is peculiar and which if it
could occur, would radically alter the phenomenon of dreaming.
Second, our knowing that a person knows how to use a sentence
correctly does not depend on his using the sentence to make a
true assertion since we can know that he knows the use of a sen¬
tence which could never be truly asserted (Linsky's example, given
above, was 'I see a ghost').
After arguing that Judging, thinking, reasoning, imagining
in sleep are "all unintelligible notions", Malcolm gets to dreams
in Chapter Eleven.
There is a use of the word 'dream', and it is the basic
sense of the word, in which a person cannot dream unless he
is asleep. The criterion of someone's having had a dream,
in this sense, is that upon awaking he tells a dream. It is
possible for a person to fall asleep and to sleep soundly
for an hour, and then, after being suddenly awakened, to tell
a dream. The various criteria of sleep that were previously
mentioned could be perfectly satisfied, so that there would
be no question that he had been sound asleep during that hour.
But the criterion of his having dreamt would also be satisfied.
It makes sense, therefore, to say of someone both that he was
sound asleep for an hour and that he dreamt during that sleep.
(P. 49)
As I argued above in Chapter 2, Section C, I too want to say that
we can only know what some other person dreamed if he tells us. I
might be willing to allow that twitches, etc. occurring while a
person slept might indicate that the person was dreaming which
Malcolm wants to put no stock in at all apparently. The only in¬
dication of dreaming for Malcolm is to be the waking report. I
could argue this since Malcolm takes several scientific investiga-
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tors to task for wanting to use rapid eye movements as an indica¬
tion of dreaming. But it is unlikely that they will pay any mind
to Dreaming (and consequently feel the need of any defense) so I
shall limit my discussion to what can better be considered by
persons lacking an expert's extensive empirical knowledge.
But there is an obvious objection to saying that the only
way to know that a person had a dream is to hear him tell his
dream, namely, the knowledge in one's own case. My knowledge that
I had a dream is in no way dependent on my hearing myself tell a
dream. And Malcolm agrees.
Perhaps the greatest cause of perplexity about the tell¬
ing of a dream as the criterion of the occurrence of a dream
is the fact that one cannot apply this criterion to oneself.
One does not find out that oneself had a dream by applying
that criterion. One uses it only for 'He had a dream, not
for 'I had a dream'. This asymmetry may lead one to deny
that the third person sentence is governed by this criterion.
'I do not determine that I had a dream on the basis of my
telling a dream. I use "T had a dream" and "He had a dream"
in the same sense. Therefore, that another person tells a
dream cannot be the thing that determines for me that he had
a dream'. The trouble with this fallacious argument lies in
the phrase 'the same sense'. ... But what _is 'the same
sense' here? To use the sentences of this asymmetrical pair
in the same sense (in so far as they can be used in the same
sense) is to use them in the normal v*ay, where telling a
dream serves as a criterion of verification for the one but
not the other. ...
Prom the fact that one does not use the above criterion
for deciding that one dreamt does it follow that there is not
such a thing as knowing one dreamt? No. One has grounds
sometimes for concluding that one dreamt, and this is know¬
ledge in a proper sense of the word. (Pp. 63-4)
Malcolm and I are agreed then on two important points: 1) that
there is an asymmetry between the way of coming to know that I had
a dream and the way of coming to know that he had a dream; and 2)
that one knows in a proper sense of the word that one had a dream
oneself without using the criterion used in the case of other
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people. One uses a criterion in the case of other persons' dreams
which one does not use in the case of one's own dreams. This is
another, perhaps better, way of saying what I said in Chapter 2:
that there are more ways than one of acquiring knowledge of per¬
sons; the way one gets some kinds of knowledge in the case of other
persons is not the way one has of coming by those kinds of know¬
ledge in one's own case.
Knowing what one has oneself dreamed does not depend upon
one's telling (see p. 71 above). We know about the contents of
another person's dream only what he tells us (see p. 86 above).
And, a further point of agreement, there is no way to check on
his report, no comparing it to his dream to see whether it cor¬
responds .
How is it possible that there are two ways of getting know¬
ledge of persons? The reason I have given above is that in the
case of other persons one has only their behavior and their re¬
ports (in the case of dreams, their reports) whereas in one's own
case one also has knowledge based one one's own experience (which
is in its occurrence private). Malcolm and others of like views
will say the question and the answer are improper. (Cf. Dreaming
pp. 86-7) One must know when to stop asking questions and the
time to stop is before this question has been asked because the
only answer to it could be: that's the way things are, or, that's
the language game we play. And I am resisting stopping with
dream-telling as a "proto-phenomenon" before we give full weight
to what is private in persons which private aspect is necessary
to our ordinary concept of person.
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But we can investigate what Malcolm says our knowledge of our
own dreams consists in to see whether there is anything 'inner' in
this knowledge. Malcolm says about one's knowledge of one's own
dreams:
From the fact that one does not use the above criterion
for deciding that one dreamt does it follow that there is not
such a thing as knowing one dreamt? No. One has grounds
sometimes for concluding that one dreamt, and this is know¬
ledge in a proper sense of the word. An example would be to
wake up with the impression that one has just painted the bed¬
room walls blue, and then to note that the walls are still
yesterday's yellow: 'So it was a dream'. To find out one
dreamt the incident is to find out that the impression one
had on waking is false. As one can know one dreamt, so can
one be mistaken. You wake up, for example, with the im¬
pression that a policeman came into your room during the
night; other people in the house say this did not occur; you
conclude you dreamt it: but the event really happened and
the others conspired to deceive you. ...
I am inclined to believe that statements of the form 'I
dreamt so and so' are always inferential in nature. I do not
mean that one always arrives at them by explicit processes of
inference but rather that one might always defend them as con¬
clusions from certain facts or supposed facts. If someone
were to ask you how you knew that you dreamt so and so, you
could always mention something that you supposed proved or
made probable that the thing in question did not occur and
that therefore you dreamt it.
What can have no justification and requires none is
your statement that you have the impression that so and so
occurred. (You may or may not believe that it did occur.)
In this sense you cannot find out that you dreamt, although
you can find out that someone else dreamt. What it does make
sense to find out is whether your impression corresponds with
reality, and to discover that it does is to discover that you
had a dream. (Pp. 64-5)
£
One's knowledge of his dreams is tb£.n supposed to be inferen¬
tial. One has an impression. One finds out that the impression
is false. One concludes that one dreamt it. I take it that the
conclusion counts a^s knowledge because it is an inference.
There are two questions I should like to ask at this point.
First. Does one have knowledge of the impression that one
has on awakening? Malcolm would probably say no, because it can
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have no justification and requires none. I presume this impression
is like an impression (sensation) of pain which is had, not known.
As I have already said, there may be good enough reasons for re¬
serving 'knoitfledge' for what is public and corrigible to warrant
limiting the application of the term in this way. But whether one
knows that one has the impression or not, one has an impression.
And this impression must be a private experience. So the (necessa¬
rily private) impression is an essential part of one's knowledge
that he dreamed whether or not the whole of such knowledge is pri¬
vate .
Second. Is it true that we can knov/ that we dreamed only as
a result of an inference?
Suppose, as often happens, one wakes up with the impression
that one dreamed but can't remember what one dreamed. One has the
impression of some mental activity during the night but cannot re¬
member it. Lacking a specific impression which is found to be
false, does one then have no right to say 'I had a dream'? If
Malcolm would say 'no, one has no right', his divergence from the
ordinary view would be obvious. "I know I had a dream but I can't
remember what it was" makes perfectly good ordinary sense.
To summarize this section concerning the way one comes to
know one dreamed. Malcolm claims that it is by means of an in¬
ference. One has an impression upon awakening which is found to
be false so one concludes that one dreamt. I have suggested this
may be true for some cases, but that even where this is the correct
account, an impression which must be a private experience is a ne¬
cessary part of such knowledge. And I submit that this is not the
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only way one comes to know that one had a dream; one may sometimes
wake up with the impression (which is not here an inference) that
one dreamt|though one does not know what one dreamt. Then one's
knowledge that one dreamt consists entirely of an impression. So
one's knowledge of one's dream life consists in part or entirely
of an impression which must be a kind of private experience.
And also, since Malcolm has granted that one can have know¬
ledge in a proper sense of one's own dreams, which is inferential,
I take it that one can Know (by means of such an inference) that
one had a dream without this knowledge being necessarily public,
though admittedly communicable. That is, one infers from a falsi¬
fied impression that one dreamed and knows this even if one doesn't
tell anyone. This knowledge one has for oneself though others are
ignorant and may be (mercifully if one's dreams are dull) kept ig¬
norant. Or one may lie, knowing what one dreamed and intentionally
mislead one's interlocutor.
This possibility of private knowledge of oneself which entails
the possibility of never-ended ignorance on the part of other per¬
sons and their being successfully deceived without the possibility
of their proving that one has lied (so long as one is consistent
in the story) is the minimum concession I need.
I should like to be able to show that the ordinary vie\\f that
dreams are "a succession of images or ideas present in the mind
during sleep" is correct. But to do this one would have to es¬
tablish that one can be aware while asleep, aware in the sense of
dream-awareness. Having a dream does not mean, for Malcolm, that
one was aware of anything.
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When he says 'I dreamt so and so' he implies, first, that it
seemed to him on waking up as if the so and so had occurred,
and second, that the so and so did not occur. There is simply-
no place here for an implication or assumption that he was
aware of anything at all while asleep. His testimony that he
had a dream does not involve that nonsensical consequence.
(P. 66)
Malcolm has asserted that being asleep and being aware are contra¬
dictory, and I have disagreed above. But since it is true that
dream-awareness is not the same in every respect with waking-
awareness, e.g., in the possibility of offering behavioral evidence
to another person to show that one is aware, and since the attempt
to show that in dreams one is aware - in the dream sense - has been
forestalled by Malcolm's asserting that any evidence of awareness
establishes that one is not asleep, it would not be useful for me
to try to merely insist that dream-awareness is a kind of aware¬
ness.
One might say that we remember our dreams, and that a neces¬
sary condition of remembering something is having been aware of it,
and that therefore we must have been aware of a dream which is
later remembered. In reply, Malcolm says that one does not remem¬
ber a dream in the paradigmatic sense of "remember"; we 'remember'
dreams "because there is nothing outside of my account of the
dream ... to determine that my account is right or wrong." (P. 57)
I wonder xtfhether remembering and 'remembering' are clearly
distinguishable in their occurrence. That is, when one remembers,
can Jse tell right off that he is not 'remembering' or does he have
to find out from another person in order to know whether there was
something which he was axrnre of or whether it was a dream of which
he was not awarel If one 'remembered' dreams but remembered con-
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scious experiences, one should be able to distinguish these kinds
of remembering. But if we could distinguish these kinds of remem¬
bering, we could never be in doubt whether what we are remembering
really was a waking experience or a dream. At least some people
do remember (or 'remember') what they are unable to definitely
label either 'dream' or 'waking experience'.
One could further proliferate senses of remembering by point¬
ing out that one remembers (should we write it "'remembers'"?) in
another sense a twinge of pain that one had yesterday but told no
one about. This must be a further sense (beyond plain remembering
and 'remembering') because though there is nothing outside of one's
account of yesterday's pain to determine that the account is right
or Xtfrong, still yesterday another person could have been told about
the pain while one had it; no similar report could have been given
of the dream while one was having it. Still another sense of
"remember" (""remember""?) could be developed for feelings which
could but need not have behavioral expression, differing from
dreams in being reportable when they occur, differing from pains
in lacking a necessary connection - at least sometimes - with a
bodily state. No great ingenuity is required to provide senses
of "remember" which are still different for images, intentions,
memories, solitary actions.
But however many senses of "remember" we devise, is it not
the case that a necessary condition of remembering something is
having been aware of it? This condition applies to all the senses
of "remember". If so, we are brought to the conclusion that we
are axmre of dreams.
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One final point. Malcolm throughout Dreaming requires that
there he outward criteria for certainty. He makes this claim ex¬
plicitly about .judging, awareness, and remembering. I have been
denying this claim throughout this thesis and especially in this
discussion of Malcolm. V. C. Chappell in his critical study of
Dreaming (Philosophical Quarterly, April 1962) also denies that
there must be outward criteria, saying, "Nor do I see, as Malcolm
seems to hold, that it is only external, objective things that can
settle a question with certainty." (Op. cit., p. 184)
In this discussion Chappell argues that one can revise a
j 1
report "often ... on the basis of having remembered, or of having
remembered better or rightly, what [was] dreamed." (Ibid., p. 182)
Malcolm has claimed that
We speak of 'remembering' dreams, and if we consider this
expression it can appear to us to be a misuse of language.
When we think philosophically about memory the following sort
of paradigm comes most naturally to our minds: I spoke certain
words to you yesterday. Today I am requested to give an ac¬
count of what those words were. The account I give is right
or wrong. This is determined by whether it agrees xtfith your
account and that of other witnesses, perhaps also by whether
it is plausible in the light of tfhat is known about you and
me and the circumstances yesterday, and perhaps by still other
things. But when I speak of 'remembering' a dream there is
nothing outside of my account of the dream (provided that I
understand the words that compose it) to determine that my ac¬
count is right or wrong. I may amend it slightly on a decond
telling - but only slightly. If I changed it very much or
many times it would no longer be said that I was 'telling a
dream'. My verbal behaviour would be too unlike the behaviour
on which the concept of dreaming is founded. That something
is implausible or impossible does not go to show that I did
not dream it. In a dream I can do the impossible in every
sense of the word. ... Since nothing counts as determining
that my memory of my dream is right or wrong, what sense can
the word 'memory' have here?
But of course it is no misuse of language to speak of
'remembering a dream'. We are taught this expression. Only
we must be mindful of its actual use and of how sharply this
differs from the use of 'remembering' that appeared in our
paradigm. (Dreaming, pp. 58-7)
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Chappell replies that we ordinarily would allow that one can
correct or fill in his first account of his dream, and that if in
Celling a dream one first says that he can't he sure what happened
at a certain point but tries to say something about what it was
like, and then later is reminded by a later event in the dream what
was supposed to have happened earlier and confidently says: "I told
it wrong before",
Surely in this case we would grant that the dream-teller re¬
members later and that he didn't earlier. We must also grant,
I think, that, insofar as his later account conflicted with
the earlier and doesn't merely supplement it or fill it out,
he misremembered or remembered wrong before and now remembers
right. Not only he but we, I think, would treat his later ac¬
count as a correction of the earlier. As for the criterion of
correctness here, it is true that we have only the dream-
teller 's word. But he has, if not a criterion at least an
indication of correctness, namely his present assurance as
against his former uncertainty. (Chappell, op.cit., p. 183)
Since Chappell has reminded us that dream accounts can be cor¬
rected (we would properly say), Malcolm might allow that one remem¬
bers (not 'remembers') a dream. But before granting vrhat I have
further claimed, namely, that dreams are one kind of experiences,
he might fall back to the next line of defence, suggested by the
last, and say that even if what is ordinarily remembered is experi¬
ences and dreams are remembered, yet dream 'experiences' are not
experiences in the normal sense. He says almost as much.
One tells a dream under the influence of an impression - as if
one was faithfully recalling events that one witnessed, ...
'This "queer phenomenon" requires an explanation', we are
inclined to protest: 'The most likely explanation of our seem¬
ing to recall certain experiences from sleep is that we did
have those experiences while we slept'. But an texplanation'
explains nothing if it involves an unintelligible hypothesis.
Nothing can count for or against the truth of this hypothesis.
We can say either that there were experiences during sleep or
that there were not, as we like. (Dreaming, p. 86)
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I think that further argument about "experience" would not be
profitable, because Malcolm has already granted the concession I
am most intent on, namely, that there are two different ways of
coming to know that someone had a dream, one way in the case of
other persons, another in one's own case. It seems to me that he
must allow that one's knowledge of one's own dream could be private.
This is, I think, sufficient.
When one reads Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind, one is
struck by the richness and provocativeness of the language. The
subtlety and evocativeness of the style are hardly typical of
philosophical vrriting. But this book has made a great stir in
philosophical circles since it first appeared in 19^9.
Because of the style (Ryle admits that it is polemical), one
may not always know exactly what is being asserted or denied. What
phenomena he wants to re-allocate or how he means to re-allocate
them in his "logical geography" is not always clear to me, and it
may be that he is not entirely consistent in his denials and ad¬
missions. Indeed since I cannot decide whether Kyle's general po¬
sition in The Concept of Mind is eplstemological behaviorism or
metaphysical behaviorism, I shall almost always be directing an
objection to a particular passage which I would willingly grant
may not constitute Ryle's real or overall view.
One way of stating my position (which diverges from fashion¬
able contemporary philosophy of mind) is that I, along with all
the ordinary people I know insist on private experience as part of
what we mean by 'person'. Does Ryle allow private experience or
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not? (The sole basis for my remarks about Ryle's position is
The Concept of Mind though I realize he may ha\re expanded or modi¬
fied his position in his other published works.)
Sometimes I think that almost all that I have said about per¬
sons * including privacy, could be fitted in with what Ryle says
some place or other. But in some places it seems that Ryle is
denying private experience. In these places he goes beyond the
epistemological behaviorism (to which I have expressed my adherence)
to a metaphysical behaviorism, and denies - seemingly - the privacy
which he admits elsewhere.
To give some content to this rather vague charge and to pro¬
vide a set of passages with the apparently inconsistent stands, I
offer a list of pages with pro-private-experience passages, and a
list of pages with anti-privacy passages. I give these in one
place because I shall not discuss all of them and they should be
mentioned, at least, as defence against the defenders of Ryle who
might say (if I didn't even list a certain passage) that I had
overlooked a pertinent statement.
Passages allowing private experience are to be found on pp. 27,
34, 35, 40, 46-7, 58, 61, 167, 176, 182, 192, 270, 275, 307; passa¬
ges xtfhich seem to disallow private experience are found on pp. 54,
63, 64, 155, l6l, 164, 179, 180, 251, 265 (Gilbert Ryle, The Concept
of Mind, London, Hutchinson's University Library, 1949). To give
some idea of the content of these passages I shall here quote
three, one allowing private experience: "We speak of 'mental
arithmetic', of 'mind-reading' and of debates going on 'in the
mind', and it certainly is the case that what is in this sense
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mental is unwitnessable." (p. 3^); and two apparent denials of
privacy:
... the differences [between speaker and listener] are dif¬
ferences of degree, not of kind. The superiority of the
speaker's knowledge of what he is doing over that of the
listener does not indicate that he has Privileged Access to
facts of a type inevitably inaccessible to the listener, but
only that he is in a very good position to know what the lis¬
tener is often in a very poor position to knov/. (P. 179)
On the view for which I am arguing consciousness and intro¬
spection cannot be what they are officially described as
being since their supposed objects are myths. (P. 155)
Even after considering particular passages carefully a resi¬
dual perplexity remains; I cannot decide whether Ryle really does
slide back and forth between epistemological behaviorism and meta¬
physical behaviorism or whether his position remains constant and
only seems (to me?) to vary because of his language which is cal¬
culated as much to arouse as to pinpoint the property or phenomenon
that he is denying. Looking at the above passages, we might ask:
1) Is Privileged Access denied?
2) Is Privileged Access allowed, but the inaccessibility to
another person under any circumstances (the meaning of "inevitably"?)
of the facts found out by means of Privileged Access denied?
3) If Privileged Access is denied, how is one to explain the
fact (admitted in the first passage) that the speaker is in a very
good position to knoitf what the listener is often in a very poor
position to know?
If I were to venture an overall interpretation of Ryle's posi¬
tion in The Concept of Mind, I'd say with complete assurance that
he is denying mind-body dualism, with moderate assurance that he is
denying mental states and processes as causes of bodily state and
processes which are then effects. I would also say that Ryle is
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denying that to describe something as •mental' is identical with
saying that it is 'private' but on the contrary is asserting that
•mental' may also apply to behavior. But I would be less assured
about saying that Ryle is allowing experiences to be private, and
that the person whose experiences they are has an advantage in
knowing facts revealed in this way, but that such facts are not
logically private, i.e., incommunicable. The incommunicability
of private experience would be what Ryle's provocative denials are
directed to, on this interpretation.
I shall not defend the accuracy of this interpretation.
Rather I shall leave it and turn to discuss particular positions
at least some of which are not in agreement with positions I have
offered as parts of Ryle's general view. If I am mistaken in the
meaning I give to certain passages, the possibility of Ryle's
having a different view (more congenial to mine) is at least here
acknowledged.
To bring the differences betvjeen Ryle's view and mine into as
sharp focus as possible, I should like to concentrate on two related
but separable phenomena, ignorance of another person's states of
mind and lying. What I mean by ignorance and lying will be made
explicit, the actuality of the phenomena will be asserted, and then
the adequacy of the means Ryle has at his disposal will be evaluated.
The argumentation will consist in showing that my way of allowing
for ignorance and lying: consciousness, awareness or whatever one
wants to call it, is not sufficiently discredited by Ryle, though
xtfhat we are prepared to say about it may be modified as a result
of his criticism. I shall further argue that what Ryle himself
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allows (unwitnessable mental acts and silent soliloquy) cannot be
covered by his behavioristic means, nor is his account of lying
adequate.
It seems to me an indubitable fact that not all that one knows
is known by another person to be known by oneself. Or, to say it
differently, there is ignorance on the part of other persons re¬
garding what one knows oneself.
There are several places where Ryle agrees and I shall quote
four. Four is rather many but I should not want to seem to be
profiting from a single slip. It will be only fair to show that
Ryle holds as a considered opinion that others may not know what
is going on 'in one's head*.
We speak of 'mental arithmetic', and of 'mind-reading' and
of debates going on 'in the mind', and it certainly is the
case that what Is in this sense mental is unwitnessable. A
boy is said to be doing 'mental arithmetic' when instead of
writing down, or reciting aloud, the numerical symbols with
which he is operating, he says them to himself, performing
his calculations in silent soliloquy. Similarly a person is
said to be reading the mind of another when he describes
truly what the other is saying or picturing to himself in
auditor^ images. (P. 3^)
Boswell described Johnson's mind when he described how he
wrote, talked, ate, fidgeted and finned. His description was,
of course, incomplete, since there were notoriously some
thoughts which Johnson kept carefully to himself... (P. 58)
If you do not divulge the contents of your silent soliloquies
and other imaginings, I have no other sure way of finding out
what you have been saying or picturing to yourself. (P. 6l)
The objects of my retrospections are items in my autobiogra¬
phy. But although personal, they need not be, though they
can be, private or silent items of that autobiography. (P. 167)
A second equally certain fact is that people lie, and at least
sometimes are successful in deceiving their interlocutors. There
are various ways of deceiving people: verbal reports and behavior,
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as well as feigning. Ryle acknowledges the existence of charla¬
tans and hypocrites, "persons who simulate qualities which they
lack and dissimulate qualities which they possess." (P. 172) I
do not find a place where he explicitly recognizes lying as such.
But successful shamming entails some kind of deception and he has
recognized successful shamming; he says it is only a tautology to
say that "successful shamming is undetected". (P. 17^)
In Section C of Chapter 2 above, I argued that there was a
logical dependence of lying on ignorance; that is, successful
lying depends on ignorance of the liar's real thoughts on the
part of the deceived. I accounted for the ignorance by saying
that not all one's experiences have behavioral equivalents, or
necessary behavioral expressions. That is, one may have something
in mind or before the mind, and give out with something quite dif¬
ferent, verbally and/or behaviorally.
The concept 'lying' requires that one knowingly express in
word or deed what one does not believe with the intention of de¬
ceiving other persons. Clearly, lying depends on communicating. If
we never put across any thoughts or gave others information about
ourselves, false, deceptive reports and information would be impos¬
sible. And even in the case of a lie, a thought or intention is
communicated. What makes it a lie is that the real intention of
the liar (namely, the intention to deceive) is not the one under¬
stood by those who are deceived. That intention remains contin¬
gently private. I say contingently private because he may confess
his duplicity and then the intention to deceive will be made public.
Though we grant that lying requires that an intention be understood
by the deceived (i.e., the one that the liar wants to put across),
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still lying requires that there be another private intention which
is known only to the liar, an intention of which _he is aware but
xfhich the deceived do(es) not know about. This private aspect of
persons has been called consciousness, and so I have called it.
There may be serious disadvantages to this label but 'conscious¬
ness1 seemed a reasonable, not non-standard way to philosophically
allow for lying and ignorance.
Ryle hox/ever objects to 'consciousness' so we shall examine
his objections to see the force of them and to answer them, if
possible. And then we can see how he accounts for lying.
In Chapter VI of The Concept of Mind, "Self-Knowledge" ,
he intends to shovi among other things
that the official theories of consciousness and introspection
are logical muddles. But I am not, of course, trying to es¬
tablish that we do not or cannot know what there is to know
about ourselves. On the contrary, I shall try to show how
vie attain such knowledge, but only after I have proved that
this knowledge is not attained by consciousness or intro¬
spection, as these supposed Privileged Accesses are normally
described. (P. 155)
Ryle offers four arguments against knowledge of ourselves
being attained by consciousness or introspection.
First, and this is not intended to be more than a per¬
suasive argument, no one who is uncommitted to a philosophical
theory ever tries to vindicate any of his assertions of fact
by saying that he found it out 'from consciousness', or 'as a
direct deliverance of consciousness', or 'from immediate
awareness'. He will back up some of his assertions of fact
by saying that he himself sees, hears, feels, smells or tastes
so and so; he will back up other such statements, somewhat
more tentatively, by saying that he remembers seeing, hearing,
feeling, smelling or tasting it. But if asked whether he
really knows, believes, infers, fears, remembers or smells
something, he never replies 'Oh yes, certainly I do, for I am
conscious and even vividly conscious of doing so'. Yet just
such a reply should, according to the doctrine, be his final
appeal. (P. l6l)
There are circumstances where a person would have recourse to
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'consciousness', but the word "consciousness" might not be used
explicitly but would all the same be relied upon. It would 'go
without saying* that the reason why he knows that he smells some¬
thing is because he is conscious of his smelling it. Even allow¬
ing that no one ever backed up his assertions of fact by saying
explicitly that he found it out 'from immediate awareness' or
'from consciousness', still that this would amount to proof that
knowledge of ourselves is never attained by consciousness or in¬
trospection is dubious. Suppose we imagine the conversation with
the person uncommitted to a philosophical theory. He is asked:
"How do you know the tea is hot?" He answers (reasonably): "I
tasted it." He and I would be astonished and perplexed if it was
then concluded "Knowledge of ourselves consequently is not at¬
tained by means of consciousness or introspection". Or would the
conclusion be put in the form: "Therefore you (the uncommitted
man) are not conscious of your tasting the tea." What precisely
is the conclusion to be?
If a person is challenged, "Do you really know (believe, infer,
fear, remember, smell) what you've Just stated?", he cannot use his
consciousness of his knowing (believing, etc.) because this con¬
sciousness accompanies and is a necessary condition of all his
assertions of knowledge (belief, etc.), so that consciousness is
not a special guarantee which is what seems to be asked for with
such a challenge. After a belief has been asserted and challenged,
there is a superfluousness in saying, "I am conscious of it," to
defend his statement because he thinks he had to be conscious of it
in the first place in order to assert it. Why add his conscious¬
ness of his asserted belief which for him 'goes without saying'I
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Only a man committed to a philosophical theory would even consider
the possibility that a man might state a belief without being
conscious of that belief. The uncommitted man may not assert
that he is conscious of his beliefs. This however is not equiva¬
lent to the assertion that he is not conscious of them.
Ryle's second argument.
Next, it is supposed that my being conscious of my men¬
tal states and operations either is my knowing them, or is
the necessary and sufficient ground for my doing so. But to
say this is to abuse the logic and even the grammar of the
verb 'to know'. It is nonsense to speak of knowing, or not
knowing, this clap of thunder or that twinge of pain, this
coloured surface or that act of drawing a conclusion or see¬
ing a joke; these are accusatives/of the wrong types to follow
the verb 'to know'. To know and to be ignorant are to know
and not to know that something is the case, for example that
that rumble is a clap of thunder or that that coloured surface
is a cheese-rind. And this is just the point inhere the meta¬
phor of light is unhelpful. Good illumination helps us to see
cheese-rinds, but we could not say 'the light was too bad for
me to know the cheese-rind', since knowing is not the same sort
of thing as looking at, and what is known is not the same sort
of thing as what is illuminated. True, we can say 'owing to
the darkness I could not recognise what I saw for a cheese-
rind', but again recognizing what I see is not another optical
performance. We do not ask for one torch to help us to see
and another to help us to recognise what we see. So even if
there were some analogy between a thing's being illuminated
and a mental process's being conscious, it x^ould not follow
that the owner of the process would recognise that process for
what it was. It might conceivably explain how mental processes
itfere discernible but it could not possibly explain how we as¬
certain truths and avoid or correct mistakes about them.
(P. 162)
There are several issues here, some of which Ryle is plainly
right about.
First. Good English usage does not - as he says - allow us
to say "know claps of thunder", "know coloured surfaces".
Secondly, Ryle is right about there being difficulties with
describing consciousness as analogous to light.
Thirdly. Being conscious of a judgment is not always a suffi-
280
cient condition of that judgment's being true. I am not too sure
that this is the meaning of the last two sentences of the quoted
argument above but if that is its meaning, I agree. I too would
want to say, and I think most people would, that my being conscious
of my .judging that what I saw was a cheese-rind is not tout court
a sufficient condition of its being a cheese-rind.
Suppose we even grant that we may not say in ordinary English
that we know mental processes. Is this a sufficient reason for
concluding that we are not conscious of mental processes? No, I
would say. There are differences between "knowing" and "being
conscious of" such that we may not use these phrases interchange¬
ably. But we can re-phrase English sentences in such a way that
we can say that we know x^hat we are conscious of, at least in
some cases. E.g., "I am conscious of a twinge of pain" can be
translated into "I knoxi/ that I am feeling a twinge of pain" said
perhaps to someone trying to get us over our complaint by pooh-
poohing it.
The third argument.
Next, there is no contradiction in asserting that some¬
one might fail to recognise his frame of mind for what it is;
indeed, it is notorious that people constantly do so. They
mistakenly suppose themselves to know things which are actual¬
ly false; they deceive themselves about their own motives;
they are surprised to notice the clock stopped ticking, with¬
out their having, as they think, been aware that it had been
ticking; they do not know that they are dreaming, when they
are dreaming, and sometimes they are not sure that they are
not dreaming, when they are ax*ake; and they deny, in good
faith, that they are irritated or excited when they are
flustered in one or other of those ways. If consciousness
were what it is described as being, it would be logically
impossible for such failures and mistakes in recognition to
take place. (P. 162)
There are several important warnings here. Not only is con¬
sciousness of a fact or judgment not always a sufficient condition
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of its truth but being conscious of something is not a necessary
condition of that something's being in the mind or being appro¬
priate),|(i.e., truly) ascribed to the mind. That is, there may
be things taken into the mind unconsciously, like the clock's
ticking. Or it may be that there are mental predicates like
'excited' or 'greedy' (a motive word?) which can appropriately
be ascribed sometimes to a person though that person to whom the
predicate is ascribed may deny feeling excited or greedy. It is
not the case that 'excited' is ascribable solely on the basis of
a feeling or solely on the basis of a report of a feeling; 'exci¬
ted' is also applied to a person on the basis of his behavior. So
it will not come as any surprise that we are sometimes ready to
label a person 'excited' who does not himself feel excited. Help¬
ful as these reminders may be they do not constitute a reason for
saying that we are never conscious of our mental processes.
The fourth and last argument against consciousness.
Finally, even though the self-intimation supposed to be
inherent in any mental state or process is not described as
requiring a separate act of attention, or as constituting a
separate cognitive operation, still what I am conscious of
in a process of inferring, say, is different from what the
inferring is an apprehension of. My consciousness is of a
process of inferring, but my inferring is, perhaps, of a
geometrical conclusion from geometrical premisses. The
verbal expression of my inference might be, 'because this is
an equilateral triangle, therefore each angle is 60 degrees',
but the verbal expression of what I am conscious of might be
'Here I am deducing such and such from so and so'. But, if
so, then it would seem to make sense to ask whether, according
to the doctrine, I am not also conscious of being conscious of
being conscious of inferring, that is, in a position to say
'Here I am spotting the fact that here I am deducing such and
such from so and so'. And then there would be no stopping-
place; there would have to be an infinite number of onion¬
skins of consciousness embedding any mental state or process
whatsoever. If this conclusion is rejected, then it will have
to be allotted that some elements in mental processes are not
themselves things we can be conscious of, namely those elements
which constitute the supposed outermost self-intimation of
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mental processes; and then 'conscious' could no longer be
retained as part of the definition of 'mental'. (P. 162-3)
As I see the argument it consists in saying: if any conscious
state or process can be made the object of consciousness (though
not "requiring", line 3 above, to be made an object of a further
act of consciousness to be conscious), then if any mental process,
_c, is not made the object of a further conscious process, that
process, jc, is not conscious. Therefore 'conscious' is no part of
the meaning of 'mental'.
There is one major error in this argument, as I have inter¬
preted it. To say that an x has a property is not equivalent to
saying that the property mentioned is a necessary condition of the
x being an x- In the case before us: to say that a conscious pro¬
cess may be made the object of a further conscious process is not
to say that a necessary condition of a conscious act's being con¬
scious is that it be made the object of a further conscious pro¬
cess. Looking at Ryle's example: if one makes an inference, that
inference is already a conscious process, as 'conscious' is common¬
ly used and as I have used it. It is true that one could be con¬
scious at another time of the process of inferring. But this
second conscious act is not required to make the first process of
inferring conscious. The conclusion that 'conscious' is not part
of the definition of 'mental' fails, though Ryle may mean that
'conscious' is not a necessary part of everything mental; with
this I agree, as I have already indicated in Chapter 2.
Ryle summarizes the result of the four arguments:
The argument, then, that mental events are authentic,
because the deliverances of consciousness are direct and un¬
impeachable testimony to their existence, must be rejected.
(P. 163)
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The net results of these four arguments seem to me to be
three (important) ones: 1) consciousness may not give unimpeach¬
able testimony concerning the exact nature of the conscious process
or its genesis or object; 2) there may be mental processes and
states in addition to those which are testified to by consciousness
(e.g., unconscious mental processes), and 3) 'conscious* is not a
necessary part of 'mental', or to say it differently, not everything
described as 'mental' must be described as 'conscious'. Ho one of
these alone nor any combination of them is equivalent to saying
that 4) it is false that the deliverances of consciousness are
direct and unimpeachable testimony to the existence of mental
events. 4) cannot be gotten from 1) and 2) because even though
there may be mis-labelings and mistakes by consciousness, still
there must be something about which one is mistaken, and that there
are more things in the mind than one is conscious of is not to say
that what one is conscious of is non-existent. Nor can 4) be got
some mental things are not conscious is not equivalent to saying
that no mental things are conscious.
The upshot of all this is, as I see it, that Kyle has not
given us here any good reason to reject the common belief that
some knoxtfledge of ourselves is attained by means of consciousness,
nor has he here (nor elsewhere in The Concept of Mind so far as I
can tell) disproved that we have privileged access to our conscious
states and processes, nor has he shown that conscious mental pro¬
cesses do not exist.
Next Ryle turns to a consideration of introspection. If I am
correct, Ryle wants to discredit consciousness and introspection in
from any combination of 1) and 2) with that
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order to deny privileged access. The reason why he wants to deny
privileged access is to restore "knowledge of what there is to be
known about other people ... to approximate parity with self-
knowledge." (P. 155) And he wants to have this guaranteed in
order to avoid solipsism. "To drop the hope of Privileged Access
is also to drop the fear of epistemological isolationism; we lose
the bitters with the sweets of Solipsism." (P. 156)
It is in this chapter on self-knowledge that Kyle's being a
metaphysical behaviorist seems least questionable. He says: "On
the view for which I am arguing consciousness and introspection
cannot be what they are officially described as being, since their
supposed objects are myths ..." (P. 155) And "it is the negative
object of this book to deny ... that there exist events of the
postulated ghostly status". (P. 164) These "ghostly events" are
what we would normally call experiences. It seems that he intends
to show that there are no such things by denying both consciousness
and introspection, i.e., "'regarding', in a non-optical sense, some
current mental state or process". (P. 163)
One argument against introspection that Ryle gives is:
[E]ven if it is claimed that in introspecting we are attend¬
ing twice at once, it will be allowed that there is some limit
to the number of possible synchronous acts of attention, and
from this it follows that there must be some mental processes
which are unintrospectible, namely, those introspections which
incorporate the maximum possible number of synchronous acts of
attention. The question would then arise for the holders of
the theory how these acts would be found occurring, since if
this knowledge was not introspectively got, it would follow
that a person's knowledge of his own mental processes could
not always be based on introspection. But if this knowledge
does not always rest on introspection, it is open to question
whether it ever does. This objection might be countered by-
appeal to the other form of Privileged Access; we know that we
introspect not by introspecting on our introspections, but from
the direct deliverances of consciousness. (P. 165)
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This argument is like the fourth one against consciousness.
If a regress of introspections is possible, and the last mental
process in the series is not introspected, then some knowledge of
oneself is not based on introspection. "But if this knowledge does
not always rest on introspection, it is open to question whether it
ever does."
My answer might be to paraphrase the latter with a homelier
example: if some apples are not red, it is open to question whether
any are.
Less flippantly my ansx^er would, predictably, be the one Ryle
expects to be appealed to: we know that we introspect not by in¬
trospecting on our introspections, but from the direct deliverances
of consciousness. If consciousness has not been discredited as a
means of getting knowledge of one's mental processes (and I have
tried to show that it has not been), then it seems to be a re¬
spectable rejoinder.
The next objection is v/orded rather colorfully.
When psychologists were less cautious than they have
since become, they used to maintain that introspection was
the main source of empirical information about the workings
of minds. They were not unnaturally embarrassed to discover
that the empirical facts reported by one psychologist some¬
times conflicted with those reported by another. They re¬
proached one another, often justly, with having professed to
find by introspection just those mental phenomena which their
preconceived theories had led them to expect to find. There
still occur disputes xfhich should be finally soluble by in¬
trospection, if the joint theories of the inner life and
inner perception were true. Theorists dispute, for example,
whether there are activities of conscience distinct from
those of intellect and distinct from habitual deferences to
taboos. Why do they not look and see? Or, if they do so,
\-ihy do their reports not tally? Again, many people who
theorise about human conduct declare that there occur certain
processes sui generis ansxrering to the description of Voli¬
tionsI have argued that there are no such processes. Why
do we argue about the existence of these processes, when the
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question ought to be as easily decidable as the question
\tfhether or not there is a smell of onions in the larder?
(P. 165-6)
I think that this amounts to saying that introspection as a
means of getting knowledge of one's mental states and processes is
discredited because if introspection were *7hat it is claimed to be,
we should always be able to label our mental states correctly and
give a final and accurate account of their genesis. This is, I
believe, an implausible argument. Who x^ould claim that introspec¬
tion - to have any status at all as a means of getting knowledge
about one's mental states and processes - must be infallible in
the labels it attaches to mental states? Who would claim that by
introspectively regarding a moral feeling one can judge whether it
is the product of intellect or was produced by habitual deference
to taboo? I see no reason why someone who holds that there is a
non-optical 'regarding' of current mental states must claim that
this regarding must provide labels unfailingly accurate any more
than some one claiming that there is an optical regarding of ob¬
jects is obliged to assert that vision always can tell whether an
orange is real or wax, or whether it came from Texas or Florida.
The last objection offered against the claims for introspection
is that some states of mind, such as panic or fury, cannot be "cool¬
ly scrutinised". Yet we do not lack information about these states
of mind.
If retrospection can give us the data we need for our knowledge
of some states of mind, there is no reason why it shotild not do
so for all. And this is just what seems to be suggested by the
popular phrase 'to catch oneself doing so and so'. We catch,
as we pursue and overtake, what is already running away from
us. I catch myself daydreaming about a mountain walk after,
perhaps very shortly after, I have begun the daydream; or I
catch myself humming a particular air only when the first few
notes have already been hummed. Retrospection, prompt or de-
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layed, is a genuine process and one which is exempt from the
troubles ensuing from the assumption of multiply divided at¬
tention; it is also exempt from the troubles ensuing from the
assumption that violent agitations could be the objects of
cool, contemporary scrutiny.
Part, then, of what people have in mind, when they speak
familiarly of introspecting, is this authentic process of
retrospection. But there is nothing intrinsically ghostly
about the objects of retrospection. In the same way that I
can catch myself daydreaming, I can catch myself scratching;
in the same way that I can catch myself engaged in a piece
of silent soliloquy, I can catch myself saying something
aloud. (P. 166)
Retrospection is Ryle's alternative to introspection. I
shall not argue the merits of introspection over retrospection. I
do not refuse to accept 'retrospection' because (contrary to x*hat
Ryle seems to think) it seems to me that retrospection can provide
privacy for those objects which would have been introspected if
retrospection had not been substituted, i.e., for objects like
day-dreams, silent soliloquies, memories, episodic feelings, etc.
It seems that Ryle thinks that if he can show that some things
that are retrospected are public, he is entitled to assert that
none of the retrospected objects are "ghostly".
That not all of the retrospected objects are public can be
seen from considering a few questions.
Do I really catch myself daydreaming in exactly the same way
that I catch myself scratching? Does the daydream have the same
status as the scratching? No. Another person could catch me
scratching and have quite as much information about the scratching
as I would have. But if another person caught me daydreaming, his
information would be significantly different from and inferior in
completeness regarding the contents of the daydream to my own.
Even if I were willing to admit that he was right, that I was day¬
dreaming, I would know the contents of my daydream before telling
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and without telling him; he would know only if I told, and only
what I told, though I could tell. The retrospected object, the
daydream, is private. The publicness of scratching does not rub
off on it.
It is true and important that what I recall is always
something expressible in the form 'myself doing so and so'.
I recall not a clap of thunder but hearing the clap of thun¬
der; or I catch myself swearing, but I do not, in the same
sense, catch you swearing. The objects of my retrospections
are items in my autobiography. But although personal, they
need not be, though they can be, private or silent items of
that autobiography. ...
The fact that retrospection is autobiographical does
not imply that it gives us a Privileged Access to facts of a
special status. (P. 167)
There are several admissions which I should like to draw
particular attention to.
1) What is retrospected is always expressible in the form
"myself doing so and so".
2) I do not catch - in the same sense - another person doing
something.
3) The items retrospected can be private.
Retrospection then is a means of getting knowledge about oneself
only. It Is a method of catching myself doing something, not a
way of catching other people doing something. It is not a method
which one uses to get knowledge of other persons. And some of the
items are private. The discussion above and elsewhere gives what
I understand by 'private'. I do not think that Ryle's meaning is
different. So retrospection delivers to oneself information which
others cannot get in the same way. I do not see that anything more
is needed for Privileged Access.
We may recapitulate what we have done so far. I pointed out
that Ryle and I are agreed that ignorance of another's mental states
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and processes, and lying are actual phenomena. What is meant by
this ignorance and lying was discussed and I claimed that lying
is logically dependent on ignorance. I repeated what I had as¬
serted in Chapter 2, namely, that consciousness is the ordinary
way to allow for the private aspect of persons that ignorance and
lying require. Then I examined Ryle's arguments against conscious¬
ness and introspection to see how telling his objections were. And
now we are to see what positive account Ryle gives of private men¬
tal processes and states and of lying.
What positive account does he give of the private objects of
retrospection (p. 167) or unspoken soliloquies or silent behaviour
(p. 169)? He denies Privileged Access but does not give any clear
answer to questions like: what is silent behaviour? How does one
knovr his unspoken soliloquies before they are retrospected which
allows them to be retrospected? We are only told how others come
to know such things, namely, through reports and behavior.
But the inadequacy of the positive account can be seen most
clearly as regards lying so I shall concentrate on showing that
inadequacy in detail.
Ryle has acknowledged the existence of successful shamming
(pp. 102, 133a 172). I cannot find any place where he discusses
lying.
Let us begin by considering the notion of pretending,
a notion which is partly constitutive of such notions as
those of cheating, acting a part, playing bears, shamming
sick and hypochondria. It will be noticed that in some
varieties of make-believe, the pretender is deliberately-
simulating or dissimulating, in some varieties he may not
be quite sure to what extent, if any, he is simulating or
dissimulating, and in other varieties he is completely
taken in by his own acting. (P. 258)
Shamming, cheating, malingering, and, I believe, lying,
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will all be subsumed under pretending.
There are lots of different sorts of pretending, dif¬
ferent motives from which people pretend and different cri¬
teria by which pretences are assessed as skilful or unskilful.
The child pretends for fun, the hypocrite for profit, the
hypochondriac from morbid egotism, the spy, sometimes, from
patriotism, the actor, sometimes, for art's sake, and the
cooking instructress for demonstration purposes. (P. 260)
He discusses a case of sham-fighting and then goes on:
The central point illustrated by these cases is that a
mock-performance may be unitary as an action though there is
an intrinsic duality in its description. Only one thing is
done, yet to say what is done requires a sentence containing,
at the least, both a main clause and a subordinate clause.
To recognise this is to see why there is no more than a verbal
appearance of a contradiction in saying of an actor, playing
the part of an idiot, that he is grimacing in an idiotic man¬
ner in a highly intelligent manner; or of a clown that he is
deftly clumsy and brilliantly inane. The scathing adjective
attaches to the conduct mentioned in the subordinate clause
of the description and the flattering adjective or adverb to
the activity mentioned in the main clause, yet only one set of
motions is executed. (P. 261)
I take it that it is important for him to deny that there is
an intrinsic duality in the action (a pretending something) because
if he allows a duality, it will consist in private thought(s) and
public behavior. Such private thought known by the pretender but
not in the same way by the onlookers is what Ryle has been at pains
to deny throughout the book. So he will not admit it here if he
can keep from it.
His means of avoiding it here is the notion of 'higher order
actions' defined as "those the descriptions of which involve the
oblique mention of other actions." (P. 191) Pretending is one
kind of higher order action because to describe the pretence one
must mention the act which is being simulated.
Now let us consider a case of lying. You ask me a direct
question: "Did you read this letter?" The fact is that I did and
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that I know I did, but wanting you to believe that I did not, I
say, with the intention of deceiving you, "No, I didn't." You
then say, "Read it. I want to hear what you think about it." So
I read it in front of you as if I had never read it before which
will make subsequent detection all the more difficult because now
I have a right to know what is in the letter and cannot give away
my having deceived you by inadvertently revealing knoxtfledge of the
letter's contents. I have lied to you, succeeded in deceiving
you. To me my action was a 'higher order action' because I know
that I am pretending not to have read the letter. To you the
action is not a higher order action. I know something that you
don't and won't, if I can help it.
How is Ryle to account for my intention to deceive which I
am as careful as I can be not to reveal? Acting and some other
y
kings of pretending are not lies because both actor and onlooker
know that the actor is acting. Ryle grants that acting is not
the same as lying.
It is, moreover, always possible for a person to take others
or himself in by acting a part (as the spectators are not
taken in at the theatre, since they have paid to see people
who advertise themselves as actors). (P. 172-3)
We may not need any private aspect of mind to which the actor has
privileged access to understand acting (though if we keep in mind
that the actor may be remembering cues and other stage business
even this may be doubtful) as we do for lying because otherxtfise we
alter our concept of lying which requires an intention expressed
verbally or behaviorally and a secret intention 'behind' the be¬
havior or report. We cannot do away with what is 'behind' the
behavior altogether because if everything is reduced to behavior
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or a disposition to behave, the contemporaneous existence of the
intention to deceive and the report or action intended to deceive
disappears, and with it what we mean by 'lying'.
Therefore I conclude that a behaviorism which denies private
aspects of mind to which each person has privileged access cannot
account for lying.
I want to require a private aspect to persons not only to
allow for lying but for other facts about persons too. I have
concentrated on .lying here because it seems to me that with this
phenomenon as we know it the need for a private aspect to persons
is most obvious.
But I should not like the differences between Ryle's vievjs
on persons and mine to seem greater than they really are so in
summary I shall give a list of propositions that I think Ryle
holds and believes important which I am in agreement with.
1. Cartesian mind-body dualism is inadequate as a theory of
persons.
2. Not everything that can be described as 'mental' can be
described as 'conscious'.
3. What we know about other persons is known on the basis of
hearing their reports and observing their behavior.
4. Character and competence predicates are ascribed largely
on the basis of performance in one's own case as well as in the
case of other persons.
These four propositions would also be agreed to by P. F. Straw-
son who wrote the last book itfe are to consider in this chapter.
His book, Individuals, the sole source for the views I call his in
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this chapter, is a very important one on the contemporary philo¬
sophical scene.
As I have already referred approvingly to this book, it will
probably be apparent that there is far less disagreement betxfeen
Strawson1s view and mine than between my views and the views of
either Malcolm or Ryle. (Of course, this is my opinion; Strawson
may disagree.}
Since I am in agreement with many of Strawson's views on
persons, the procedure I shall follow is to give his views and
then show that my position is like or at least consistent with
his, or I shall raise a question.
[I]t is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of
consciousness, experiences, to oneself, in the way one does,
that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe
them, to others who are not oneself. ... It means, for ex¬
ample, that the ascribing phrases are used in just the same
sense when the subject is another as when the subject is
oneself. ... One can ascribe states of consciousness to
oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can
ascribe them to others only If one can identify other sub¬
jects of experience. And one cannot identify others if one
can identify them only as subjects of experience, possessors
of states of consciousness. (P. F. Strawson. Individuals.
Pp. 99-100)
I have been saying that we can and do communicate our experi¬
ences, states of consciousness, using words and phrases (and com¬
munally understood kinds of behavior) which mean the same in the
case of others and in my own case. But in order to know another's
experience, he must communicate it via his body because we cannot
gei pure states of consciousness in other ways, say, telepathy,
with any high degree of reliability. And if we could and did,
there would seem to be the logical problem of knowing whose ex¬
periences they are.
Straitfson claims that the concept 'person' is logically prior
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to 'body' or 'consciousness'.
What we have to acknowledge, ... is the primitiveness of
the concept of a person. What I mean by the concept of a per¬
son is the concept of a type of entity such that both predi¬
cates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascrib¬
ing corporeal characteristics, a physical" "situation &c. are
eaually applicable to a single individual of the single type.
(P. 102)
There would be no question of ascribing one's own states of
consciousness, or experiences, to anything, unless one also
ascribed, or were ready and able to ascribe, states of con¬
sciousness, or experiences, to other individual entities of
the same logical type as that thing to which one ascribes one's
own states of consciousness. The condition of reckoning oneself
as a subject of such predicates is that one should also reckon
others as subjects of such predicates. The condition, in turn,
of this being possible, is that one should be able to distin¬
guish from one another, to pick out or identify, different sub¬
jects of such predicates, i.e. different individuals of the
type concerned. The condition, in turn, of this being possi¬
ble is that the individuals concerned, including oneself,
should be of a certain unique type: of a type, namely, such
that to each individual of that type there must be ascribed,
or ascribable, both states of consciousness and corporeal
characteristics"! [P. 104)
Since I have spent more space and effort insisting on con¬
sciousness, perhaps someone might think that I mean for 'conscious¬
ness' to be logically fundamental, not 'person' including both Con¬
sciousness' and 'body'. But I x^ould remind him of my insistence
on the need for bodies to communicate experiences and the need for
bodies if we are to be "personified", i.e., made into persons. My
requirements emphasize communication and the genesis of persons,
taking as given the community of persons as we have them. If
there is any disagreement on this point between my viextf and Straw-
. {W>
son's, it consists in my reluctance to require that could never be
any method of identifying subjects of experience who lacked bodies,
which Strawson may be requiring. It is to me conceivable that dis¬
embodied subjects, e.g., angels, could be identifiable to each
other, though I can not provide in detail methods of identification.
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Perhaps it might be like an overall aesthetic 'feel' to each sub¬
ject which would be distinguishable and unique to each subject,
like, in some ways, the master-sound each individual has in Straw-
son's chapter, "Sounds". But I would not press this possibility,
and would readily grant that with what we actually have, subjects
of experience are identifiable only by means of their bodies.
There are, according to Strawson, two kinds of predicates
which properly apply to persons.
The first kind of predicate consists of those which are also
properly applied to material bodies to which we would not
dream of applying predicates ascribing states of conscious¬
ness. I will cail this first kind M-predicates and they in¬
clude things like 'weighs 10 stone', 'is in the drawing-room'
and so on. The second kind consists of all the other predi¬
cates we apply to persons. These I shall call P-predicates.
P-predicates, of course, will be very various. They will in¬
clude things like 'is smiling', 'is going for a walk*, as
well as things like 'is in pain', 'is thinking hard', 'be¬
lieves in God' and so on. (P. 104)
Strawson in elaborating on these predicates says that the 'I' to
which M-predicates and P-predicates are ascribed is not to be un¬
derstood as ambiguous, meaning a consciousness sometimes and a
particular huma.n body sometimes.
That is, if we are to avoid the general form of this error,
we must not think of 'I' or 'Smith' as suffering from type-
ambiguity. Indeed, if we want to locate type-ambiguity some¬
where, we would do better to locate it in certain predicates
like 'is in the drawing-room' 'was hit by a stone' &c., and
say they mean one thing when applied to material objects and
another when applied to persons. (P. 105)
P-predicates can be ascribed to persons but perhaps another kind
of ambiguity must be located in them since they imply consciousness
but lower animals can also be conscious.
For though not all P-predicates are what we should call
'predicates ascribing states of consciousness' (e.g., 'going
for a walk' is not), they may be said to have this in common,
that they imply the possession of consciousness on the part
of that to which they are ascribed. (P. 105)
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It can easily be seen that Ttfhat appears to be a P-predicate may
be ascribed to lower animals, which Strawson does not mention.
One might say, "My dog is going for a walk" or ascribe to a lower
animal some other predicate which is not an M-predicate but rather
one of "all the others we apply to persons" or a P-predicate. It
would seem that some P-predlcates can be applied and are applied
to lower animals, but we would not want to say then that we say
the same things about animals and persons, that if P-predicates
"imply consciousness", they imply consciousness in the same sense
in both persons and animals.
Following the model given above we might conclude that 'is
taking a walk1 and other P-pred.ieates which can be applied to
animals too are ambiguous (like 'is in the drawing room' x*as said
to be ambiguous) meaning one thing when applied to conscious ani¬
mals other than man and another when applied to persons. It seems
at least as clear that 'is going for a walk' means something dif¬
ferent when applied to animals from what it means when applied to
persons as 'is in the drawing room' means something different when
applied to objects from what it means when applied to persons.
This might be a good place to bring up two questions related
to the matter of the logical priority of 'person' and the logically
secondary status of 'consciousness'. I have argued above (p. 105ff.)
that a young child learns language and behavior by imitating persons
around him, and that imitating requires something not-public in the
child, so that there is something not-public given in and not
learned by the child.
This not-public something in the child is the animal conscious¬
ness, I am prepared to say. By 'animal consciousness' I mean 'that
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consciousness which we attribute to non-person animals'. Before
a child is self-conscious or using language at all, he experiences;
he smells things, feels warm or cold, sees, etc., or we ordinarily
believe that he does as we believe that the higher animals also do.
And we further believe that consciousness (though not self-conscious¬
ness) is necessary in order for any animal to see, hear, etc. I
hardly think that Straitfson, who seems so sensible and so sensitive
to what ordinary practices presuppose, would take the Cartesian
position that animals are only machines and do not feel or have
any sort of conscious experience.
I should have liked Strawson to answer two questions in order
to clarify certain issues.
First. Is there an animal consciousness given which is ne¬
cessary to that animal's becoming a self-conscious person? If one
says that a person Is conscious, one should make clear whether
'consciousness' could be applied univocally to other animals. I
itfould say that it cannot, because a person can be conscious of
himself or self-conscious in a way that we think animals can not
be.
Second. If xue say that 'person' is logically prior, and that
'consciousness' is logically secondary, are we committed to saying
that a person is temporally prior to his consciousness? I do not
think that Strawson would want to say so. I myself would say that
consciousness (in the sense of animal consciousness) is temporally
prior to person and self-consciousness (which is a necessary condi¬
tion of being a person). But Strawson has not discussed the dif¬
ference between animal consciousness and self-consciousness, so I
cannot be sure what he would say.
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Indeed* a criticism that I have of Individuals is that cer¬
tain issues are not discussed, perhaps not even mentioned. In this
case, I should have liked to see a discussion of the differences
"between animal consciousness and the consciousness of persons. But
a reasonable reply to my criticism might be: you want a discussion
of that problem and someone else feels the need of a discussion of
some other problem; in a single book one cannot discuss everything.
Strawson next goes on to consider how P-predicates are as¬
cribed.
Clearly there is no sense in talking of identifiable indivi¬
duals of a special type, a type, namely, such that they pos¬
sess both M-predicates and P-predicates, unless there is in
principle some way of telling, with regard to any individual
of that type, and any P-predicate, whether that individual
possesses that P-predicate. And, in the case of at least
some P-predicates, the ways of telling must constitute in
some sense logically adequate kinds of criteria for the as¬
cription of the P-predicate. ... [0]ne ascribes P-predicates
to others on the strength of observation of their behaviour;
and the behaviour-criteria one goes on are not just signs of
the presence of what is meant by the P-predicate, but are
criteria of a logically adequate kind for the ascription of
the P-predicate. (Pp. 105-£)
So far this is not different from Malcolm's criteriological view
but Strawson goes on to insist on what Malcolm seems to allow only
grudgingly and what some readers (perhaps careless ones) do not
see at all, namely, that we have a different basis for ascribing
some predicates to ourselves from the criteria we use in the case
of other persons.
But this is only one half of the picture about P-predi¬
cates. For of course it is true of some important classes of
P-predicates, that when one ascribes them to oneself, one
does not do so on the strength of observation of those be¬
haviour criteria on the strength of which one ascribes them
to others. This is not true of all P-predicates. It is not,
in general, true of those which carry assessments of character
or capability: these, when self-ascribed, are in general as¬
cribed on the same basis as that on which they are ascribed
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to others. Even of those P-predicates of which it is true
that one does not generally ascribe them to oneself on the
basis of the criteria on the strength of which one ascribes
them to others, there are many of which it is also true that
their ascription is liable to correction by the self-ascriber
on this basis. But there remain many cases in which one has
an entirely adequate basis for ascribing a P-predicate to
oneself, and yet in which this basis is quite distinct from
those on which one ascribes the predicate to another. Thus
one says, reporting a present state of mind or feeling: 'I
feel tired, am depressed, am in pain'. (P. 107)
Strawson realizes that there may be an objection raised at this
point.
How can this fact be reconciled with the doctrine that the
criteria on the strength of which one ascribes P-predicates
to others are criteria of a logically adequate kind for this
ascription?
The apparent difficulty of bringing about this reconcili¬
ation may tempt us in many directions. It may tempt us, for
example, to deny that these self-ascriptions are really as-
criptive at all, to assimilate first-person ascriptions of
states of consciousness to those other forms of behaviour
which constitute criteria on the basis of which one person
ascribes P-predicates to another. This device seems to
avoid the difficulty; it is not, in all cases, entirely in¬
appropriate. But it obscures the facts; and is needless.
(P. 107)
This device is one Ryle seems to use, one form of what I have
called metaphysical behaviorism. I am gratified that Strawson
rejects it.
It is merely a sophisticated form of failure to recognize the
special character of P-predicates, or, rather, of a crucial
class of P-predicates. For just as there is not in general
one primary process of learning, or teaching oneself, an inner
private meaning for predicates of this class, then another
process of learning to apply such predicates to others on the
strength of a correlation, noted in one's own case, with cer¬
tain forms of behaviour, so - and equally - there is not in
general one primary process of learning to apply such predi¬
cates to others on the strength of behaviour criteria, and
then another process of acquiring the secondary technique of
exhibiting a new form of behaviour, viz., first-person P~
utterances. Both these pictures are refusals to acknowledge
the unique logical character of the predicates concerned. ...
[I]t is essential to the character of these predicates that
they have both first- and third-person ascriptive uses, that
they are both self-ascribable otherwise than on the basis of
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observation of the behaviour of the subject of them, and
other-ascribable on the basis of behaviour criteria. To
learn their use is to learn both aspects of their use. In
order to have this type of concept, one must be both a self-
ascriber and an other-ascriber of such predicates, and must
see every other as a self-ascriber. In order to understand
this type of concept, one must acknowledge that there is a
kind of predicate which is unambiguously and adequately as-
cribable both on the basis of observation of the subject of
the predicate and not on this basis, i.e. independently of
observation of the subject: the second case is the case where
the ascriber is also the subject. If there were no concepts
answering to the characterization I have just given, we should
indeed have no philosophical problem of the soul; but equally
we should not have our concept of a person. (Pp. 107-8)
The denial that all P-predicates are ascribable on the same basis
Is one ttfhich I have been insisting on (likely with less coolness,
clarity, and directedness). Strawson has said that there are not
two processes by means of which we learn to apply P-predicates,
one process for learning to apply P-predicates to others on the
basis of behavior and another process of acquiring the technique
of exhibiting a new form of behavior, viz. first person P-utter-
ances. I have tried to show in Section D of Chapter 2 what the
process of learning to apply P-predicates to others and to oneself
is, namely, the process of learning language.
What is given ttfhich makes possible the process of learning
P-predicates? Strawson only mentions, at one place, what seems
to me to ground our being able to see others as persons like one¬
self and to understand them.
What I am suggesting is that it is easier to understand how
we can see each other, and ourselves, as persons, if we think
first of the fact that we act, and act on each other, and act
in accordance with a common human nature. (P. 112)
The fact that we have a common nature seems to me of great impor¬
tance. As I have said in Chapter 2, the mother caring for her child
does not wonder whether the child's cry means that the child feels
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pain, or whether shivering means the child is cold. What she knows
about the child does not depend on her learning in this instance
what crying means; she knows what crying means in any child. All
infants share certain common traits which give us a base for un¬
derstanding and a base to go on from. It is also because of un¬
learned class characteristics that individuals can begin to learn
what they must, if they are to become full-fledged persons. One
such class characteristic which is needed to become a person is
the instinct to imitate. By means of imitating a person, an in¬
fant learns words, predicates, which have both first- and third-
person ascriptive uses. What is being denied is that there is one
way of learning the word as applied to others and another way of
learning the word as applied to oneself. The method of learning
words is likely complex but the same method is used whether the
predicate is to be ascribed to oneself or others. The sameness
of the method of learning xtfords serves as the means of connecting
the different methods of ascribing P-predicates to oneself and to
others.
Noxv I should like to say something about why in practice
solipsism is no problem, and here I leave the discussion of
Individuals.
I learn words in a social setting, from family, friends,
teachers, l^riters, etc. The learned words constitute part of my
ovm content, and largely determine how my experience is to be got¬
ten, viewed, stored, recalled. These words are gotten from other
persons, directly or indirectly (e.g., from books people have
written). If I were to deny that the words came from other persons.
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I would have to deny the 'personishness' of what they gave me,
and therewith my own personness. So I cannot doubt the person-
ness of others any more than I can doubt my own. I became a
person only in relation to other persons.
The knoxvledge that other persons are persons like me has a
logical and temporal priority to the possibility of my entertain¬
ing solipsism. My certainty of my likeness to other persons was
secure before I could pose the question: are they persons like
me? The identifying with them (perhaps at the very beginning
only with their like physical forms) in order to imitate them was
not learned. The likeness of me to them was further assured by
their making me like them with their words and ways of behaving.
I do not ever have to construct an argument by means of which I am
only then persuaded that there are persons besides myself like
myself.
The question - a very general one - how is it possible that
we can know that others are persons like oneself? is answered by
saying that it was not possible to doubt that there are persons
like me until I had been made a person by them. To doubt that
there are other persons besides oneself, one has to have language.
By the time that one has language the conviction that one is a
person among persons has been built into his very being. So
solipsism is impossible. Persons are persons because they use
language as I was taught to use language and behave as I was taught
to behave.
The belief in my being among persons like me is the most
general belief. From it we may move to the quextion of a parti¬
cular individual's being a (normal) person or not. This question
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can be and is decided on the basis of his language use and beha¬
vior, but language use referring almost certainly to public ob¬
jects in one way or another. A stranger (of the species Homo
sapiens) is prima facie viewed as a person, and it is interesting
to observe how doubts a-ise. The doubt as to a stranger's being
one of us (normal people) is not usual but unusual and is brought
about by some irregularity. The doubt will come from irregular
behavior and/or language about public objects and events, not
likely from reports of his private experiences. It could hardly
happen that everything about an individual could strike us as
entirely normal except his use of dream, reminiscence, emotion,
sensation words. The decision as to a man's normality does not
depend solely on whether we can know that he uses words for pri¬
vate experiences in the way we do. He speaks, makes sense,
strikes us as a normal user of the language. We grant that a
person kno*?s how to use a sentence because he knows the language.
We do not normally verify that he knows how to use a sentence be¬
fore we allot-? that he does.
The question of whether we can understand a man's use of
words referring to private experiences is settled indirectly, by
settling whether he is a normal person like oneself. This ques¬
tion is settled largely by relying on what is public. When he is
labeled 'normal person', he gets virtually a blank check; he may
fill in as he likes. We are willing to give credence to what he
claims (limited by our a priori knowledge of what we take to be
possible) unless we are given some reason not to. So we do not
move from doubt through reports of private experience to belief
in his personness but rather (if doubt arises) from doubt through
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behavior and language use referring to what is public to belief in
his personness to belief in his meaning by words referring to pri¬
vate experiences what we mean by words referring to private ex¬
periences. We may say quite baldly that our understanding of his
itfords referring to what is private follows from our belief that he
is a person like us. It is patently true that we do not go to a
stranger with doubt in his personness which he must overcome but
rather belief in his personness which he through what he does
shakes. Belief not doubt is the normal state.
It is the case though that we can doubt his words. But what
do we doubt? Not that he does not mean by his words what we mean
by our words so that total doubt and solipsism might overwhelm us.
What we doubt is that he means what he says, i.e., that he is tell¬
ing the truth. Our belief is that the meanings of the words are
correctly understood by him and us, and that he is trading on this
common understanding itself to deceive us. No common understanding;
no lies.
Or another case. A person with tJhom we have been communica¬
ting reveals that he is color-blind. Having normal color vision
we are certain that color words do not have the same private,
experiential meanings for him that they have for us. There is no
way of knowing from his behavior or reports exactly what his ex¬
perience is. Our ignorance and non-comprehension are almost com¬
plete on this point.
The consideration of different ways of seeing colors Is pos¬
sible in a way that considering the possibility of a person's not
feeling pain when his body is hurt before us is not. When a per¬
son is hurt, there is then no real possibility of reflecting on
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whether he is feeling pain as we feel pain. We must help.
It is quite different to contemplate what color-blind people
experience. They are not asking us to do something. We think,
calmly, that their experience must be different from the experience
of people with color vision. But we cannot say exactly what the
difference is.
But we do not move from this belief in a localized incommuni-
cability to the belief that we cannot understand any of a color¬
blind person's reports. Much less do we move to the even more
general belief that we cannot understand any person's reports of
any of his private experiences.
The faint-hearted will say: "Let's ignore (or even deny) the
private experience and just pay attention to whether he stops at
red lights and behaves as we do." This is a simple-minded, prac¬
tical solution. (I am not saying that we should pay no attention
to practical considerations.) Paying attention to the private
experience of someone else which we cannot share does not mosfe the
traffic down the road to its destination but it does make us aware
of xvhat it is to be a person, of what our concept of 'person' in¬
cludes, a not-useless and rewarding outcome, I should have thought.
The question of 1) how we can know that what a person means
(to himself) by his report is the same as what it means to us in
particular cases is a different question from 2) how we can know
that what a person means by his report is the same as what it means
to us ever.
The first question can arise only because we have a setting of
understanding in which particular cases of misunderstanding and
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lying can occur. Doubt arises because of something peculiar.
The methods of answering the questions are different. We
have to rely upon our accumulated knowledge of the world and of
the individual to answer the first question. We will be only as
good at spotting misunderstanding and lies as we are acute, per¬
ceptive, experienced. The question must be ansxiered in each par¬
ticular case.
Not so with the second question. The question cannot arise
from circumstances or as a result of x*hat happens. It arises
academically. It is settled generally, if at all, not only one
case at a time.
In ordinary practice we are neither solipsists, sceptics,
dualists, nor metaphysical behavioristsj we are epistemological
behaviorists regarding private experience as necessary, important,
and valuable. Some details of the ordinary view could be given
briefly as: 1) each person knows that there are other persons who
have private experiences (a denial of metaphysical behaviorism),
2) each person is directly acquainted with his ovm experiences
only, 3) the content of experience can be expressed truly or
falsely in word and deed, 4) in general persons understand these
expressions, 5) in particular cases virtual ignorance may exist,
6) all predicates are assigned to others on the basis of the ob¬
servation of behavior (only believers in telepathy and Extra-
Sensory Perception will disagree), and 7) some predicates, e.g.,
character, competence, role, and status predicates, are assigned
to oneself as xrell as others on the basis of behavioral criteria.
The overwhelming preponderance of understanding allows pockets
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of deception, misunderstanding, and mystery, which the ordinary
person faces with equanimity. Such enclaves can occur only be¬
cause persons have so much communal understanding. If all were
mystery (misunderstanding, deception), we would never be forced
by (understood) words to wonder (protest, suspect). The gaps
serve to give piquancy and a greater awareness of everyone's es¬
sential separateness which meets with and mixes with the other so
gratifyingly. Solipsism and total scepticism are out of the
question.
Summary
1. Metaphysical behaviorism is the position denying the existence
of private experiences and asserting that persons are constituted
entirely of actual behavior plus dispositions to behave in certain
ways.
2. Epistemological behaviorism is the position that private expe¬
riences occur and that all x*e can know of other persons comes from
reports and observation of behavior.
3. The importance of private experiences cannot be denied. A
private realm is needed for self-discipline and self-imposed
sanctions, both needed for responsibility as we know it. If a
behavioristic account denies the importance of private experience,
such an account must consequently oe judged inadequate.
Malcolm
-"-H Dreaming Malcolm argues that there are two ways of coming
to know that a person had a dream: a report in the case of another
person; an inference from an impression which turns out to be mis-
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taken in one's own case. I agree that we come to know what other
people dreamed from their reports. But in our own case it may be
either an inference or an impression of having dreamt, without
knowing what one dreamt. That there are two methods of coming to
get knowledge of what persons dreamed is the important concession
needed for the view of persons which I have been advocating.
Ryle
5. Ryle allows that there are private mental goings-on and lies.
6. His arguments intended to show that knowledge of ourselves is
not attained by consciousness or introspection seem to be incon¬
clusive*
7. Ryle, to avoid privileged access, substitutes retrospection for
introspection. But on his own admission a)what is retrospected is
always myself doing so and so, b) I do not catch - in the same
sense - another person doing something, and c) the items that are
retrospected can be private. Nothing more than these three is
needed for privileged access.
8. Ryle's means of allowing for lying is to call it a "higher order
action'. This will do only if a private aspect of mind may enter¬
tain one intention while another intention is expressed to and
accepted by the deceived person(s). Metaphysical behaviorism is
not adequate to account for lying.
Strawson
9. Strawson asserts that it is a necesxary condition of one's as¬
cribing states of consciousness to oneself that one should also be
prepared to ascribe them univocally to other persons.
10. In order to identify subjects of experience, these subjects
must have bodies.
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11. The concept 'person' is logically prior to 'body' or 'con¬
sciousness '.
12. P-predicates imply consciousness but are ascribable only to
persons. Strawson offers no discussion of animal consciousness.
13. P-predicates are ascribed to others on the basis of observa¬
tion of their behavior, and oneself not on this basis.
Summary of concluding remarks
14. The knowledge that other persons are persons like oneself has
a logical and temporal priority to the possibility of asking whe¬
ther other persons are like oneself.
15. Doubts regarding the normality of some individual arise
through some irregularity of behavior or language about public
objects and events.
16. Ordinary persons are neither solipsists, sceptics, dualists,
nor metaphysical behaviorists but rather epistemological behavior-
ists, regarding private experience as necessary, important and
valuable.
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